Horayot 4b — Talmud de Babylone

▶ 📖 Mishna § Apropos the ruling of a court to nullify a mitzva, Rav Yosef raises a dilemma: If the court issued a ruling that there…

§ Apropos the ruling of a court to nullify a mitzva, Rav Yosef raises a dilemma: If the court issued a ruling that there is no prohibition against plowing on Shabbat, what is the halakha? The Gemara elaborates: Do we say that since the judges agree to the application of the entire matter of prohibitions on Shabbat and their ruling is exclusively with regard to plowing, its status is tantamount to nullification of a portion of the mitzva and fulfillment of a portion of the mitzva? Or perhaps, since the judges are abolishing the principal category of labor of plowing in its entirety, it is tantamount to abolishing the essence of the mitzva of Shabbat. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear resolution of the dilemma from the mishna, which gives as an example of a ruling for which the court is liable to bring an offering: There is a prohibition against engaging in intercourse with a menstruating woman written in the Torah, but one who engages in intercourse with a woman who observes a clean day for a day that she experiences a discharge is exempt. And why should they be liable in that case? Didn’t the judges abolish the halakha of a woman who observes a clean day for a day that she experiences a discharge, in its entirety? Apparently, nullification of one category of halakha in a mitzva is not tantamount to abolition of the essence of an entire mitzva. The Gemara rejects this: Rav Yosef could say to you: The ruling concerning a woman who observes a clean day for a day that she experiences a discharge is as we stated, as we explained earlier. The reference is not to abolition of the entire halakha of the woman who observes a day for a day, but rather to a case where the judges ruled that the initial stage of intercourse is permitted. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear resolution of the dilemma from the mishna, which gives as an example of a ruling for which the court is liable to bring an offering: There is a prohibition against performing prohibited labor on Shabbat written in the Torah, but one who carries out objects from the private domain to the public domain is exempt. And why should they be liable in that case? Didn’t the judges abolish the halakha of the principal category of labor of carrying out in its entirety? The Gemara rejects this: That too is as we explained earlier, that the court rules to nullify only a portion of the labor, e.g., throwing or passing an item from domain to domain. The Gemara suggests: Come and hear resolution of the dilemma from the mishna, which gives as an example of a ruling for which the court is liable to bring an offering: There is a prohibition against engaging in idol worship written in the Torah, but one who bows to the idol but did not sacrifice an offering is exempt. And why should the court be liable in that case? But didn’t the judges abolish the halakha of bowing in its entirety? The Sages say: Bowing, too, is as we explained earlier, that the court rules to nullify only an aspect of bowing, not to abolish the prohibition against bowing in its entirety. Apropos rulings to nullify a mitzva or part of a mitzva, Rabbi Zeira raises a dilemma: If a court issued a ruling that there is no prohibition against performing prohibited labor on Shabbat during the Sabbatical Year, what is the halakha? Before seeking to resolve that dilemma, the Gemara asks: With regard to what matter did they err that resulted in that ruling? They erred with regard to this verse written with regard to Shabbat: “In plowing and in harvest you shall rest” (Exodus 34:21), which the judges interpreted to mean: During a time when there is plowing, i.e., in all years of the Sabbatical cycle other than the Sabbatical Year, there is a prohibition against performing labor on Shabbat. But during a time when there is no plowing, i.e., during the Sabbatical Year, there is no prohibition against performing labor on Shabbat. The Gemara elaborates on Rabbi Zeira’s dilemma. Do we say: Since one fulfills the mitzva of Shabbat during the rest of the years of the Sabbatical cycle, nullifying Shabbat during the Sabbatical Year is tantamount to nullification of a portion of the mitzva and fulfillment of a portion of the mitzva? Or perhaps, since the court is abolishing Shabbat during the Sabbatical Year, it is tantamount to abolishing the entire essence of the mitzva? Ravina said: Come and hear resolution of the dilemma from a baraita: In the case of a prophet who prophesies to abolish a matter of the matters of the Torah, he is deemed a false prophet and is liable to be executed through strangulation. If he prophesies for the nullification of part and the fulfillment of part of a matter in the Torah, Rabbi Shimon says he is exempt from execution. And with regard to idol worship, even if he says: Worship it today and revoke its status tomorrow, everyone agrees that he is liable, as with regard to idol worship, even a ruling to nullify part of the mitzva involves a severe prohibition. Learn from it that in a case where a court issued a ruling that there is no prohibition against performing prohibited labor on Shabbat during the Sabbatical Year, it is tantamount to nullification of a portion of the mitzva and fulfillment of a portion of the mitzva. The Gemara affirms: Indeed, learn from it. If the court issued a ruling, and one of the judges knew that they erred and he said to them: You are mistaken; or if the most distinguished [mufla] member of the court was not there for that session of the Sanhedrin, or if one of the judges was disqualified from serving as a judge, e.g., because he was a convert, or a child born from an incestuous or adulterous relationship [mamzer], or a Gibeonite, or an old man no longer able to father children, this court is exempt, because they have not rendered a full-fledged ruling. This is derived by means of a verbal analogy, as “assembly” is stated here with regard to a court that issues an erroneous ruling: “And if the entire assembly of Israel shall act unwittingly” (Leviticus 4:13), and “assembly” is stated there with regard to the halakha of one who commits murder unwittingly: “And the assembly shall judge between the one who struck and the blood redeemer” (Numbers 35:24). Just as in the “assembly” stated there, with regard to the unwitting murderer, all the judges must be fit to issue rulings, so too, in the “assembly” stated here, with regard to the court that issued an erroneous ruling; the court will not be liable unless all the judges will be fit to issue rulings.

