📜 Menachot — 2b

The Gemara concludes the proof from the verse: And with regard to a gift offering, is it permitted to deviate from its protocol ab initio? Clearly one may not do so. Accordingly, if one of the sacrificial rites of a meal offering was performed for the sake of a different meal offering, it is still prohibited to perform any of its other sacrificial rites improperly. § The mishna teaches that all the meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake are fit for sacrifice but they do not fulfill the obligation of the owner. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, as it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon says: All the meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake are fit for sacrifice and they even satisfy the obligation of the owner. The baraita continues: Conversely, consecrated animals that were sacrificed not for their sake do not fulfill the obligation of the owner, as in this regard meal offerings are not similar to slaughtered offerings. The difference is that when one removes a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering, its mode of preparation proves that it is in fact for the sake of a pan meal offering, as the two offerings differ in appearance. Similarly, with regard to a dry meal offering, e.g., the meal offering of a sinner, which contains no oil, whose handful is removed for the sake of a meal offering that is mixed with oil, its mode of preparation proves that it is for the sake of a dry meal offering, and one’s improper intent is therefore disregarded. But with regard to slaughtered offerings it is not so, as there is one manner of slaughter for all offerings, and one manner of sprinkling the blood for all offerings, and one manner of collection of the blood for all offerings. Since the differentiation between slaughtered offerings is established only through intention, one who sacrifices an animal offering not for its own sake does not fulfill the obligation of the owner. Rabbi Shimon apparently disagrees with the tanna of the mishna on two counts: First, he claims that if the handful of a meal offering was removed not for its own sake it satisfies the obligation of the owner, whereas the mishna teaches that the obligation is not fulfilled. Second, Rabbi Shimon does not differentiate between the meal offering of a sinner or the meal offering of jealousy, and the other types of meal offerings. The Gemara comments: This works out well, i.e., the mishna can be explained in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, according to Rav Ashi, who says (3b), in a resolution of two apparently contradictory statements of Rabbi Shimon: Here, where Rabbi Shimon says that the meal offering is fit and fulfills the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a case where one states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep pan, i.e., he mentions only the vessel, not the type of meal offering. Conversely, there, where Rabbi Shimon says that the meal offering does not satisfy the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a case where one states that he is removing a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering. Accordingly, it can be explained that the mishna is referring to a case where one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of another meal offering, which is why it does not satisfy the obligation of the owner. But according to the statements of Rabba and Rava, who resolved that contradiction in a different manner, what can be said? The Gemara elaborates: And if you would say that the contradiction addressed by Rav Ashi is resolved as Rabba answers, this is problematic. Rabba resolved the contradiction as follows: Here, where Rabbi Shimon says that the meal offering satisfies the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a change of sanctity, i.e., it was sacrificed for the sake of another type of meal offering, whereas there, where Rabbi Shimon says that it does not fulfill the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a change of owner, e.g., the meal offering of Reuven was sacrificed for the sake of Shimon. The Gemara explains that the reason this is problematic is that if one accepts Rabba’s resolution, how can the mishna be explained in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon? The mishna is clearly discussing the case of a change of sanctity, as it teaches: How are these rites performed for their sake and then not for their sake, whereby the offering does not satisfy the owner’s obligation? It is in a case where one initially removed the handful for the sake of the meal offering of a sinner and then for the sake of a voluntary meal offering. This is a change involving a different type of meal offering. And alternatively, if you would say that the contradiction addressed by Rav Ashi is resolved as Rava answers, this is equally problematic. Rava resolved the contradiction as follows: Here, where Rabbi Shimon says that the meal offering satisfies the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a case where one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of another meal offering, whereas there, where Rabbi Shimon says that it does not satisfy the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a case where one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of a slaughtered offering. The Gemara explains that if one accepts Rava’s resolution, the mishna cannot be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon: The mishna is discussing a case where one removes a handful from a meal offering for the sake of another meal offering, as it teaches: How are these rites performed not for their sake and for their sake? It is a case where one removed the handful