Beitzah 10a — Talmud de Babylone

▶ 📖 Mishna However, where there is no embedded shovel, even Beit Shammai did not permit it. Alternatively, it is possible that Beit…

However, where there is no embedded shovel, even Beit Shammai did not permit it. Alternatively, it is possible that Beit Hillel say their opinion only here, since a dove is muktze, which is prohibited by rabbinic law, and therefore when he stands and says: I will take this and that, it is enough. However there, where the prohibition applies by Torah law, they did not say so. Rather, if there is a difficulty involving a contradiction, this is the difficulty, from a different mishna (11a): Beit Shammai say: One may not take a large pestle from a mortar, which is normally used for crushing wheat in the preparation of porridge, for any other purpose on a Festival, e.g., to cut meat on it; and Beit Hillel permit it. Apparently, with regard to rejoicing on the Festival, the opinion of Beit Shammai is stringent, and that of Beit Hillel is lenient. And the Gemara raises a contradiction: With regard to one who slaughters an undomesticated animal or a fowl on a Festival, Beit Shammai say: He may dig earth with a shovel and cover the blood, and Beit Hillel say: He may not slaughter an undomesticated animal or a fowl, unless he had earth prepared for that purpose while it was still day. It was in this regard that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The attribution of the opinions is reversed. The Gemara rejects this: From where do you know this? Perhaps it is not so. Rather, Beit Shammai say their opinion only there, where there is a shovel embedded and prepared the day before, but where there is no embedded shovel, they did not rule leniently. Alternatively, one can say that Beit Hillel say their opinion only here, with regard to a pestle, which at least has the status of a vessel, and therefore it is not completely muktze. However, there, in the case of slaughtering, Beit Hillel did not issue a lenient ruling. Rather, if there is a difficulty, this is the difficulty: It is taught in a mishna (11a): Beit Shammai say: One may not place an unprocessed hide before those who will tread on it, as this is an instance of the prohibited labor of tanning on a Festival. And one may not lift the hide from its spot, as it is considered muktze, unless there is an olive-bulk of meat on it, in which case it may be carried on account of its meat. And Beit Hillel permit one to place a hide before those who will tread upon it. Once again the Gemara states: Apparently, with regard to rejoicing on the Festival, the opinion of Beit Shammai is stringent, and that of Beit Hillel is lenient. And the Gemara raises a contradiction: With regard to one who slaughters an undomesticated animal or a fowl on a Festival, Beit Shammai say, etc. Concerning this case, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The attribution of the opinions is reversed. Here too, the Gemara rejects this: From where do you know this? Perhaps that is not so. Rather, Beit Shammai say their opinion only there, where there is a shovel embedded and prepared the day before, but where there is no embedded shovel, they did not rule leniently. Alternatively, Beit Hillel say their opinion only here, with regard to a hide, which is suitable for people to recline upon, and therefore it is not completely muktze. However, there, in the case of slaughtering, they were not lenient. Rather, if there is a difficulty, this is the difficulty, as it is taught (11a): Beit Shammai say: One may not remove the shutters of a store on a Festival, to open the store by raising them, due to the prohibition against building and demolishing on a Festival; and Beit Hillel permit not only to open the shutters, but even to replace them. Apparently, with regard to rejoicing on the Festival, the opinion of Beit Shammai is stringent, and that of Beit Hillel is lenient. And the Gemara raises a contradiction: With regard to one who slaughters an undomesticated animal or a fowl on a Festival, Beit Shammai say, etc. Granted, the contradiction between one statement of Beit Shammai and the other statement of Beit Shammai is not difficult, as it can be explained as follows: There, in the slaughtering case, it is referring to a situation where there is a shovel embedded and prepared the day before; here, there is no embedded shovel, and therefore Beit Shammai are stringent. However, the contradiction between one statement of Beit Hillel and the other statement of Beit Hillel is difficult. It is with regard to this contradiction that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The attribution of the opinions is reversed. The Gemara comments: Alternatively, one can suggest a different answer without reversing the opinions: Beit Hillel say their lenient opinion only here, in the case of the shutters, because they maintain that there is no prohibition against building with regard to vessels and there is no prohibition against dismantling with regard to vessels, which means that no Torah prohibition is violated in removing the shutters. However, there, in the case of slaughtering, where there are no extenuating circumstances, Beit Hillel did not permit it. Consequently, there is no contradiction that necessitates a reversal of the opinions. Beit Shammai say: One may not take fledgling doves from a dovecote on a Festival, unless he shook the ones he wished to take while it was still day, thereby preparing them. And Beit Hillel say: It is not necessary to shake; rather, it is sufficient if one stands the day before and says: I will take this fledgling and that one.

