Zeva'him 13a — Talmud de Babylone

▶ 📖 Mishna does not refute the inference by citing a common element of karet, as the elements of karet in a sin offering and in a P…

does not refute the inference by citing a common element of karet, as the elements of karet in a sin offering and in a Paschal offering are not parallel. The Gemara asks: If so, let it be derived from this inference that a guilt offering is also disqualified if sacrificed not for its sake. The Gemara answers: With regard to a guilt offering, ben Azzai refutes the inference as follows: What is notable about the common element of a sin offering and a Paschal offering? It is notable in that there are communal offerings as well as individual offerings of these types, as well as communal burnt offerings, whereas there is no communal guilt offering. And if you wish, say instead that actually, ben Azzai also refutes the entire inference, because a sin offering and a Paschal offering uniquely share an element of karet. And the reason ben Azzai maintains that a burnt offering sacrificed not for its sake is disqualified is that he learned it as a tradition. And as for the fact that Rav Huna cites an a fortiori inference, he does not believe it to be the true source for ben Azzai’s halakha; he said it only to sharpen the minds of his students with it, challenging them to refute it. With regard to the Paschal offering and the sin offering, where one slaughtered them not for their sake, or where he collected their blood in a vessel, conveyed this blood to the altar, or sprinkled this blood on the altar not for their sake, or where he performed one of these sacrificial rites for their sake and not for their sake, or not for their sake and for their sake, in all these cases the offerings are unfit. How are these rites performed for their sake and not for their sake? In a case where one slaughtered the Paschal offering for the sake of a Paschal offering and for the sake of a peace offering. How are these rites performed not for their sake and for their sake? In a case where one slaughtered the Paschal offering for the sake of a peace offering and for the sake of a Paschal offering. The offering is unfit because a slaughtered offering is disqualified due to prohibited intent in four matters: In the performance of the sacrificial rites of slaughtering the animal, in collecting the blood, in conveying the blood, and in sprinkling the blood. Rabbi Shimon deems the offering fit if the prohibited intent was during the rite of conveying the blood, as he would say: It is impossible to sacrifice an offering without slaughtering the animal, or without collection of the blood, or without sprinkling the blood, but it is possible to sacrifice an offering without conveying the blood to the altar. How so? If one slaughters the animal alongside the altar and sprinkles the blood, the blood does not need to be conveyed. Therefore, the rite of conveying the blood is not significant enough to cause the offering to be disqualified due to prohibited intent while performing it. Rabbi Eliezer says: With regard to one who conveys the blood in a situation where he is required to convey it, prohibited intent while conveying it disqualifies the offering. If he conveys the blood in a situation where he is not required to convey it, prohibited intent while conveying it does not disqualify the offering.

▶ 💬 Guemara The mishna teaches that a slaughtered offering is disqualified due to prohibited intent while performing four rites, inc…