▶ 💬 Guemara The mishna teaches: Or if the most distinguished member of the court was not there, the court is exempt. From where do w…

The mishna teaches: Or if the most distinguished member of the court was not there, the court is exempt. From where do we derive this halakha? Rav Sheshet said, and likewise the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: For what reason did the Sages say: If the court issued a ruling with regard to a matter with which the Sadducees agree, the judges are exempt? It is due to the fact that it was incumbent upon them to learn that halakha that is written explicitly in the Torah, and they did not learn it. Similarly, in a case where the most distinguished member of the court was not there, the judges are also exempt, as it was incumbent upon them to learn and they did not learn. The mishna teaches: “Assembly” is stated there and “assembly” is stated here…the court will not be liable unless all the judges will be fit to issue rulings. The Gemara asks: And there, from where do we derive that all the judges must be fit to issue rulings? The Gemara answers that this is as Rav Ḥisda says that the verse states in connection with the transfer of the Divine Spirit from Moses to the Elders: “That they may stand there with you” (Numbers 11:16). The term “with you” is explained to mean: With similarity to you, in the sense that they must be fit to issue rulings. The Gemara challenges: And say that the term “with you,” means that they shall be like Moses in that they will all be fit for the Divine Presence to rest upon them. Rather, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says that it is derived as the verse states in the context of the advice that Yitro gave to Moses: “And they shall judge the people at all times…and ease your burden from upon you and bear it with you” (Exodus 18:22). “With you” is interpreted to mean: Similar to you. MISHNA: If the judges of the court issued an erroneous ruling unwittingly and the entire congregation performed a transgression unwittingly on the basis of their ruling, the court brings a bull, as it is stated in the Torah with regard to an unwitting communal sin-offering. If the court issued the erroneous ruling intentionally, as they knew that their ruling was incorrect, and the congregation performed a transgression unwittingly on the basis of the ruling of the court, each member of the congregation brings a female lamb or a female goat as an individual sin-offering. If the court issued the erroneous ruling unwittingly and the congregation performed a transgression intentionally, i.e., with the knowledge that the ruling of the court was erroneous, these people are exempt from bringing an offering. GEMARA: The mishna teaches: If the court issued the erroneous ruling unwittingly and the congregation performed a transgression intentionally, these people are exempt. The Gemara infers: But if the person performed a transgression unwittingly in a manner similar to that of an intentional transgression, the court is liable. And what are the circumstances of that performance? It is a case where the court issued a ruling that forbidden fat is permitted, and the forbidden fat became confused for a person with permitted fat and he ate the forbidden fat. The Gemara suggests: If so, let us say: Resolve from here that which Rami bar Ḥama raises as a dilemma (2a) with regard to this case, a dilemma that remained unresolved. The Gemara rejects this: Rami bar Ḥama could say to you that the dilemma cannot be resolved based on this inference, as due to the fact that the tanna taught the first clause of the mishna: If the court issued the erroneous ruling intentionally, and the congregation performed a transgression unwittingly, he taught the latter clause employing a similar style: If the court issued the erroneous ruling unwittingly and the congregation performed a transgression intentionally. MISHNA: If the judges of the court issued an erroneous ruling and the entire congregation or a majority thereof performed a transgression on the basis of their ruling, the judges bring a bull as an unwitting communal sin-offering. And if the erroneous ruling involved idol worship, the judges bring a bull and a goat, as it is written in the Torah (see Numbers 15:24); this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: It is not the court that brings the offering, it is the people. Twelve tribes, each of which performed a transgression, bring twelve bulls, i.e., each tribe brings one, and for idol worship they bring twelve bulls and twelve goats, as each tribe is a congregation.

