📜 Zeva'him — 3b

If a partition protects an item from impurity imparted by a corpse, which is severe, this is only because such impurity is unique in that it is imparted to that which is in the same tent, i.e., under the same roof, and tents are divided by partitions. If so, should a partition protect food from impurity imparted in an earthenware vessel, which, although mild, is not divided by partitions, like tents are? The Gemara notes: The comparison between non-sacred meat vis-à-vis offerings and a partition in an earthenware vessel works out well according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that a partition does not prevent transmission of impurity inside an earthenware vessel. But according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who maintains that a partition is effective in an earthenware oven, what can be said? How is this compatible with the principle that an item is not affected by something not of its type? The Gemara responds: Rabbi Eliezer agrees with this principle. Yet he says that a partition in an earthenware vessel is effective due to his a fortiori inference, which overrides the principle that an item is not affected by something not of its type. The Gemara challenges: If that is so, that an a fortiori inference overrides this principle, let us say an a fortiori inference there as well, with regard to a sin offering that was slaughtered for the consumption of non-sacred meat: If slaughtering sacrificial animals for the sake of other sacrificial animals desecrates those sacrificial animals, all the more so is it not clear that slaughtering them for the consumption of non-sacred meat desecrates them? The Gemara responds: Rather, the reasoning behind the statement of Rav that a sin offering slaughtered for the consumption of non-sacred meat is fit is not in accordance with this principle at all, but it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar. As Rabbi Elazar says: What is the reasoning behind the statement of Rav? The verse: “And they shall not desecrate the sacred items of the children of Israel, which they set apart unto the Lord” (Leviticus 22:15), teaches that only improper intentions for the sake of sacred items, i.e., offerings, desecrate sacred items, but non-sacred intent does not desecrate sacred items. The Gemara notes: Apparently, an inference from a verse can come to rule out a conflicting a fortiori inference. If so, here too, with regard to a partition in an oven, let the verse “and every earthen vessel into whose interior any of them falls” come to rule out Rabbi Eliezer’s a fortiori inference that a partition prevents food in an oven from becoming impure. The Gemara responds: This expression: “Whose interior,” does not indicate that a partition is ineffective, as it is necessary to teach another halakha, namely, that food that one kneaded with clay, covering it from all sides, and put in the airspace of an oven that had the carcass of a creeping animal in it is impure. Because it might enter your mind to say that since the food cannot become impure by touching an impure item, as the clay serves as an interposition, it also cannot become impure by being put in the airspace of an impure oven. The phrase “in whose interior any of them falls” teaches us that the food does contract impurity. The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis, who apparently do interpret the verse as teaching that a partition is ineffective in preventing the contracting of impurity in an earthenware vessel, how do they derive that food covered with clay and placed in an impure oven is impure? The Gemara answers: These matters do not need a verse to teach them. Such food has the same status as any other food in an impure oven, and the halakha therefore is self-evident. § Rav Yosef bar Ami raises a contradiction between Rav’s statement with regard to deviation with regard to the type of offering, i.e., slaughtering for the sake of a different type of offering, and Rav’s statement with regard to deviation with regard to the owner, i.e., slaughtering for the sake of someone other than the offering’s owner, and he then resolves the contradiction. The contradiction is as follows: Did Rav say that a sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of another sin offering, i.e., one that the owner is obligated to bring for a different transgression, is fit, but that if one slaughtered it for the sake of a burnt offering it is unfit? Apparently, slaughtering an offering with an improper intention not of its type ruins it; whereas intent that is of its type does not ruin it. But doesn’t Rav say that a sin offering that one slaughtered for a person who is not its owner but who nevertheless is obligated to bring a sin offering is unfit, whereas if one slaughtered it for a person who is obligated to bring a burnt offering, it is fit? Apparently, an improper intention that is of its type ruins the offering, whereas intent not of its type does not ruin it. And he resolves the contradiction as follows: There, with regard to deviation from the type of offering, the Merciful One states in the Torah: “And slaughter it for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33). And here a sin offering was slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering, and therefore although it was for the sake of a different sin offering, it remains fit. Here, concerning deviation with regard to the owner, it is written in the Torah concerning a sin offering: “And he shall be forgiven” (Leviticus 4:26), indicating that specifically he, the owner, but not another person, shall be forgiven. Therefore, if a sin offering is slaughtered for the sake of another person, it is unfit. The other person to whom this is referring is presumably similar to him, the owner of the sin offering, in that he is obligated to make atonement similar to that of the owner. Therefore, if the other person is obligated to bring a burnt offering and not a sin offering, this disqualification does not apply. § Rav Ḥaviva raises a contradiction between Rav’s statement concerning deviation with regard to the owner and the aforementioned baraita concerning the interior of its interior, i.e., a vessel placed in an earthenware vessel, and resolves the contradiction. The contradiction is as follows: But did Rav say that a sin offering that one slaughtered for a person other than its owner but who is also obligated to bring a sin offering is unfit, whereas if one slaughtered it for a person obligated to bring a burnt offering, it is fit? Apparently, an improper intention that is of its type ruins it, whereas intent that is not of its type does not ruin it. But isn’t it taught in a baraita that if the carcass of a creeping animal is found inside an earthenware vessel, the vessel’s interior is rendered impure but not the interior of its interior, and even a vessel purified through rinsing, if placed in the earthenware vessel, protects food inside it from contracting impurity? Evidently, impurity in the airspace of an earthenware vessel can be contained by something not of its type. And Rav Ḥaviva resolves the contradiction as follows: The expression: Whose interior [tokho], is written four times. In other words, in the verse: “And every earthen vessel into whose interior [tokho] any of them falls, anything that is in its interior [tokho] shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:33), the word tokho is mentioned twice, and each time, the verse could have written: The interior. Since the possessive: Its, is added to each instance, the verse is interpreted exegetically as though the word interior [tokh] were mentioned four times: Interior [tokh], whose interior [tokho], interior [tokh], and its interior [tokho]. One of these is necessary to teach the matter itself, that an impure earthenware vessel imparts impurity to food in its airspace; and one instance is used for a verbal analogy between the two instances of the word interior, from which it is derived that an earthenware vessel itself contracts impurity from impure items in its airspace. One indicates that the interior airspace of this, i.e., an earthenware vessel, renders food impure, but not the interior of another type of vessel, which imparts impurity only through contact; and the other instance indicates that its interior, but not the interior of its interior, imparts impurity, and that even a vessel purified through rinsing, if placed in the earthenware vessel, protects food inside it from becoming impure. Consequently, it is derived from a verse that inside an earthenware vessel, other vessels not of its type can block the transmission of impurity. Since this halakha is derived from a verse written in that context, there is no reason to assume that a similar halakha would apply to slaughter.