📜 Houllin — 4a

a string [dekurya] of birds, and the Jew does not know whether they were properly slaughtered, he severs the head of one of them and gives it to the Samaritan to eat. If the Samaritan ate it, it is permitted for the Jew to eat the meat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. But if the Samaritan did not eat the meat, it is prohibited to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. In arriving at their respective interpretations of the mishna, Abaye inferred from the first clause of the baraita and Rava inferred from the latter clause of the baraita. Abaye inferred from the first clause: The slaughter performed by a Samaritan is permitted in a case where there is a Jew actively supervising to ensure that the slaughter was performed properly, that the reason it is permitted is that the Jew is standing over him. But if the Jew exits and enters, then no, it is prohibited to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. Rava inferred from the latter clause: If the Jew came and found that the Samaritan already slaughtered the animal, the Jew cuts an olive-bulk of meat from the slaughtered animal and gives it to the Samaritan to eat. The reason that it is necessary to administer this test is due only to the fact that the Jew came and found that the Samaritan already slaughtered the animal. But in a case where the Jew exits and enters, it is permitted to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered ab initio. The Gemara raises an objection: And according to Abaye, the latter clause is difficult. The Gemara answers that Abaye could have said to you: The tanna also characterizes the case where a Jew exits and enters as a case of: If the Jew came and found the Samaritan. The Gemara raises an objection: And according to Rava, the first clause is difficult. The Gemara answers that Rava could have said to you: The case where a Jew exits and enters is also considered like a case where the Jew is standing over him, and it is included in that halakha. § The baraita continues: Similarly, if the Jew found a string of birds in the possession of a Samaritan, and the Jew does not know whether they were properly slaughtered, he severs the head of one of them and gives it to the Samaritan to eat. If the Samaritan ate it, it is permitted for the Jew to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. But if the Samaritan did not eat the meat, it is prohibited to eat from what the Samaritan slaughtered. The Gemara asks: Why is that a reliable indication? Let us be concerned that perhaps it is this bird alone, whose head the Jew severed, that the Samaritan slaughtered properly, and the rest are unslaughtered carcasses. Rav Menashe said an answer to this question. Before presenting his answer, the Gemara cites a mnemonic for the three statements of Rav Menashe cited in this tractate, this one and two others: Inserts, a scalpel (see 31a), into rams (see 51a). Rav Menashe’s answer is as follows: The case in the baraita is one where the Jew inserts the string of birds under the corners of his garment and hands the Samaritan the head of one of the birds. In that way, the Samaritan has no way of knowing from which bird the head was taken. If he ate it, apparently all the birds were slaughtered properly. The Gemara challenges: And perhaps the Samaritan placed a distinguishing mark in that bird, indicating to him that it is the kosher one. Rav Mesharshiyya said: The case in the baraita is one where the Jew crushed the head that he gave the Samaritan, thereby rendering it indistinguishable from the others. The Gemara challenges this answer: And perhaps the Samaritans hold there is no source for the slaughter of a bird in the Torah. Therefore, the fact that the Samaritan ate the bird’s head is no proof that the bird was properly slaughtered. The Gemara rejects that possibility: And according to your reasoning, those actions that disqualify the slaughter of an animal: Interrupting the slaughter, pressing the knife, concealing the knife in the course of an inverted slaughter, diverting [hagrama] the knife from the place of slaughter, and ripping the simanim from their place before cutting them, are they written in the Torah? Rather, even though the details are not all written in the Torah, once the Samaritans embraced those disqualifications, they embraced them, and a Jew may rely on their slaughter; when they eat from the meat, it is permitted for a Jew to eat the meat as well. Here too, although the requirement of ritual slaughter for a bird is not written in the Torah, once the Samaritans embraced the mitzva of ritual slaughter, they embraced it in the same manner that it is performed by Jews. And with regard to mitzvot that are not written explicitly in the Torah that Samaritans embraced, the question of whether they are presumed to fulfill them in the manner that Jews fulfill them or they are not presumed to do so is a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: It is permitted to eat the matza of a Samaritan on Passover, and a person fulfills his obligation to eat matza on the first night of Passover with it. Rabbi Elazar prohibits the consumption of the matza of a Samaritan on Passover, because the Samaritans are not experts in the details of mitzvot like Jews and do not know the precise nature of leaven prohibited by the Torah. