Chagigah 10a — Talmud de Babylone

▶ 📖 Mishna with a rape, in which case it is not prohibited for the woman to return to her husband. There, it is referring to a woma…

with a rape, in which case it is not prohibited for the woman to return to her husband. There, it is referring to a woman who had relations willfully, and therefore she is forbidden to her husband. And if you wish, say that this and that are both dealing with a rape, and it is still not difficult. Here, where the transgression cannot be rectified, it is referring to one who raped the wife of a priest, as it is forbidden for a priest to have relations with his wife once she has intercourse with any other man, even unwillingly. There, it is referring to one who raped the wife of an Israelite, in which case there is no prohibition against her returning to her husband. Since the Gemara mentioned a Torah scholar who abandons the study of Torah, it cites a relevant verse: “Neither was there any peace to him that went out or came in due to the adversary” (Zechariah 8:10). Rav said: Once a person leaves the study of halakha, i.e., Mishna and Gemara, even for the study of the Torah itself, he will no longer have peace. The verses of the Torah are often obscure and it is difficult to learn halakha directly from them without the aid of the interpretations of the Talmud. And Shmuel said: This is referring to one who leaves the study of Talmud to learn Mishna. Whereas the reasoning of the Talmud is relatively clear, the Mishna cites legal rulings without explaining their reasoning. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The verse applies even to one who leaves the study of one Talmud for the other Talmud, i.e., who leaves off his study of the Jerusalem Talmud to begin the Babylonian Talmud, as he will encounter difficulties with the new style of learning. Incidental to the Festival peace-offering, the mishna describes the nature of various areas of Torah study. The halakhot of the dissolution of vows, when one requests from a Sage to dissolve them, fly in the air and have nothing to support them, as these halakhot are not mentioned explicitly in the Torah. There is only a slight allusion to the dissolution of vows in the Torah, which is taught by the Sages as part of the oral tradition. The halakhot of Shabbat, Festival peace-offerings, and misuse of consecrated property are like mountains suspended by a hair, as they have little written about them in the Torah, and yet the details of their halakhot are numerous. The details of monetary law, sacrificial rites, ritual purity and impurity, and the halakhot of those with whom relations are forbidden all have something to support them, i.e., there is ample basis in the Torah for these halakhot, and these are the essential parts of Torah.

▶ 💬 Guemara It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer said: The halakhot of the dissolution of vows have something to support the…

