📜 Temurah — 5b

And according to the opinion of Rava, this term: “Is most holy,” serves to exclude the case of a firstborn offering from the prohibition of sale. As it is taught in a baraita: It is stated with regard to a firstborn offering: “But the firstling of an ox, or the firstling of a sheep, or the firstling of a goat, you shall not redeem; they are holy” (Numbers 18:17). But if it develops a blemish it may still be sold. By contrast, it is stated with regard to the animal tithe offering: “It shall not be redeemed” (Leviticus 27:33), and the animal tithe may not be sold, not when alive and not when slaughtered, not when unblemished and not when blemished. The Gemara objects: But isn’t there the case of substitution, with regard to which the Merciful One states: “He shall not exchange it, nor substitute it” (Leviticus 27:10), and it is taught in the mishna (2a): That is not to say that it is permitted for a person to effect substitution; rather, it means that if one substituted a non-sacred animal for a consecrated animal, the substitution takes effect, and the one who substituted the non-sacred animal incurs the forty lashes. Apparently, his action is effective, and this seems to be a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rava. The Gemara explains that Rava could say to you: It is different there, as that same verse states: “And if he shall at all substitute animal for animal, then both it and that for which it is substituted shall be holy,” which teaches that his action is effective in this context specifically. And according to the opinion of Abaye, that transgressions are effective in general, that clause is still necessary, because if the Merciful One had not stated: “Both it and that for which it is substituted shall be holy,” I would say that this initially consecrated animal will leave its consecrated state, and that non-sacred animal will enter into sanctity instead. Therefore, the verse teaches us that the first animal retains its sanctity as well. The Gemara objects: But isn’t there the case of a firstborn offering, with regard to which the Merciful One states: “But the firstling of an ox, or the firstling of a sheep, or the firstling of a goat, you shall not redeem; they are holy” (Numbers 18:17)? And we learned in a mishna (21a): All sacrificial animals that became blemished are subject to redemption through sale, and their substitutes are also subject to redemption through sale, except for the firstborn and the animal tithe offerings. Apparently, if one attempts to redeem a firstborn offering, his action is not effective, and this seems to be a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Abaye. The Gemara explains that Abaye could say to you: It is different there, as that same verse states: “They are holy,” thereby teaching that they shall always be as they are, even if one attempts to redeem them. The Gemara asks: And according to Rava, who maintains that transgressions are not effective, why does he need the term “They are holy”? The Gemara answers: This term teaches that if one substituted another animal for a firstborn offering or for an animal tithe offering, they, the originally consecrated animals, are sacrificed, but their substitutes, although they have sanctity, are not sacrificed. The Gemara asks: And according to Abaye, from where does he derive this conclusion that the substitutes are not sacrificed? The Gemara answers: The verse states concerning firstborn offerings: “Whether it be ox or sheep, it is the Lord’s” (Leviticus 27:26). One can infer from this wording that it is sacrificed to the Lord but its substitute is not sacrificed. The Gemara asks: And what does Rava derive from that verse? The Gemara responds: Yes, it is indeed so that he, like Abaye, derives from that verse, not from Numbers 18:17 as originally suggested, the halakha that the substitute of a firstborn is not sacrificed. Rather, why do I need the term “They are holy” which appears in that verse? It teaches with regard to a firstborn offering or an animal tithe offering whose blood was mixed with the blood of any other offering brought upon the altar that the blood is nevertheless sacrificed on the altar as it would have been individually. The Gemara asks: And Abaye, from where does he derive this conclusion, that such blood is sacrificed? The Gemara answers: He derives it from the verse concerning the High Priest’s service on Yom Kippur: “And he shall take of the blood of the bull, and of the blood of the goat, and put it upon the corners of the altar” (Leviticus 16:18). One might ask: But isn’t there more blood of the bull than of the goat? Why is the blood of the goat not nullified? From here it is derived that offerings brought upon the altar do not nullify one another, as it is taught in a baraita that the phrase in the verse “And he shall take of the blood of the bull, and of the blood of the goat” serves to teach that they must be mixed. This is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya. Accordingly, Abaye derives that mixtures of blood may be sacrificed. And as for Rava, he holds that there, the High Priest would take from this blood of the bull by itself and from that blood of the goat by itself, rather than mixing them together. And in this matter, he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan, who disagrees with Rabbi Yoshiya. The Gemara continues its analysis of the dispute between Abaye and Rava. But isn’t there the case of an animal tithe offering, with regard to which the Merciful One states: “It shall not be redeemed” (Leviticus 27:33)? And we learned in a mishna (21a): All sacrificial animals that became blemished are subject to redemption through sale, and their substitutes are also subject to redemption through sale, except for the firstborn and the animal tithe offering. Apparently, if one attempts to redeem an animal tithe offering, his act is not effective, and this seems to be a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Abaye. The Gemara explains that Abaye could say to you: It is different there, as one derives that halakha from the halakha of a