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: On the contrary, with regard to any mitzva that the Samaritans embraced and accepted upon themselves, they are more exacting in its observance than are Jews. Therefore, one may assume that they prepared the matza properly. The Gemara proceeds to analyze that baraita. The Master said: It is permitted to eat the matza of a Samaritan on Passover, and a person fulfills his obligation to eat matza on the first night of Passover with it. The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that if the matza is permitted one fulfills his obligation with it on Passover? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that Samaritans are not expert in the mitzva of guarding the matza for the sake of the mitzva, the tanna teaches us that they are expert. Rabbi Elazar deems it prohibited to eat the matza of Samaritans on Passover, due to the fact that the Samaritans are not experts in the details of mitzvot. He holds that Samaritans are not expert in the mitzva of guarding the matza for the sake of the mitzva. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: With regard to any mitzva that Samaritans embraced and accepted upon themselves, they are more exacting in its observance than are Jews. The Gemara raises an objection: That is identical to the opinion of the first tanna. The Gemara explains: There is a practical difference between their opinions with regard to a mitzva that is written but with regard to which the Samaritans did not embrace it. The first tanna holds: Once the mitzva is written in the Torah, even if there is no knowledge that they embraced it, Samaritans can be relied upon to perform it properly. And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds: Even with regard to a mitzva written in the Torah, if they embraced its observance, yes, one may rely on the Samaritans, but if they did not embrace its observance, no, one may not rely on them. The Gemara challenges: If it is so that this is the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, the formulation of his statement is imprecise. He said: With regard to any mitzva that Samaritans embraced and accepted upon themselves, they are more exacting in its observance than are Jews; this indicates that one may rely upon Samaritans to observe those mitzvot even if they are not written in the Torah. Therefore, he should have said: If they embraced, which addresses the statement of the first tanna. Contrary to the first tanna, who said that one may rely upon Samaritans with regard to any mitzva that is written, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says that one may rely upon them only if they embraced the mitzva. Rather, there is a practical difference between their opinions with regard to a mitzva that is not written and with regard to which the Samaritans embraced its observance. The first tanna holds: Since it is not written, even though they embraced its observance one may also not rely upon them. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds: Once it is known that they embraced observance of a mitzva, they embraced the mitzva and one may rely upon them. § With regard to the statement of Rava cited earlier (3a), the Gemara analyzes the matter itself. Rava says: In the case of a Jewish transgressor whose transgression is that he eats unslaughtered animal carcasses to satisfy his appetite, if he seeks to slaughter an animal, one examines a knife to ensure that it is perfectly smooth with no nicks and gives it to the transgressor, and it is permitted to eat from what he slaughtered. The Gemara explains: What is the reason? Since in this case there is the option to slaughter the animal in a permitted manner or to slaughter the animal in a prohibited manner, such a transgressor would not intentionally forsake the permitted manner and eat food slaughtered in a prohibited manner. Since he has a knife that was examined and the majority of those associated with slaughter are experts, the food is presumed to be permitted, and there is no concern that perhaps he intentionally sabotaged the slaughter. The Gemara challenges: If so, then even in a case where the Jew did not examine the knife, it should be permitted to eat from the animal slaughtered by the transgressor. The Gemara answers: It is prohibited because if the transgressor discovers that the knife is flawed, he does not exert himself to replace it with a knife with a smooth blade. The Sages said to Rava: A baraita is taught that supports your opinion: With regard to the leavened bread of transgressors, who do not eradicate their leavened bread before Passover, after Passover