The mishna teaches that a slaughtered offering is disqualified due to prohibited intent while performing four rites, including collection of the blood. The Gemara asks: And does collection of the blood with prohibited intent disqualify the offering? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And the sons of Aaron, the priests, shall present the blood” (Leviticus 1:5); this is referring to collection of the blood. Do you say it is referring to collection of the blood, or is it referring to only sprinkling the blood? When it states immediately afterward: “And sprinkle the blood roundabout against the altar,” sprinkling the blood is thereby stated. If so, how do I realize the meaning of: “And the sons of Aaron, the priests, shall present”? This is referring to collection of the blood. And the phrase “the sons of Aaron, the priests” teaches that collection of the blood must be performed by a fit priest, i.e., one who has no blemish and who was not disqualified due to flawed lineage, and that he must do so while he is wearing priestly service vestments. The baraita continues: Rabbi Akiva said: From where is it derived that collection of the blood may be performed only by a fit priest and while he is wearing service vestments? The expression “the sons of Aaron” is stated here in the verse in Leviticus, and it is stated there: “These are the names of the sons of Aaron, the priests that were anointed, whom he consecrated to minister in the priest’s office” (Numbers 3:3). Just as there, in the verse in Numbers, it mentions the word “priests” with regard to fit priests, i.e., Aaron’s sons, and with regard to priests who were consecrated to serve by being dressed with service vestments (see Exodus 29:30), so too here, the reference is to a fit priest and with regard to one who is wearing service vestments. Rabbi Tarfon said: I will bury my sons if I did not hear a halakha from my teachers discerning a distinction between collection of and sprinkling the blood, but I cannot explicate the distinction, as I do not remember what it was. The baraita continues: Rabbi Akiva said: I will explicate: With regard to collection, the Torah does not render intent like action. Collecting the blood with prohibited intent does not disqualify the offering. But with regard to sprinkling, the Torah does render intent like action. Furthermore, if one collected the blood outside the Temple, he is not liable to be punished with karet. But if one sprinkled the blood outside the Temple, he is punished with karet. Moreover, if those who are unfit for the Temple service collected the blood, they are not liable for that action. But if those who are unfit for the Temple service sprinkled the blood, they are liable to receive the penalty of death at the hand of Heaven for that action. Rabbi Tarfon said to him excitedly: I take an oath by the Temple service that you have not deviated left or right from what I heard from my teachers. I myself heard them and I cannot explicate what they taught, whereas you teach this halakha on your own in concurrence with the halakha I heard. He said to Rabbi Akiva, using this language: Akiva, anyone who leaves you is like one who leaves his life. In any event, Rabbi Akiva’s statement in the baraita apparently contradicts the mishna with regard to the matter of whether the collection of the blood with prohibited intent disqualifies the offering. Rava said: It is not difficult. The baraita here is referring to intent of piggul, i.e., intent to consume or burn the offering after its appointed time. The mishna there is referring to intent not for the sake of the offering. The Gemara adds: The language of the mishna is also precise, as it teaches that a slaughtered offering is disqualified in this manner, and it does not teach that an offering is rendered piggul in this manner. Apparently, the mishna is referring to intent that merely disqualifies the offering without rendering it piggul, one who partakes of which is liable to receive karet. The Gemara concludes: Conclude from the mishna’s language that this interpretation is correct. The Gemara asks: And does intent of piggul during the collection of the blood not disqualify the offering? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: One might have thought that intent to consume an offering after its designated time is effective to render the offering piggul only when one has that intent during sprinkling. From where is it derived to include slaughter and collection of the blood in this halakha? The verse states: “And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of his peace offerings is at all eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be imputed to the one who offers it; it shall be an abhorred thing [piggul ]” (Leviticus 7:18). As derived on 29a, the verse is referring to performance of the sacrificial rites with intent to consume the offering after its designated time. The phrase “is at all eaten” teaches that the verse speaks of matters that lead to consumption, i.e., those sacrificial rites that enable consumption of the offering, including slaughter of the animal and collecting the blood. The baraita continues: One might have thought that I should include even the pouring of the remainder of the blood on the base of the altar, after its sprinkling, and the burning of the sacrificial portions on the altar. Therefore, the verse states: “On the third day, it shall not be accepted, neither shall it be imputed to the one who offers it” (Leviticus 7:18). The phrase “the one who offers it” indicates the sprinkling of the blood. Sprinkling was included in the general category of rites that enable consumption. And for what purpose was it singled out? To compare other halakhot to it, i.e., to say to you: Just as sprinkling is unique, as it is a rite and if not performed it prevents atonement, so too, any rite that prevents atonement if not performed is included in the halakha of piggul. Pouring the remainder of the blood and burning the sacrificial portions are therefore excluded, as they do not prevent atonement if not performed. Evidently, intent of piggul applies to the collection of the blood, contrary to Rava’s resolution of the contradiction between the mishna and the baraita.

▶ 🇫🇷 Résumé en français La mishna enseigne qu’un sacrifice abattu est disqualifié en raison d’une intention interdite lors de l’accomplissement …