firstborn offering, by verbal analogy between the term “avara” that is stated with regard to an animal tithe offering: “Whatsoever passes [ya’avor] under the rod” (Leviticus 27:32), and the term “avara” that is stated with regard to a firstborn offering: “You shall set apart [veha’avarta] to the Lord all that opens the womb” (Exodus 13:12). It was already derived above that a firstborn offering cannot be redeemed. But in general, transgressions are effective. The Gemara objects: But isn’t there the case of one who separated teruma prior to the separation of the first fruits, with regard to which the Merciful One states: “You shall not delay to offer of the fullness of your harvest and the outflow of your presses” (Exodus 22:28)? The verse was expounded earlier (4b) as teaching that one must separate first fruits before separating teruma. And we learned in a mishna (Terumot 3:6): If one separates teruma prior to the separation of the first fruits, although he has transgressed a prohibition, what he did is done, and produce has the status of teruma. This appears to refute the opinion of Rava. The Gemara explains that Rava could say to you: It is different there, as the verse states: “From all that is given you, you shall set apart that which is the Lord’s teruma” (Numbers 18:29), thereby teaching that the separation of teruma is effective in any case. But in general, transgressions are not effective. And according to the opinion of Abaye that transgressions are generally effective, that verse is required to teach another halakha, as Rav Pappa said to Abaye (Beitza 13b): Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish stated that if the first tithe was separated while the grain was still on the stalks, that amount is exempt from teruma, even though the amount of teruma the priest receives is thereby reduced. If that is so, then even if the Levite preceded the priest by taking the first tithe after the grain had been threshed and arranged in a pile, we should exempt that grain from the obligation of teruma as well. Abaye said to Rav Pappa: With regard to your claim, the verse states: “From all that is given you, you shall set apart.” This verse teaches that the Levites must designate a portion of all the gifts they receive and give it to the priests, even if they received them before teruma had been separated. Rav Pappa asked: What did you see that leads you to include the first tithe taken from the pile in the category: “All that is given,” and to exclude that which is taken from the stalks? Abaye answered: I include a tithe taken from the pile, as it has been processed to the point where it is included in the category of grain, since it is written: “The first fruits of your grain…you shall give him” (Deuteronomy 18:4); and I exclude a tithe taken from the stalks, as it is not included in the category of grain and is not yet obligated in teruma. The Gemara objects: But isn’t there the case of a widow betrothed to a High Priest, with regard to which the Merciful One stated: “A widow, or one divorced, or a profaned woman, or a harlot, these shall he not take; but a virgin of his own people shall he take to wife. And he shall not profane his seed among his people” (Leviticus 21:14–15)? And we learned in a mishna (Kiddushin 66b): Any case where there is a valid betrothal and yet there is a transgression, the offspring follows the flawed lineage. For example, if a widow, who may not marry a High Priest, nevertheless did so, the offspring may not marry a priest. Still, the marriage is in force, contrary to the opinion of Rava. The Gemara explains that Rava could say: It is different there, as the verse states: “And he shall not profane [lo yeḥallel] his seed.” The verse states only that the offspring is profaned, not that he has the status of a mamzer, which would hold for one born of a union between two people with regard to whom marriage cannot take effect. Rava infers from the verse that the betrothal of a High Priest and a widow specifically does take effect. But in general, transgressions are not effective. And according to the opinion of Abaye, that transgressions are generally effective, what is derived from that phrase? Abaye can say: If it merely means to teach that the betrothal takes effect, let the verse state simply: Lo yaḥel, which would have the same meaning. What is indicated by the use of the longer form: Lo yeḥallel? This teaches that there are two profanations: One for him, i.e., that the offspring is profaned, and one for her, i.e., that the mother is disqualified from marrying even a common priest. The Gemara objects: But isn’t there the case of one who consecrated blemished animals for sacrifice on the altar, with regard to which the Merciful One states: “But whatsoever has a blemish, that you shall not bring; for it shall not be acceptable for you” (Leviticus 22:20)? And we learned in a baraita: If one consecrates blemished animals for sacrifice on the altar, even though he has transgressed a prohibition, what he did is done, and the consecration takes effect. This is apparently a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Rava. The Gemara explains that Rava could say to you: It is different there, as the verse states with regard to blemished animals: “But for a vow it shall not be accepted” (Leviticus 22:23). Since the verse specifies only that it is its sacrifice which does not effect acceptance, one may consequently infer that if one consecrates them, they are still consecrated. But in general, transgressions are not effective. And according to the opinion of Abaye, that transgressions are generally effective, what does this phrase teach? Abaye can say that if the Merciful One had not stated: “But for a vow it shall not be accepted,” I would say that one who consecrated it is considered like one who transgressed a mitzva but the offering is still fit to be sacrificed. The verse therefore teaches us that it may not be sacrificed as an offering. The Gemara objects: But there is the case of one who consecrates unblemished animals for Temple maintenance, with regard to which the Merciful One states: