Meilah 6b — Talmud de Babylone

▶ 📖 Mishna The mishna presents a dispute with regard to the status of offerings of the most sacred order, which normally are not su…

The mishna presents a dispute with regard to the status of offerings of the most sacred order, which normally are not subject to the halakhot of misuse once their blood has been sprinkled and they have been permitted to the priests. The case of the mishna is the meat of offerings of the most sacred order, whose consumption is permitted from the moment their blood was sprinkled, that left the Temple courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood, and then reentered the courtyard. Rabbi Eliezer says: The sprinkling of this blood does not permit its consumption by the priests. Consequently, one is liable for misusing it. And he is not liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibitions of piggul, if he partook of it after it was slaughtered with the intent to partake of it or sprinkle its blood beyond its designated time, or of notar, if he partook of the meat after it remained overnight, or of partaking of the meat while ritually impure. Rabbi Akiva says: The sprinkling is effective despite the fact that the meat left the Temple courtyard and was disqualified, and therefore one is not liable for misusing it. Likewise, other halakhot that apply to offerings whose blood was sprinkled apply to it, and consequently one is liable for eating it due to violation of the prohibitions of partaking of meat that is piggul, or notar, or remained overnight, or of partaking of the meat while ritually impure. Rabbi Akiva said, in support of his opinion: But there is the case of one who designated an animal as his sin offering and it was lost, and he designated another animal in its stead, and thereafter the first sin offering was found and both of them are standing fit for sacrifice. If he slaughtered both animals at the same time and sprinkled the blood of one of them, which means that the second was disqualified as a leftover sin offering, the question arises as to the status of the meat of the second animal with regard to the halakhot of misuse. Is it not the case that just as the blood of the animal whose blood was sprinkled exempts its meat from liability for its misuse, so too it exempts the meat of the other animal? Since he could have chosen to sprinkle the blood of either animal, they are considered as though they were one offering. If so, one may learn from there by an a fortiori inference with regard to the case of sprinkling the blood of meat that left the courtyard and returned: If the sprinkling of its blood exempted the meat of the other animal from the halakhot of misuse, it is only right that it should exempt its own meat that left the courtyard. The mishna adds that just as Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva disagree as to whether the sprinkling of blood exempts meat that left the courtyard from liability for its misuse, so too, they disagree with regard to the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity consumed on the altar that left the Temple courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood. The dispute is whether the subsequent sprinkling of the blood generates liability for misuse of those portions. Rabbi Eliezer says: The sprinkling of the blood is completely ineffective in rendering those portions consecrated to the Lord. Consequently, one is not liable for misusing them. And similarly, one is not liable for their consumption due to violation of the prohibitions of piggul, notar, or of partaking of meat while ritually impure. Rabbi Akiva says: The sprinkling is effective, and therefore one is liable for misusing them. And likewise, one is liable for its consumption due to violation of the prohibitions of piggul, notar, or of partaking of the meat while ritually impure.

▶ 💬 Guemara The Gemara asks: Why do I need the mishna to cite these two disagreements, i.e., both the case of offerings of the most …

The Gemara asks: Why do I need the mishna to cite these two disagreements, i.e., both the case of offerings of the most sacred order and offerings of lesser sanctity? After all, both disagreements are based on the same principle. The Gemara answers: Both cases are necessary, as, if the disagreement was stated only with regard to offerings of the most sacred order, I would say that it is specifically in that case that Rabbi Eliezer says that one is liable for misusing the meat of the offering, due to the fact that only sprinkling the blood properly removes the offering from being subject to the halakhot of misuse. By contrast, sprinkling the blood improperly, including for meat that left the courtyard, does not remove the offering from the halakhot of misuse. But with regard to the issue of when the rite of sprinkling brings the offering into being subject to the halakhot of misuse, i.e., in the case of sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity, Rabbi Eliezer concedes to Rabbi Akiva that even sprinkling the blood improperly, as in this case, brings the offering into being subject to the halakhot of misuse. And by contrast, if their disagreement was stated only with regard to offerings of lesser sanctity, I would say that it is specifically in the case of offerings of lesser sanctity that Rabbi Akiva said one is liable for misusing them. This is due to the fact that here the act of sprinkling serves to include them in the category of misuse, and therefore even sprinkling the blood improperly, as in this case, brings the offering into being subject to the halakhot of misuse. But with regard to offerings of the most sacred order, where the sprinkling of the blood serves to remove the offering from being subject to the halakhot of misuse, one might say that Rabbi Akiva agrees that sprinkling the blood improperly does not remove the offering from being subject to the halakhot of misuse. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that the tanna’im disagree in both cases. § It was stated that amora’im disagree with regard to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva in the mishna. Rabbi Yoḥanan says: When Rabbi Akiva says that sprinkling is effective to remove the meat of offerings of the most sacred order that left the courtyard from the halakhot of misuse, that applies specifically in a case where only part of it left the courtyard and part remained inside. In such a situation, as the sprinkling is effective for the portion that remained inside the courtyard, it also is effective for the portion that left the courtyard. But if all of it left the courtyard, Rabbi Akiva did not say that the sprinkling is effective to remove the meat from the halakhot of misuse. Rav Asi said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: My colleagues in the exile, i.e., the Sages of Babylonia, already taught me that