▶ 💬 Guemara Rav Ḥanan bar Ami said: The dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel applies to the first brood, the first pair of f…

Rav Ḥanan bar Ami said: The dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel applies to the first brood, the first pair of fledglings hatched in the first month of the year from a pair of doves. Those fledglings are usually left in the nest and are not used for food. As Beit Shammai hold: We issue a decree prohibiting taking them, as perhaps on the Festival he will come to reconsider after handling them and decide to leave them in their place, in which case he has moved them unnecessarily. However, once he has already shaken them, there is no further concern that he might change his mind on the Festival itself. And Beit Hillel hold: We do not issue a decree, as there is no concern that one might change his mind, and therefore a verbal commitment is sufficient. However, with regard to the second brood, the fledglings born on the second cycle in the following month, everyone agrees that it is enough for one to stand and say: I will take this one and that one. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Beit Hillel, why does one need to say: I will take this one and that one? Let him say: From here, this dovecote, I will take tomorrow. Why does one have to specify exactly which fledglings he plans to remove from the dovecote? And if you say that Beit Hillel do not accept the principle of retroactive designation, i.e., they reject the idea that a person’s original intention can be clarified retroactively, and therefore it cannot be said that the fledglings one takes on the Festival were the ones he had in mind beforehand, but didn’t we learn in a mishna (Ohalot 7:3): If a corpse is located in a house, and the house has many entrances, whether they are open or closed, not only is the inside of the house ritually impure as a tent of the dead, but all the entrances are likewise ritually impure and impart impurity to the vessels they contain? The reason is that the corpse might be removed via any of the entrances, and therefore they all contract impurity. If only one of the entrances was open after the person died, that entrance alone is ritually impure, as the corpse will certainly be removed through it, and all the other entrances remain ritually pure. The same applies if one decided from the outset to remove the corpse through one of the entrances, or to carry it out through a window that is four by four handbreadths in size, which is large enough for a corpse. This intention spares all the other entrances from ritual impurity, as it is clear that the corpse will not be removed through them. With regard to this case, Beit Shammai say: This halakha applies only if one had decided to remove the corpse by a particular entrance before the person died, so that the entrance through which the body would be removed was already determined at the time of death. And Beit Hillel say: This halakha applies even after the person died, as the principle of retroactive designation is invoked, which means that the entrance through which the deceased will be removed is retroactively designated. This indicates that Beit Hillel do accept the principle of retroactive designation. The Gemara refutes this proof: Wasn’t it stated by amora’im with regard to this mishna that Rabba said: In this case, Beit Hillel referred only to purifying the entrances from that point forward. In other words, after one has decided on an entrance that he will use to remove the dead, any vessels in the space of the other entrances do not become ritually impure. However, vessels that were located inside the space of the other entrances before the decision was made remain impure. According to these amora’im, Beit Hillel do not accept the principle of retroactive designation. And, so too, Rav Oshaya said: This halakha is referring to purifying the entrances from that point forward, which indicates: From here onward, yes, the entrances are ritually pure; retroactively, no, they are not considered pure. Rava said that there is a different way to resolve the conflicting rulings of Beit Hillel: Actually, in the case of ritual impurity, Beit Hillel maintain that all the entrances are ritually pure retroactively. And here, with regard to fledglings, this is the reason why Beit Hillel insist that one designate which particular fledglings one plans to take on the Festival: Perhaps one will move fledglings, and put them down, and again move them, and put them down until he finds the pair he wants, thereby moving an object that is not suitable for him, i.e., which is muktze. The Gemara raises an objection: But if this is indeed the concern, didn’t you say that it is enough if one stands and says: I will take this one and that one. In this case, too, he does not touch them. It is therefore possible that he may reconsider his choice of fledglings on the Festival after he handles them. The Gemara answers: This applies only when one made his choice on the eve of the Festival. Since he knows that he may not alter his decision on the Festival itself even if he does not like the ones he chose, he definitively decides to take those fledglings and will not handle others.

▶ 🇫🇷 Résumé en français Rav Ḥanan bar Ami a dit : La dispute entre Beit Shammai et Beit Hillel s’applique à la première couvée, la première pair…