for the sake of a voluntary meal offering and then for the sake of the meal offering of a sinner. The Gemara concludes: Rather, according to the resolutions offered by Rabba and Rava, it is clear that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. § The Gemara cites the baraita that is the basis for the apparent contradiction between the statements of Rabbi Shimon, which was mentioned in the previous discussion: And a Sage raises a contradiction from one statement of Rabbi Shimon and another statement of Rabbi Shimon, as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says that the verse written concerning the meal offering: “It is most sacred, as the sin offering, and as the guilt offering” (Leviticus 6:10), indicates that there are some meal offerings whose halakha is like that of a sin offering, and there are some whose halakha is like that of a guilt offering. Rabbi Shimon elaborates: The halakha with regard to the meal offering of a sinner is like that of a sin offering. Therefore, if one removed a handful from it not for its own sake, it is disqualified, just like a sin offering that was slaughtered not for its own sake. Conversely, the halakha with regard to a voluntary meal offering is like that of a guilt offering. Therefore, if one removed a handful from it not for its own sake, it is valid, like a guilt offering that was slaughtered not for its own sake. Rabbi Shimon adds: And a voluntary meal offering is like a guilt offering in another aspect as well: Just as a guilt offering is valid but it does not effect acceptance, i.e., it does not satisfy the owner’s obligation, so too, a voluntary meal offering is valid but it does not effect acceptance. Rabbi Shimon here apparently contradicts his ruling that all meal offerings from which a handful was removed not for their sake satisfy the obligation of the owner. Rabba said in resolution of this contradiction: This is not difficult. Here, where Rabbi Shimon says that the meal offering satisfies the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a change of sanctity, i.e., it was sacrificed for the sake of another type of meal offering, whereas there, where he says that it does not fulfill the owner’s obligation, he is referring to a change of owner, e.g., the meal offering of Reuven was sacrificed for the sake of Shimon. Abaye said to Rabba: Now consider, the fact that the Merciful One disqualifies a meal offering due to improper intent is derived from the Torah’s comparison of meal offerings to sin offerings and guilt offerings. If so, what difference is there to me if there was a change of sanctity, and what difference is there to me if there was a change of owner? In the case of a guilt offering either of these changes prevents it from satisfying the obligation of the owner. Rabba said to Abaye: The claim that its mode of preparation proves one’s intent, which Rabbi Shimon states in explanation of why offerings are disqualified through improper intent, is based on logical reasoning, as Rabbi Shimon interprets the reason behind the mitzva in the verse and draws halakhic conclusions based on that interpretation. Rabba continues: This is significant, as Rabbi Shimon holds that the Merciful One disqualifies improper intent that is not recognizably false, i.e., when the intent is not in clear contradiction to the sacrificial rites performed. The intent to sacrifice an offering for the sake of another owner does not include a change in the sacrificial rites and it therefore disqualifies the offering. The Merciful One does not disqualify improper intent that is recognizably false and contradicts the sacrificial rites performed, e.g., if one removes a handful from a pan meal offering for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering, as the different substance itself indicates that it is a pan meal offering. The Gemara lists several questions with regard to Rabba’s statement, for which it provides a mnemonic: Burnt offering, burnt offering, pinched and squeezed, bird sin offering, offerings of the most sacred order, offerings of lesser sanctity. The Gemara first asks: But if that is so, that only intent that is not recognizably false disqualifies an offering, then in the case of a bird burnt offering where one pinched the nape of its neck above the red line that divides the upper and lower halves of the altar for the sake of a bird sin offering, it should effect acceptance according to Rabbi Shimon. The reason is the actions performed on it prove that it is a bird burnt offering. Because if it is in fact a bird sin offering, he would have performed the pinching below the red line while standing beside the altar. Nevertheless, Rabbi Shimon agrees with the ruling of the mishna (Zevaḥim 64b) that this bird offering does not satisfy its owner’s obligation. The Gemara rejects this: Is that to say that a case of a bird sin offering that is pinched above the red line is not possible? Didn’t the Master say: The pinching of a bird sin offering that is performed in any place on the altar is valid after the fact? Accordingly, there is no discernible difference between the pinching of a bird burnt offering and the pinching of a bird sin offering, so the owner’s obligation is not fulfilled. The Gemara raises another difficulty: If recognizably false intent does not disqualify an offering, then a bird burnt offering where a priest squeezed its blood above the red line for the sake of a bird sin offering should effect acceptance, as the actions performed on it prove that it is a bird burnt offering. Because if it is in fact a bird sin offering, he would have performed the required act of holding the body of the bird and sprinkling its blood below the red line, instead of squeezing out its blood above that line.