It is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer said: The halakhot of the dissolution of vows have something to support them, as it is stated: “When a man shall clearly utter a vow” (Leviticus 27:2), and: “When either man or woman shall clearly utter a vow” (Numbers 6:2), i.e., the words “clearly utter” appear twice. One clear utterance is for prohibition, i.e., when one states his intention to accept the vow, and one clear utterance is for dissolution, when he provides the Sage with a reason why the vow should no longer apply. This is an allusion in the Torah to the annulment of vows. Rabbi Yehoshua likewise says: These halakhot have something to support them, as it is stated: “Wherefore I swore in My wrath” (Psalms 95:11), meaning: In my wrath I swore, and I retracted. This is the basis for the dissolution of vows, in which the one who uttered the vow tells the Sage that he regrets it, as he did so in a moment of anger. Rabbi Yitzḥak says: These halakhot have something to support them, as it is stated: “Whoever is of a willing heart, let him bring it” (Exodus 35:5). This verse indicates that as long as one retains the same desire to fulfill the vow, he must continue to fulfill it, but if he regrets taking the vow he may arrange for it to be dissolved. Ḥananya, son of Rabbi Yehoshua’s brother, also says: They have something to support them, as it is stated: “I have sworn, and have fulfilled it, to observe your righteous ordinances” (Psalms 119:106). This verse indicates that certain oaths need not be fulfilled, i.e., those that have been dissolved. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: If I had been there, sitting with those Sages, I would have said to them: My source is better than yours, as it is stated: “He shall not nullify his word” (Numbers 30:3), from which it may be inferred: He himself cannot nullify his word; however, others, i.e., a Sage, may nullify it for him by dissolving his vow. Rava said: For all of the suggested sources for the dissolution of vows there is a possible refutation, except for that of Shmuel, for which there is no refutation. Rava elaborates. As, if it is derived from the statement of Rabbi Eliezer, perhaps the phrase: “Clearly utter” should be understood in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who said an alternative interpretation in the name of Rabbi Tarfon. As it is taught in a baraita with regard to two people who are arguing whether or not someone who passed before them is a nazirite, each of them declaring that if he is correct he himself will become a nazirite, Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Tarfon: Actually, neither of them is a nazirite, as naziriteship is effected only by means of a clear utterance and neither party is certain they will be a nazirite at the time of their utterance. He derives this halakha from this phrase: “Clearly utter.” Similarly, if it is derived from the statement of Rabbi Yehoshua, perhaps this is what the verse is saying: In my wrath I swore and I do not take it back, despite the fact that it was stated in a moment of anger. If it is derived from the statement of Rabbi Yitzḥak, perhaps the phrase “a willing heart” comes to exclude the statement of Shmuel, as Shmuel said: If one decided in his heart but did not verbalize a vow, it is insufficient, as he must verbally express it. And therefore this phrase teaches us that even though he did not verbally express the vow he is still obligated to fulfill it. Finally, if it is derived from the statement of Rabbi Ḥananya, son of Rabbi Yehoshua’s brother, perhaps the phrase “and fulfilled it” should be explained in accordance with the opinion of Rav Giddel, who said that Rav said a different interpretation of this verse. As Rav Giddel said that Rav said: From where is it derived that although one is already obligated to fulfill all mitzvot one may take an oath to fulfill a mitzva, and this is not considered an oath taken in vain? As it is stated: “I have sworn, and have fulfilled it, to observe Your righteous ordinances” (Psalms 119:106). Rav concludes. However, for Shmuel’s source there is no refutation. Rava said, and some say it was Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak who said: This explains the folk saying that people say: One spicy pepper is better than a basketful of squash, as the single pepper has more flavor than all the squash combined. § The mishna stated that the halakhot of Shabbat are like mountains suspended by a hair. The Gemara asks: But the halakhot of Shabbat are written, i.e., the prohibition against performing labor is explicit in the Torah. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to say this in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Abba. As Rabbi Abba said: One who digs a hole on Shabbat only because he needs its dirt and not for the hole itself is exempt from liability for that act, as this is not the labor of digging prohibited on Shabbat by Torah law. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion did Rabbi Abba issue this ruling? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who said: One who performs on Shabbat a labor that is not necessary for its own sake, i.e., he performs the labor for a purpose other than the direct result of the action, is exempt from liability for it. The Gemara offers an alternative possibility. This ruling can be explained even if you say that Rabbi Abba holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, that one is liable for a labor that is not necessary for its own sake. There, in other cases, Rabbi Yehuda deems one liable because his purpose is creative. Here, where one is digging the hole for the dirt, the purpose is destructive, as the action damages the ground. Therefore, Rabbi Yehuda concedes that in this case he is exempt. The Gemara returns to the mishna. What then does the mishna mean by the phrase: Like mountains suspended by a hair?

▶ 🇫🇷 Résumé en français Il est enseigné dans une baraita que Rabbi Eliezer a dit : Les halakhot de la dissolution des vœux ont quelque chose pou…