Rav Ḥanan bar Ami a dit : La dispute entre Beit Shammai et Beit Hillel s’applique à la première couvée, la première paire d’oisillons éclos au premier mois de l’année d’une paire de colombes. Ces oisillons sont généralement laissés au nid et ne sont pas utilisés pour la nourriture. Car Beit Shammai tiennent : Nous émettons un décret interdisant de les prendre, car peut-être qu’au jour de Fête il viendra à reconsidérer après les avoir manipulés et décidera de les laisser à leur place, auquel cas il les aura déplacés inutilement. Cependant, une fois qu’il les a déjà secoués, il n’y a plus de crainte qu’il change d’avis le jour de Fête lui-même. Et Beit Hillel tiennent : Nous n’émettons pas de décret, car il n’y a pas de crainte qu’on change d’avis, et par conséquent un engagement verbal suffit. Cependant, en ce qui concerne la seconde couvée, les oisillons nés au second cycle le mois suivant, tout le monde est d’accord qu’il est suffisant pour qu’on se tienne et dise : Je prendrai celui-ci et celui-là. La Guemara demande : Et selon l’avis de Beit Hillel, pourquoi a-t-on besoin de dire : Je prendrai celui-ci et celui-là ? Qu’il dise : D’ici, ce colombier, je prendrai demain. Pourquoi faut-il spécifier exactement quels oisillons il prévoit de retirer du colombier ? Et si tu dis que Beit Hillel n’acceptent pas le principe de désignation rétroactive, c’est-à-dire qu’ils rejettent l’idée que l’intention originelle d’une personne puisse être clarifiée rétroactivement, et par conséquent on ne peut pas dire que les oisillons qu’on prend au jour de Fête étaient ceux qu’il avait en tête auparavant, mais n’avons-nous pas appris dans une mishna (Ohalot 7:3) : Si un cadavre se trouve dans une maison, et que la maison a de nombreuses entrées, qu’elles soient ouvertes ou fermées, non seulement l’intérieur de la maison est rituellement impur comme tente du mort, mais toutes les entrées sont également rituelles impures et communiquent l’impureté aux récipients qu’elles contiennent ? La raison est que le cadavre pourrait être retiré par l’une quelconque des entrées, et par conséquent elles contractent toutes l’impureté. Si seulement une des entrées était ouverte après la mort de la personne, cette entrée seule est rituellement impure, car le cadavre sera certainement retiré par elle, et toutes les autres entrées restent rituelles pures. Il en va de même si on a décidé dès le départ de retirer le cadavre par l’une des entrées, ou de le porter par une fenêtre de quatre sur quatre palmes de taille, ce qui est assez grand pour un cadavre. Cette intention épargne toutes les autres entrées de l’impureté rituelle, car il est clair que le cadavre ne sera pas retiré par elles. À ce sujet, Beit Shammai disent : Cette halakha ne s’applique que si l’on avait décidé de retirer le cadavre par une entrée particulière avant la mort de la personne, de sorte que l’entrée par laquelle le corps serait retiré était déjà déterminée au moment de la mort. Et Beit Hillel disent : Cette halakha s’applique même après la mort de la personne, car le principe de désignation rétroactive est invoqué, ce qui signifie que l’entrée par laquelle le défunt sera retiré est désignée rétroactivement. Cela indique que Beit Hillel acceptent le principe de désignation rétroactive. La Guemara réfute cette preuve : N’a-t-il pas été dit par les amora’im à propos de cette mishna que Rabba a dit : En ce cas, Beit Hillel n’ont fait référence qu’à purifier les entrées à partir de ce moment-là. En d’autres termes, après qu’on a décidé d’une entrée qu’on utilisera pour retirer le mort, tout récipient se trouvant dans l’espace des autres entrées ne devient pas rituellement impur. Cependant, les récipients qui se trouvaient dans l’espace des autres entrées avant la décision restent impurs. Selon ces amora’im, Beit Hillel n’acceptent pas le principe de désignation rétroactive. Et, de même, Rav Oshaya a dit : Cette halakha fait référence à purifier les entrées à partir de ce moment-là, ce qui indique : À partir d’ici, oui, les entrées sont rituellement pures ; rétroactivement, non, elles ne sont pas considérées comme pures. Rava a dit qu’il y a une autre façon de résoudre les décisions contradictoires de Beit Hillel : En réalité, dans le cas de l’impureté rituelle, Beit Hillel soutiennent que toutes les entrées sont rituellement pures rétroactivement. Et ici, en ce qui concerne les oisillons, c’est la raison pour laquelle Beit Hillel insistent pour qu’on désigne quels oisillons précis on prévoit de prendre au jour de Fête : Peut-être qu’on déplacera des oisillons, et les posera, et de nouveau déplacera et les posera jusqu’à ce qu’il trouve la paire qu’il veut, déplaçant ainsi un objet qui ne lui convient pas, c’est-à-dire qui est muktze. La Guemara soulève une objection : Mais si c’est bien là la préoccupation, n’as-tu pas dit qu’il suffit que l’on se tienne et dise : Je prendrai celui-ci et celui-là. Dans ce cas aussi, il ne les touche pas. Il est donc possible qu’il reconsidère son choix d’oisillons au jour de Fête après les avoir manipulés. La Guemara répond : Cela ne s’applique que lorsqu’on a fait son choix la veille de la Fête. Puisqu’il sait qu’il ne peut pas modifier sa décision le jour de Fête lui-même, même s’il n’aime pas ceux qu’il a choisis, il décide définitivement de prendre ces oisillons et ne manipulera pas les autres.

📜 Beitzah — 10a

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