📜 Keritot — 7b

From where do we derive that in the case of a Canaanite maidservant, owned by a Jew, who miscarried, she brings a sin offering and it is eaten? As the Sages taught in a baraita: The passage discussing the halakhot of a woman following childbirth begins with the verse: “Speak to the children of Israel, saying: If a woman conceives and gives birth to a male” (Leviticus 12:2). From this verse I have derived only that the full-fledged children of Israel are included in these halakhot; from where do I derive that a convert and a Canaanite maidservant are also included in these halakhot? The verse states “a woman,” which includes other women. The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the special emphasis in the mishna: And likewise a Canaanite maidservant? Why does the mishna deem it necessary to write this halakha? The Gemara answers: It might enter your mind to say that when we say: With regard to any mitzva in which a woman is obligated a Canaanite slave is also obligated in that mitzva, this statement applies with regard to a matter that is the same for a man and for a woman. But with regard to the offerings of a woman after childbirth, which is a category that applies to women but does not apply to men, one might say a Canaanite maidservant is not obligated to bring these offerings. It is for this reason the mishna taught the case of a Canaanite maidservant. § The mishna teaches: These women bring a sin offering but their sin offerings are not eaten. It then teaches that in a case where one miscarried a fetus of a type for which a woman is exempt from bringing an offering and the other one miscarried a fetus of a type for which a woman is obligated to bring an offering, Rabbi Yosei maintains that if both are standing together they bring one offering together. The Gemara asks: What exactly do they do? The two of them bring one definite burnt offering, and a sin offering of a bird due to uncertainty, and they each stipulate that if she is obligated to bring the sin offering the animal is hers, and if not then it belongs to the other woman. The Gemara asks: And is Rabbi Yosei of the opinion that a stipulation is effective in the case of a sin offering? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (23a): With regard to a situation where one of two women unwittingly ate a piece of forbidden fat and is obligated to bring a sin offering, but it is unknown which woman, Rabbi Shimon says: They both bring one sin offering together, and Rabbi Yosei says: They do not both bring one sin offering together. Evidently, Rabbi Yosei is not of the opinion that a stipulation is effective with regard to a sin offering. Rava said: Rabbi Yosei concedes that a stipulation is effective with regard to one who has not yet brought an atonement offering to complete the purification process, as is the case concerning a woman after childbirth. And likewise, when Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Rabbi Yosei concedes with regard to one who has not yet brought an atonement offering that a stipulation is effective. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this difference between the sin offering of one who has not yet brought an atonement offering and standard sin offerings? The Gemara answers: There, with regard to a sin offering brought for a transgression, the man requires definite awareness of his transgression for him to be obligated to bring a sin offering, as it is written: “If his sin, which he has sinned, be known to him” (Leviticus 4:28). Therefore, in the case where one of two women ate forbidden fat, they do not bring a sin offering together and stipulate that it should be for whichever of them ate the forbidden fat. But here, with regard to a woman after a miscarriage, when these women bring their sin offering they do so only in order to become permitted in the consumption of sacrificial food, and therefore the stipulation is effective. The Gemara cites a proof that this distinction is in fact the opinion of Rabbi Yosei: As it is taught in the latter clause of that mishna that Rabbi Yosei says: With regard to any sin offering that comes as atonement for a sin, two people do not bring it together. This indicates that if a sin offering does not atone for a sin, two people can bring it together. § The mishna teaches: And these women do not bring a sin offering, and among them are a woman who gives birth by caesarean section. Rabbi Shimon deems a woman liable to bring an offering in a case where she gives birth by caesarean section. The Gemara asks: What is the reason of Rabbi Shimon? Reish Lakish said that the verse states: “But if she bears a girl” (Leviticus 12:5). The term “she bears” is superfluous in the context of the passage, and it serves to include another type of birth, and what is it? This is a birth by caesarean section. The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis, what is their reasoning? Rabbi Mani bar Pattish said that their ruling is derived from the verse: “If a woman conceives [tazria] and gives birth to a male” (Leviticus 12:2). The word tazria literally means to receive seed, indicating that all the halakhot mentioned in that passage do not apply unless she gives birth through the place where she receives seed, not through any other place, such as in the case of a caesarean section. MISHNA: A woman who gives birth to a daughter counts fourteen days during which she is ritually impure. That is followed by sixty-six days during which she remains ritually pure even if she experiences a flow of blood. The Torah obligates a woman to bring her offering on the eighty-first day (see Leviticus 12:1–6). If the woman miscarries another fetus before that day, she is not required to bring an additional offering. In the case of a woman who miscarries a fetus on the night of, i.e., preceding, the eighty-first day, Beit Shammai deem her exempt from bringing a second offering and Beit Hillel deem her liable to bring a second offering. Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: What is different between the night of the eighty-first and the day of the eighty-first? If they are equal with regard to the halakhot of ritual impurity, i.e., the blood flow of this woman on the eighty-first night renders her ritually impure and all the standard strictures of ritual impurity apply to her, will the two time periods not be equal with regard to liability to bring an additional offering as well? Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: No, there is a difference between that night and the following day. If you said with regard to a woman who miscarries on the eighty-first day that she is obligated to bring an additional offering, this is logical, as she emerged into a period that is fit for her to bring her offering. Would you say the same with regard to a woman who miscarries on the night of the eighty-first day, where she did not emerge into a period that is fit for her to bring her offering, as offerings are not sacrificed at night? Beit Hillel said to Beit Shammai: But let the case of a woman who miscarries on the eighty-first day that occurs on Shabbat prove that this distinction is incorrect, as she did not emerge into a period that is fit for her to bring her offering because individual offerings are not sacrificed on Shabbat, and nevertheless she is obligated to bring an additional offering. Beit Shammai said to Beit Hillel: No, there is a difference between these cases. If you said this ruling with regard to a woman who miscarries on the eighty-first day that occurs on Shabbat, the reason is that although Shabbat is unfit for the sacrifice of an individual offering, it is fit for the sacrifice of a communal offering whose time is fixed, e.g., the daily offering. Would you say the same with regard to a woman who miscarries on the night of the eighty-first day, as the night is completely unfit, since neither an individual offering nor a communal offering is sacrificed at night? Beit Shammai add: And as for the ritual impurity status of the blood, i.e., Beit Hillel’s opinion that the two time periods are equal with regard to the halakhot of ritual impurity, this does not prove what the halakha should be with regard to offerings, as with regard to a woman who miscarries before the completion of the term of eighty days, her blood is impure like the blood of a woman after childbirth, and nevertheless she is exempt from bringing the offering.