Il est enseigné dans une baraita que Rabbi Eliezer a dit : Les halakhot de la dissolution des vœux ont quelque chose pour les appuyer, comme il est dit : « Lorsqu’un homme prononcera clairement un vœu » (Lévitique 27:2), et : « Lorsque soit un homme, soit une femme prononcera clairement un vœu » (Nombres 6:2), c’est-à-dire que les mots « prononcera clairement » apparaissent deux fois. Une prononciation claire est pour l’interdiction, c’est-à-dire lorsqu’on déclare son intention d’accepter le vœu, et une prononciation claire est pour la dissolution, lorsqu’il fournit au Sage une raison pour laquelle le vœu ne devrait plus s’appliquer. C’est une allusion dans la Torah à l’annulation des vœux. Rabbi Yehoshua dit également : Ces halakhot ont quelque chose pour les appuyer, comme il est dit : « C’est pourquoi je jurai dans ma colère » (Psaumes 95:11), ce qui signifie : Dans ma colère j’ai juré, et je me suis rétracté. C’est la base de la dissolution des vœux, dans laquelle celui qui a prononcé le vœu dit au Sage qu’il le regrette, car il l’a fait dans un moment de colère. Rabbi Yitzḥak dit : Ces halakhot ont quelque chose pour les appuyer, comme il est dit : « Quiconque a un cœur généreux, qu’il l’apporte » (Exode 35:5). Ce verset indique que tant qu’on conserve le même désir d’accomplir le vœu, on doit continuer à l’accomplir, mais si on regrette d’avoir fait le vœu, on peut organiser sa dissolution. Ḥananya, fils du frère de Rabbi Yehoshua, dit également : Elles ont quelque chose pour les appuyer, comme il est dit : « J’ai juré, et je l’ai accompli, d’observer tes ordonnances justes » (Psaumes 119:106). Ce verset indique que certains serments n’ont pas besoin d’être accomplis, c’est-à-dire ceux qui ont été dissous. Rav Yehuda a dit que Shmuel a dit : Si j’avais été là, assis avec ces Sages, j’aurais dit : Ma source est meilleure que la vôtre, comme il est dit : « Il ne violera pas sa parole » (Nombres 30:3), d’où l’on peut déduire : Lui-même ne peut pas violer sa parole ; cependant, d’autres, c’est-à-dire un Sage, peuvent la violer pour lui en dissolvant son vœu. Rava a dit : Pour toutes les sources suggérées pour la dissolution des vœux il y a une possible réfutation, sauf pour celle de Shmuel, pour laquelle il n’y a pas de réfutation. Rava développe. Car, si on dérive de la déclaration de Rabbi Eliezer, peut-être la phrase : « Prononcera clairement » doit être comprise conformément à l’opinion de Rabbi Yehuda, qui a dit une interprétation alternative au nom de Rabbi Tarfon. Comme il est enseigné dans une baraita concernant deux personnes qui se disputent pour savoir si quelqu’un qui est passé devant eux est un naziréen, chacun déclarant que s’il a raison, lui-même deviendra naziréen, Rabbi Yehuda dit au nom de Rabbi Tarfon : En réalité, aucun d’eux n’est naziréen, car le naziréat n’est effectué que par le moyen d’une prononciation claire et aucune des parties n’est certaine qu’elle sera naziréenne au moment de sa prononciation. Il dérive cette halakha de cette phrase : « Prononcera clairement. » De même, si on dérive de la déclaration de Rabbi Yehoshua, peut-être voici ce que le verset dit : Dans ma colère j’ai juré et je ne le reprends pas, malgré le fait que cela a été dit dans un moment de colère. Si on dérive de la déclaration de Rabbi Yitzḥak, peut-être la phrase « un cœur généreux » vient pour exclure la déclaration de Shmuel, car Shmuel a dit : Si on a décidé dans son cœur mais n’a pas verbalisé un vœu, cela est insuffisant, car il doit l’exprimer verbalement. Et donc cette phrase nous apprend que même s’il n’a pas exprimé verbalement le vœu, il est néanmoins obligé de l’accomplir. Enfin, si on dérive de la déclaration de Rabbi Ḥananya, fils du frère de Rabbi Yehoshua, peut-être la phrase « et je l’ai accompli » doit être expliquée conformément à l’opinion de Rav Giddel, qui a dit que Rav a dit une interprétation différente de ce verset. Car Rav Giddel a dit que Rav a dit : D’où dérive-t-on que bien qu’on soit déjà obligé d’accomplir toutes les mitzvot, on peut prêter serment d’accomplir une mitzva, et cela n’est pas considéré comme un serment fait en vain ? Comme il est dit : « J’ai juré, et je l’ai accompli, d’observer tes ordonnances justes » (Psaumes 119:106). Rav conclut. Cependant, pour la source de Shmuel, il n’y a pas de réfutation. Rava a dit, et certains disent que c’était Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak qui a dit : Ceci explique le dicton populaire que les gens disent : Un piment épicé vaut mieux qu’un panier de courges, car le piment unique a plus de saveur que toutes les courges combinées. § La mishna a déclaré que les halakhot du Chabbat sont comme des montagnes suspendues à un cheveu. La Guemara demande : Mais les halakhot du Chabbat sont écrites, c’est-à-dire que l’interdiction d’effectuer un travail est explicite dans la Torah. La Guemara répond : Non, il est nécessaire de dire cela conformément à l’opinion de Rabbi Abba. Car Rabbi Abba a dit : Celui qui creuse un trou le Chabbat uniquement parce qu’il a besoin de sa terre et non pour le trou lui-même est exempt de responsabilité pour cet acte, car ce n’est pas le travail de creuser interdit le Chabbat par la loi de la Torah. La Guemara demande : Conformément à l’opinion de qui Rabbi Abba a-t-il rendu cette décision ? C’est conformément à l’opinion de Rabbi Shimon, qui a dit : Celui qui accomplit le Chabbat un travail qui n’est pas nécessaire pour lui-même, c’est-à-dire qu’il accomplit le travail dans un but autre que le résultat direct de l’action, est exempt de responsabilité pour cela. La Guemara offre une possibilité alternative. Cette décision peut être expliquée même si vous dites que Rabbi Abba tient conformément à l’o

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