La mishna enseigne qu’un sacrifice abattu est disqualifié en raison d’une intention interdite lors de l’accomplissement de quatre rites, y compris la collecte du sang. La Guemara demande : Et la collecte du sang avec une intention interdite disqualifie-t-elle le sacrifice ? Mais n’est-il pas enseigné dans une baraita : Le verset dit : « Et les fils d’Aaron, les prêtres, présenteront le sang » (Lévitique 1:5) ; ceci fait référence à la collecte du sang. Dis-tu qu’il s’agit de la collecte du sang, ou bien s’agit-il seulement de l’aspersion du sang ? Lorsqu’il est dit immédiatement après : « Et il aspergera le sang tout autour contre l’autel », l’aspersion du sang est ainsi énoncée. Si tel est le cas, comment réaliser le sens de : « Et les fils d’Aaron, les prêtres, présenteront » ? Ceci fait référence à la collecte du sang. Et l’expression « les fils d’Aaron, les prêtres » enseigne que la collecte du sang doit être accomplie par un prêtre apte, c’est-à-dire celui qui n’a aucun défaut et qui n’a pas été disqualifié en raison d’une lignée entachée, et qu’il doit le faire tout en portant les vêtements de service sacerdotaux. La baraita continue : Rabbi Akiva dit : D’où dérive-t-on que la collecte du sang peut être accomplie seulement par un prêtre apte et tout en portant les vêtements de service ? L’expression « les fils d’Aaron » est énoncée ici dans le verset du Lévitique, et elle est énoncée là : « Voici les noms des fils d’Aaron, les prêtres qui furent oints, qu’il consacra pour exercer le ministère sacerdotal » (Nombres 3:3). De même que là, dans le verset des Nombres, le mot « prêtres » est mentionné à propos de prêtres aptes, c’est-à-dire les fils d’Aaron, et à propos de prêtres qui furent consacrés pour servir en étant revêtus des vêtements de service (voir Exode 29:30), de même ici, la référence est à un prêtre apte et à propos de celui qui porte les vêtements de service. Rabbi Tarfon dit : Que j’enterre mes fils si je n’ai pas entendu une halakha de mes maîtres discernant une distinction entre la collecte du et l’aspersion du sang, mais je ne peux pas l’expliciter, car je ne me souviens pas de ce que c’était. La baraita continue : Rabbi Akiva dit : Je vais l’expliciter : En ce qui concerne la collecte, la Torah ne rend pas l’intention comme l’action. Collecter le sang avec une intention interdite ne disqualifie pas le sacrifice. Mais en ce qui concerne l’aspersion, la Torah rend l’intention comme l’action. De plus, si l’on a collecté le sang à l’extérieur du Temple, il n’est pas passible de punition par karet. Mais si l’on a aspergé le sang à l’extérieur du Temple, il est puni par karet. En outre, si ceux qui sont inaptes au service du Temple ont collecté le sang, ils ne sont pas passibles pour cette action. Mais si ceux qui sont inaptes au service du Temple ont aspergé le sang, ils sont passibles de la peine de mort par la main du Ciel pour cette action. Rabbi Tarfon lui dit avec excitation : Je jure par le service du Temple que tu n’as pas dévié ni à gauche ni à droite de ce que j’ai entendu de mes maîtres. Moi-même, j’ai entendu et je ne peux pas expliciter ce qu’ils ont enseigné, tandis que tu enseignes cette halakha de ton propre chef en conformité avec la halakha que j’ai entendue. Il lui dit, en utilisant ce langage : Akiva, quiconque te quitte est comme celui qui quitte sa vie. En tout cas, la déclaration de Rabbi Akiva dans la baraita contredit apparemment la mishna en ce qui concerne la question de savoir si la collecte du sang avec une intention interdite disqualifie le sacrifice. Rava dit : Ce n’est pas difficile. La baraita ici fait référence à l’intention de piggul, c’est-à-dire l’intention de consommer ou de brûler le sacrifice après son temps fixé. La mishna là fait référence à une intention non pour le bien du sacrifice. La Guemara ajoute : Le langage de la mishna est aussi précis, car elle enseigne qu’un sacrifice abattu est disqualifié de cette manière, et elle n’enseigne pas qu’un sacrifice est rendu piggul de cette manière. Apparemment, la mishna fait référence à une intention qui disqualifie simplement le sacrifice sans le rendre piggul, dont celui qui en mange est passible de karet. La Guemara conclut : Conclus de ce langage de la mishna que cette interprétation est correcte. La Guemara demande : Et l’intention de piggul pendant la collecte du sang ne disqualifie-t-elle pas le sacrifice ? Mais n’est-il pas enseigné dans une baraita : On pourrait avoir pensé que l’intention de consommer un sacrifice après son temps désigné n’est efficace pour rendre le sacrifice piggul que lorsque l’on a cette intention pendant l’aspersion. D’où dérive-t-on d’inclure l’abattage et la collecte du sang dans cette halakha ? Le verset dit : « Et si de la chair du sacrifice de ses offrandes de paix est mangée le troisième jour, elle ne sera pas acceptée, ni ne sera imputée à celui qui l’offre ; ce sera une chose abominable [piggul] » (Lévitique 7:18). Comme dérivé en 29a, le verset fait référence à l’accomplissement des rites sacrificiels avec l’intention de consommer le sacrifice après son temps désigné. L’expression « est mangée » enseigne que le verset parle des choses qui mènent à la consommation, c’est-à-dire ces rites sacrificiels qui permettent la consommation du sacrifice, y compris l’abattage de l’animal et la collecte du sang. La baraita continue : On pourrait avoir pensé [...]

📜 Zeva'him — 13a

📋 Références bibliques — Zeva'him 13a

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