Arakhin 6b — Talmud de Babylone

▶ 📖 Mishna The Gemara asks: Is that so? But Rabbi Yannai, who was a charity collector, borrowed money belonging to charity and repa…

The Gemara asks: Is that so? But Rabbi Yannai, who was a charity collector, borrowed money belonging to charity and repaid. The Gemara answers: The case of Rabbi Yannai is different; it is beneficial to the poor that he be allowed to borrow and repay, as the longer he leaves the charity fund empty, the more he impels people to give charity, and he thereby brings more money to the poor. The Sages taught a baraita that deals with a similar matter: In the case of a Jew who donated a candelabrum or a lamp to the synagogue, it is prohibited to change it and use it for another purpose. Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba thought to say that there is no difference whether he wishes to change for a voluntary matter or for a matter involving a mitzva, as in both cases it is prohibited. Rav Ami said to Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba: This is what Rabbi Yoḥanan says: When the Sages taught the baraita, they taught only that it is prohibited when he changes it for a voluntary matter, but it is permitted to change it for a matter involving a mitzva. This halakha is derived from the fact that Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: With regard to a gentile who donated a candelabrum or a lamp to the synagogue, if it is before its owner’s name has been forgotten, i.e., people still remember that he donated the item, it is prohibited to change it and use it for another purpose. Once its owner’s name has been forgotten, it is permitted to change it. The Gemara clarifies: With regard to what purpose is it stated that one may not change it before the owner’s name was forgotten? If we say that it is prohibited to change it for a voluntary matter, why does the baraita specifically mention a gentile? It is prohibited to change it in this manner even if it was donated by a Jew. Rather, the baraita must be dealing with a change for a matter involving a mitzva, and therefore it is prohibited only if the donor is a gentile and his name has not yet been forgotten. And the reason for this halakha is that it is specifically a gentile who would protest and scream: Where is the candelabrum that I donated? But in the case of a Jew, who would not protest and scream if they used his donation for a different mitzva, one may well change it. The Gemara relates that Sha’azrak, an Arab [tayya’a] merchant, donated a candelabrum to Rav Yehuda’s synagogue. Raḥava changed its purpose before Sha’azrak’s name was forgotten as the donor, and Rava became angry at Raḥava for not waiting. Some say the opposite: Rava changed its purpose, and Raḥava became angry at Rava. And some say that the attendants of Pumbedita, the charity collectors, changed its purpose, and Raḥava became angry at them, and Rabba became angry at them as well. The Gemara explains: The one who changed its purpose holds that it was permitted to change it, as it was not common for Sha’azrak to be in the city and it was unlikely that he would protest the change. And the one who became angry holds that even so, they should not have changed it, as sometimes he happens to come there. One who is moribund and one who is taken to be executed after being sentenced by the court is neither the object of a vow nor valuated. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Akavya says: He is not the object of a vow, because he has no market value; but he is valuated, due to the fact that one’s value is fixed by the Torah based on age and sex. Rabbi Yosei says: One with that status vows to donate the assessment of another person to the Temple treasury, and takes vows of valuation, and consecrates his property; and if he damages the property of others, he is liable to pay compensation.

▶ 💬 Guemara The Gemara asks: Granted, it makes sense that one who is moribund is not the object of a vow, as he has no monetary valu…