▶ 🇫🇷 Résumé en français La Guemara demande : Pourquoi ai-je besoin que la mishna cite ces deux désaccords, c’est-à-dire à la fois le cas des off…

La Guemara demande : Pourquoi ai-je besoin que la mishna cite ces deux désaccords, c’est-à-dire à la fois le cas des offrandes de sainteté la plus élevée et celui des offrandes de sainteté moindre ? Après tout, les deux désaccords reposent sur le même principe. La Guemara répond : Les deux cas sont nécessaires, car, si le désaccord n’était énoncé que à propos des offrandes de sainteté la plus élevée, je dirais que c’est spécifiquement dans ce cas que Rabbi Eliezer dit qu’on est passible de mauvais usage pour la viande de l’offrande, en raison du fait que seule l’aspersion du sang faite correctement retire l’offrande de l’application des halakhot de mauvais usage. En revanche, l’aspersion du sang faite incorrectement, y compris pour la viande qui est sortie de la cour, ne retire pas l’offrande de l’application des halakhot de mauvais usage. Mais en ce qui concerne la question de savoir quand le rite de l’aspersion fait entrer l’offrande dans l’application des halakhot de mauvais usage, c’est-à-dire dans le cas des portions sacrificielles des offrandes de sainteté moindre, Rabbi Eliezer concède à Rabbi Akiva que même l’aspersion du sang faite incorrectement, comme dans ce cas, fait entrer l’offrande dans l’application des halakhot de mauvais usage. Et en revanche, si leur désaccord n’était énoncé que à propos des offrandes de sainteté moindre, je dirais que c’est spécifiquement dans le cas des offrandes de sainteté moindre que Rabbi Akiva a dit qu’on est passible de mauvais usage à leur égard. Cela est dû au fait que ici l’acte d’aspersion sert à les inclure dans la catégorie du mauvais usage, et donc même l’aspersion du sang faite incorrectement, comme dans ce cas, fait entrer l’offrande dans l’application des halakhot de mauvais usage. Mais en ce qui concerne les offrandes de sainteté la plus élevée, où l’aspersion du sang sert à retirer l’offrande de l’application des halakhot de mauvais usage, on pourrait dire que Rabbi Akiva concède que l’aspersion du sang faite incorrectement ne retire pas l’offrande de l’application des halakhot de mauvais usage. Par conséquent, la mishna nous apprend que les tanna’im sont en désaccord dans les deux cas. § Il a été dit que les amora’im sont en désaccord en ce qui concerne l’opinion de Rabbi Akiva dans la mishna. Rabbi Yoḥanan dit : Lorsque Rabbi Akiva dit que l’aspersion est efficace pour retirer la viande des offrandes de sainteté la plus élevée qui est sortie de la cour de l’application des halakhot de mauvais usage, cela s’applique spécifiquement dans un cas où seulement une partie en est sortie de la cour et une partie est restée à l’intérieur. Dans une telle situation, comme l’aspersion est efficace pour la portion qui est restée à l’intérieur de la cour, elle est aussi efficace pour la portion qui est sortie de la cour. Mais si tout en est sorti de la cour, Rabbi Akiva n’a pas dit que l’aspersion est efficace pour retirer la viande de l’application des halakhot de mauvais usage. Rav Asi dit à Rabbi Yoḥanan : Mes collègues de l’exil, c’est-à-dire les Sages de Babylonie, m’ont déjà enseigné que

📜 Meilah — 6b

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