📜 Guittin — 11b

With regard to witnesses who signed a bill of divorce and whose names are like the names of gentiles, what is the halakha? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: There came before us bills of divorce that were signed only with names such as Lukos and Los, and we deemed them valid by means of the witnesses of transmission. The Gemara infers: And this applies specifically to names such as Lukos and Los, as it is uncommon to find Jews who are called by these names. However, with regard to other gentile names, concerning which it is common to find Jews who are called by these names, no, the documents are not valid, as people might mistakenly rely on the signatures of gentiles. Reish Lakish raised an objection to this ruling from a baraita (Tosefta 4:8): With regard to bills of divorce that come from a country overseas, and witnesses are signed upon them, even though the names of the witnesses are like the names of gentiles, they are valid, because the names of most Jews outside of Eretz Yisrael are like the names of gentiles. This indicates that a bill of divorce is valid even when the names are not clearly those of gentiles. The Gemara answers: There the halakha is different, as it teaches the reason explicitly: Because the names of most Jews outside of Eretz Yisrael are like the names of gentiles. Consequently, it can be assumed that the court examined the matter at the time of the signing, and that the document was signed by Jews. However, in Eretz Yisrael it is more likely that ambiguous names are actually those of gentiles, and therefore a document of this kind is valid only when it is clear it was signed by gentiles, to avoid mistakes. This was one version of the discussion. And there are those who say that Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Yoḥanan about the very same case as in the baraita, and he resolved the matter for him from the baraita, that even if the names signed on a bill of divorce brought from outside of Eretz Yisrael are like the names of gentiles, they are valid. With regard to one who says to another: Give this bill of divorce to my wife, or: Give this bill of manumission to my slave, if before the document reaches the woman or the slave the giver wishes to retract his decision, then with regard to both of them, he can retract. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: One can retract his decision in the case of bills of divorce but not in the case of bills of manumission. The Rabbis explain the reason for their ruling: This is because one can act in a person’s interest in his absence, and therefore the agent acquires the document on behalf of the slave from the moment the owner hands the bill of manumission to the agent. But one can act to a person’s detriment only in his presence. The receipt of a bill of divorce is considered to be to a woman’s detriment, and therefore an agent cannot receive it for her without her consent. They explain further: The emancipation of a slave is in his interests, despite the fact that he receives sustenance from his master while a slave, as, if the master wishes not to sustain his slave he is allowed not to provide him with sustenance. This demonstrates that slavery is not in the interest of the slave, as he does not receive any guaranteed benefit. But if a husband wishes not to sustain his wife, he is not allowed to proceed in this manner. Consequently, marriage is in the interests of the woman. Rabbi Meir said to the Rabbis: But even so, it is not in the interest of a slave to be emancipated, as, if his master is a priest, he disqualifies his slave from partaking of teruma by emancipating him, just as a husband who is a priest disqualifies his Israelite wife from partaking of teruma by divorcing her. The Rabbis said to him: It is permitted for a priest’s slave to partake of teruma not because he has a right to sustenance, but rather because he is his master’s acquisition.