▶ 🇫🇷 Résumé en français La mishna enseigne : Ou si le membre le plus éminent du tribunal n’était pas là, le tribunal est exempt. D’où tirons-nou…

La mishna enseigne : Ou si le membre le plus éminent du tribunal n’était pas là, le tribunal est exempt. D’où tirons-nous cette halakha ? Rav Sheshet dit, et de même l’école de Rabbi Yishmael enseigna : Pour quelle raison les Sages ont-ils dit : Si le tribunal a rendu une décision sur une question avec laquelle les Sadducéens sont d’accord, les juges sont exempts ? C’est parce qu’il leur incombait d’apprendre cette halakha qui est écrite explicitement dans la Torah, et ils ne l’ont pas apprise. De même, dans un cas où le membre le plus éminent du tribunal n’était pas là, les juges sont aussi exempts, car il leur incombait d’apprendre et ils n’ont pas appris. La mishna enseigne : « Assemblée » est dit là et « assemblée » est dit ici… le tribunal ne sera pas responsable à moins que tous les juges soient aptes à rendre des décisions. La Guemara demande : Et là, d’où tirons-nous que tous les juges doivent être aptes à rendre des décisions ? La Guemara répond que c’est comme Rav Ḥisda dit que le verset dit à propos du transfert de l’Esprit Divin de Moïse aux Anciens : « Qu’ils se tiennent là avec toi » (Nombres 11:16). Le terme « avec toi » est expliqué comme signifiant : Avec ressemblance à toi, en ce sens qu’ils doivent être aptes à rendre des décisions. La Guemara conteste : Et dis que le terme « avec toi » signifie qu’ils seront comme Moïse en ce qu’ils seront tous aptes pour la Présence Divine à reposer sur eux. Plutôt, Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak dit que cela est dérivé comme le verset dit dans le contexte du conseil que Yitro donna à Moïse : « Et ils jugeront le peuple en tout temps… et allégeront ton fardeau de dessus toi et le porteront avec toi » (Exode 18:22). « Avec toi » est interprété comme signifiant : Semblable à toi. MISHNA : Si les juges du tribunal ont rendu une décision erronée par inadvertance et que toute la congrégation a commis une transgression par inadvertance sur la base de leur décision, le tribunal apporte un taureau, comme il est dit dans la Torah à propos d’un sacrifice pour le péché communautaire commis par inadvertance. Si le tribunal a rendu la décision erronée intentionnellement, car ils savaient que leur décision était incorrecte, et que la congrégation a commis une transgression par inadvertance sur la base de la décision du tribunal, chaque membre de la congrégation apporte une brebis ou une chèvre comme sacrifice pour le péché individuel. Si le tribunal a rendu la décision erronée par inadvertance et que la congrégation a commis une transgression intentionnellement, c’est-à-dire en sachant que la décision du tribunal était erronée, ces personnes sont exemptes d’apporter une offrande. GEMARA : La mishna enseigne : Si le tribunal a rendu la décision erronée par inadvertance et que la congrégation a commis une transgression intentionnellement, ces personnes sont exemptes. La Guemara en déduit : Mais si la personne a commis une transgression par inadvertance d’une manière similaire à celle d’une transgression intentionnelle, le tribunal est responsable. Et quelles sont les circonstances de cette action ? C’est un cas où le tribunal a rendu une décision selon laquelle la graisse interdite est permise, et la graisse interdite fut mélangée pour une personne avec de la graisse permise et il mangea la graisse interdite. La Guemara suggère : Si c’est le cas, disons : Résous d’ici ce que Rami bar Ḥama soulève comme dilemme (2a) concernant ce cas, un dilemme qui est resté non résolu. La Guemara rejette cela : Rami bar Ḥama pourrait te dire que le dilemme ne peut pas être résolu sur la base de cette inférence, car en raison du fait que le tanna a enseigné la première clause de la mishna : Si le tribunal a rendu la décision erronée intentionnellement, et que la congrégation a commis une transgression par inadvertance, il a enseigné la dernière clause en employant un style similaire : Si le tribunal a rendu la décision erronée par inadvertance et que la congrégation a commis une transgression intentionnellement. MISHNA : Si les juges du tribunal ont rendu une décision erronée et que toute la congrégation ou une majorité d’entre elle a commis une transgression sur la base de leur décision, les juges apportent un taureau comme sacrifice pour le péché communautaire commis par inadvertance. Et si la décision erronée impliquait l’idolâtrie, les juges apportent un taureau et un bouc, comme il est écrit dans la Torah (voir Nombres 15:24) ; c’est la déclaration de Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda dit : Ce n’est pas le tribunal qui apporte l’offrande, c’est le peuple. Douze tribus, chacune ayant commis une transgression, apportent douze taureaux, c’est-à-dire que chaque tribu en apporte un, et pour l’idolâtrie, elles apportent douze taureaux et douze boucs, car chaque tribu est une congrégation.

📜 Horayot — 4b

📋 Références bibliques — Horayot 4b

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