The Gemara asks: Granted, it makes sense that one who is moribund is not the object of a vow, as he has no monetary value. And it also stands to reason that he is not valuated, as he is not subject to setting, i.e., standing, and therefore is not subject to valuation. The verse states: “Then he shall be set before the priest, and the priest shall value him” (Leviticus 27:8). This teaches that anyone who cannot stand, such as one who is dying, is not included in the halakha of valuation. But with regard to one who is taken to be executed, granted, he is not the object of a vow, as he has no monetary value, since no one would purchase him. But with regard to the mishna’s statement that he is not valuated, why not? The Gemara answers that the reason is as it is taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that in the case of one who is being taken to be executed and who said: My valuation is upon me to donate to the Temple, that he did not say anything, and the valuation is not collected from his estate? The verse states: “Anything dedicated [ḥerem], that may be dedicated of men, shall not be redeemed” (Leviticus 27:29). This teaches that with regard to one who is worthy of excommunication [ḥerem], i.e., condemned to death, one cannot redeem him, i.e., pay his valuation. One might have thought that this applies even before his verdict is issued, i.e., that this halakha applies even if one issued this statement before being sentenced to death. Therefore, the verse states: “Of men,” and not all men, i.e., only some men destined to be executed have no valuation, and not all of them. The Gemara asks: And with regard to Rabbi Ḥanina ben Akavya, who says in the mishna that even a person taken to be executed is valuated, due to the fact that one’s value is fixed, what does he do with the phrase “anything dedicated”? The Gemara answers that he requires it for that which is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, says: Since we found with regard to those executed at the hand of Heaven that they give money and their sins are atoned, as it is stated in the case of the owner of a forewarned ox that killed a person: “The ox shall be stoned, and its owner shall also be put to death. If there be laid upon him a ransom, then he shall give for the redemption of his life whatsoever is laid upon him” (Exodus 21:29–30), one might have thought that even with regard to those liable to receive the death penalty at the hands of man it is so, that one can pay in lieu of execution. Therefore, the verse states: “Anything dedicated that may be dedicated of men, shall not be redeemed” (Leviticus 27:29). I have derived only that one cannot give payment in lieu of execution with regard to severe prohibitions punishable by the death penalty, e.g., blasphemy or cursing one’s father, for which no atonement is designated in the Torah for their unwitting violation. From where is it derived that the same applies to less severe prohibitions punishable by the death penalty, e.g., violating Shabbat or killing, for which atonement of an offering or exile is designated in the Torah for their unwitting violation? The verse states: “Anything dedicated,” to include all prohibitions punishable by court-administered execution. § The mishna teaches, with regard to one who is taken to be executed, that Rabbi Yosei says: Such a person vows to donate the assessment of another person to the Temple treasury, and takes vows of valuation, and consecrates his property; and if he damages the property of others, he is liable to pay compensation. The Gemara asks: And does the first tanna say that such a person does not vow to donate the assessment of another person to the Temple treasury and take vows of valuation, such that Rabbi Yosei could be understood as disputing his opinion? The first tanna merely said that such an individual is not subject to vows and valuations. What is the difference between their opinions? Rather, with regard to whether or not one who is taken to be executed can vow to donate the assessment of another person to the Temple treasury, and take vows of valuation, and consecrate his property, everyone, including the first tanna, agrees that he can. When they disagree, it is in a case where he causes damage. The first tanna holds that if he causes damage he is not liable for payment, and Rabbi Yosei holds that if he causes damage he is liable to pay compensation. The Gemara asks: With regard to what principle do these tanna’im disagree, as it is an accepted principle that one who causes damage must pay? Rav Yosef said: They disagree as to whether the payment can be collected from his estate. This depends on the question of whether or not one who is owed money from a loan by oral agreement, i.e., a loan given without a document that places a lien on the land, can collect from the heirs. The first tanna holds that one who is owed money from a loan by oral agreement cannot collect from the heirs, and Rabbi Yosei holds that one who is owed money from a loan by oral agreement can collect from the heirs. Rava says: In fact, everyone agrees that one who is owed money from a loan by oral agreement cannot collect from the heirs; and here the tanna’im disagree with regard to the status of a loan that is written in the Torah, i.e., a financial obligation decreed by Torah law, such as paying damages. The first tanna holds that a loan that is written in the Torah is not considered as though it is written in a document, and may not be collected from the heirs. Rabbi Yosei holds that such a loan is considered as though it is written in a document, and therefore it may be collected from the heirs. And there are those who teach the dispute between Rava and Rav Yosef with regard to this baraita: In the case of one who is taken to be executed after being sentenced by the court, if he injured another he is liable for payment. But if others injured him they are exempt, as they would be if they injured a dead person. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Even if it was he who injured others, he is exempt, as he cannot be brought back to stand before the court for judgment, since he must be executed without delay.

▶ 🇫🇷 Résumé en français La Guemara demande : Accordé, il est logique que celui qui est moribond ne soit pas l’objet d’un vœu, car il n’a aucune …

La Guemara demande : Accordé, il est logique que celui qui est moribond ne soit pas l’objet d’un vœu, car il n’a aucune valeur monétaire. Et il est également raisonnable qu’il ne soit pas soumis à l’évaluation, car il n’est pas sujet à la mise en place, c’est-à-dire à se tenir debout, et par conséquent il n’est pas soumis à l’évaluation. Le verset dit : « Alors il sera placé devant le prêtre, et le prêtre l’évaluera » (Lévitique 27:8). Cela enseigne que quiconque ne peut se tenir debout, comme celui qui est mourant, n’est pas inclus dans la halakha de l’évaluation. Mais en ce qui concerne celui qui est emmené pour être exécuté, accordé, il n’est pas l’objet d’un vœu, car il n’a aucune valeur monétaire, puisque personne ne l’achèterait. Mais en ce qui concerne la déclaration de la mishna selon laquelle il n’est pas évalué, pourquoi pas ? La Guemara répond que la raison est comme il est enseigné dans une baraita : D’où dérive-t-on que dans le cas de celui qui est emmené pour être exécuté et qui a dit : Mon évaluation est sur moi pour la donner au Temple, qu’il n’a rien dit, et que l’évaluation n’est pas perçue sur sa succession ? Le verset dit : « Tout interdit [ḥerem], qui sera interdit parmi les hommes, ne sera point racheté » (Lévitique 27:29). Cela enseigne qu’en ce qui concerne celui qui est digne d’excommunication [ḥerem], c’est-à-dire condamné à mort, on ne peut pas le racheter, c’est-à-dire payer son évaluation. On aurait pu penser que cela s’applique même avant que son verdict ne soit rendu, c’est-à-dire que cette halakha s’applique même si l’on a émis cette déclaration avant d’être condamné à mort. Par conséquent, le verset dit : « Parmi les hommes », et non pas tous les hommes, c’est-à-dire que seuls certains hommes destinés à être exécutés n’ont pas d’évaluation, et non pas tous. La Guemara demande : Et en ce qui concerne Rabbi Ḥanina ben Akavya, qui dit dans la mishna que même une personne emmenée pour être exécutée est évaluée, en raison du fait que la valeur d’une personne est fixe, que fait-il de l’expression « tout interdit » ? La Guemara répond qu’il l’exige pour ce qui est enseigné dans une baraita : Rabbi Yishmael, fils de Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, dit : Puisque nous avons trouvé en ce qui concerne ceux qui sont exécutés par la main du Ciel qu’ils donnent de l’argent et que leurs péchés sont expiés, comme il est dit dans le cas du propriétaire d’un bœuf averti qui a tué une personne : « Le bœuf sera lapidé, et son propriétaire sera aussi mis à mort. Si une rançon lui est imposée, alors il donnera pour la rédemption de sa vie tout ce qui lui est imposé » (Exode 21:29-30), on aurait pu penser que même en ce qui concerne ceux qui sont passibles de la peine de mort par la main des hommes il en est ainsi, que l’on peut payer en lieu et place de l’exécution. Par conséquent, le verset dit : « Tout interdit qui sera interdit parmi les hommes, ne sera point racheté » (Lévitique 27:29). Je n’ai dérivé que l’impossibilité de donner un paiement en lieu et place de l’exécution en ce qui concerne les interdictions graves punissables de la mort, par exemple le blasphème ou la malédiction de son père, pour lesquelles aucune expiation n’est désignée dans la Torah pour leur violation involontaire. D’où dérive-t-on que la même chose s’applique aux interdictions moins graves punissables de la mort, par exemple la violation du Chabbat ou le meurtre, pour lesquelles une expiation d’une offrande ou d’un exil est désignée dans la Torah pour leur violation involontaire ? Le verset dit : « Tout interdit », pour inclure toutes les interdictions punissables par l’exécution ordonnée par le tribunal. § La mishna enseigne, en ce qui concerne celui qui est emmené pour être exécuté, que Rabbi Yosei dit : Une telle personne fait des vœux pour donner l’évaluation d’une autre personne au trésor du Temple, et prend des vœux d’évaluation, et consacre ses biens ; et s’il endommage les biens d’autrui, il est tenu de payer une compensation. La Guemara demande : Et le premier tanna dit-il qu’une telle personne ne fait pas de vœux pour donner l’évaluation d’une autre personne au trésor du Temple et ne prend pas de vœux d’évaluation, de sorte que Rabbi Yosei puisse être compris comme contestant son opinion ? Le premier tanna a simplement dit qu’un tel individu n’est pas sujet aux vœux et aux évaluations. Quelle est la différence entre leurs opinions ? Plutôt, en ce qui concerne la question de savoir si celui qui est emmené pour être exécuté peut faire des vœux pour donner l’évaluation d’une autre personne au trésor du Temple, et prendre des vœux d’évaluation, et consacrer ses biens, tout le monde, y compris le premier tanna, est d’accord qu’il le peut. Lorsqu’ils sont en désaccord, c’est dans un cas où il cause un dommage. Le premier tanna tient que s’il cause un dommage il n’est pas tenu de payer, et Rabbi Yosei tient que s’il cause un dommage il est tenu de payer une compensation. La Guemara demande : En ce qui concerne quel principe ces tanna’im sont-ils en désaccord, car c’est un principe accepté que celui qui cause un dommage doit payer ? Rav Yosef a dit : Ils sont en désaccord sur la question de savoir si le paiement peut être perçu sur sa succession. Cela dépend de la question de savoir si celui à qui l’on doit de l’argent d’un prêt par accord oral, c’est-à-dire un prêt accordé sans document qui impose un privilège sur les terres, peut percevoir des héritiers. Le premier tanna tient que celui à qui l’on doit de l’argent d’un prêt par accord oral ne peut pas percevoir des héritiers, et Rabbi Yosei tient que celui à qui l’on doit de l’argent d’un prêt par accord oral peut percevoir des héritiers. Rava dit : En fait, tout le monde est d’accord que celui à qui l’on doit de l’argent d’un prêt par accord oral ne peut pas percevoir des héritiers ; et ici les tanna’im sont en désaccord en ce qui concerne le statut d’un prêt [...]

📜 Arakhin — 6b

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