▶💬GuemaraIf the animal killed a man, who is commanded in all mitzvot, yes, its owner should have to pay the ransom, but if the an…
If the animal killed a man, who is commanded in all mitzvot, yes, its owner should have to pay the ransom, but if the animal killed a woman, who is obligated in only some mitzvot, no, he is exempt from the ransom. And conversely: If the Torah had taught us that men and women are equated only in this case of the ransom, one might say that because there is the loss of life the Merciful One has pity on her and therefore the owner of the animal is always obligated to pay the ransom. But with regard to those two other categories, I might say no, a woman is not equated to a man. Therefore it was necessary to mention them all.
§ The mishna teaches that women are obligated in all prohibitions except for the prohibitions of: Do not round the corners of one’s head, and: Do not destroy the corners of your beard, and: Do not contract ritual impurity from a corpse. The Gemara asks: Granted, a woman of priestly lineage is not obligated in the mitzva of: Do not contract ritual impurity from a corpse, as it is written: “Speak to the priests, the sons of Aaron, and say to them: None shall become impure for the dead among his people” (Leviticus 21:1). This verse teaches that the prohibition applies to the sons of Aaron, but not the daughters of Aaron. But from where do we derive the prohibitions of: Do not round the corners of one’s head, and: Do not destroy the corners of your beard?
The Gemara answers that this is as it is written: “You shall not round the corners of your head and you shall not destroy the corners of your beard” (Leviticus 19:27). The juxtaposition of the two prohibitions teaches that anyone who is included in the prohibition against destroying the beard is included in the prohibition against rounding the head. And since these women are not included in the prohibition against destroying, they are also not included in the prohibition against rounding the head.
The Gemara asks: And from where do we derive that women are not obligated in the prohibition against destroying the corners of one’s beard? The Gemara answers: If you wish, propose a logical reason, as ordinarily women do not have a beard. And if you wish, cite a verse that teaches this point, as the verse states: “You shall not round the corners of your head [roshekhem] and you shall not destroy the corners of your beard [zekanekha]” (Leviticus 19:27).
The Gemara explains: From the fact that the verse changed its language, as the term “your head [roshekhem]” is in the plural while “your beard [zekanekha]” is in the singular, it can be inferred that if so, if the prohibition against destroying one’s beard applied to everyone, let the Merciful One write: And you shall not destroy the corners of your beards [zekanekhem], in the plural, so that the end of the verse parallels the beginning. What is indicated by the fact that the verse states: “And you shall not destroy the corners of your beard [zekanekha],” in the singular? This serves to teach: Your beard is included, but not your wife’s beard.
The Gemara asks: And is a woman not included in this prohibition? But isn’t it taught in a baraita (Tosefta, Nega’im 4:8): The beard of a woman and that of a eunuch, if they grow facial hair, are considered like a beard for all matters. What, is it not the case that this statement is referring to the prohibition against destroying?Abaye said: You cannot say that the baraita is referring to destroying, as it is derived that a woman is exempt through the verbal analogy of “the corners of your beard” (Leviticus 19:27) here and “the corners of their beard” (Leviticus 21:5) from the sons of Aaron: Just as there, in the case of priests, women are certainly exempt from the mitzva, as the verse is referring to the male descendants of Aaron who perform the Temple service and not to women, so too here, with regard to the prohibition against destroying one’s beard, which is stated to all Jews, women are exempt. At this stage the Gemara assumes that the exclusion of women denoted by the verse: “Speak to the priests, the sons of Aaron” (Leviticus 21:1), which excludes women, is applied to all the mitzvot stated in that chapter, including destroying the corners of one’s beard.
The Gemara asks: But if we maintain that when the Merciful One writes: “The sons of Aaron” (Leviticus 21:1), it is written with regard to the entire manner of that chapter, including the prohibition against destroying one’s beard, let the verse, i.e., the Torah, be silent and not state about this prohibition concerning all Jews. And this halakhacould be derived through an a fortiori inference, as I could say the following: And if with regard to priests, for whom the verse includes additional mitzvot, this prohibition applies only to the sons of Aaron and not the daughters of Aaron, is it not all the more so the case with regard to Israelites, who have fewer mitzvot, that only men should be obligated and not women?
The Gemara answers: Nevertheless, the verbal analogy is necessary. Were it not for the verbal analogy, I would say that the halakhot of ritual impurity concluded discussion of that matter. In other words, the exclusion of women denoted by the phrase “the sons of Aaron” applies only to the halakhot of impurity, which appear immediately after that phrase. Conversely, the other halakhot mentioned in this chapter, including the prohibition against destroying the beard, apply to women as well.
The Gemara asks: If so, now too, let us say that the halakhot of ritual impurity concluded discussion of that matter, and the daughters of Aaron are also prohibited to destroy their beards. And if you maintain that the reason the prohibition stated with regard to priests does not apply to women is due to the verbal analogy employing the term “the corners of,” which serves to connect the halakha stated with regard to priests with the halakha stated with regard to all Jews, that verbal analogy is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: The verse states with regard to priests: “Neither shall they shave off the corners of their beard” (Leviticus 21:5). One might have thought that a priest would be liable even if he shaved his beard with scissors. Therefore the verse states, in a command issued to all Jews: “And you shall not destroy the corners of your beard” (Leviticus 19:27). This teaches that one is liable only for destroying the beard to the root, which is not achieved with scissors.
The baraita continues: One might have thought that if he extracted his hairs with tweezers, which uproot hairs, or small planes [uvirhitni], he should likewise be liable for destroying his hair. The verse therefore states: “Neither shall they shave off the corners of their beard,” to teach that shaving alone is prohibited and these actions are not considered shaving. How can both these requirements for the prohibition be met? The verse is referring to a type of shaving that involves destruction. You must say this is shaving with a razor. According to this baraita, the verbal analogy is necessary to define the action included in the prohibition against destroying, not to teach who is included in the prohibition.
The Gemara explains: If it is so that the verbal analogy teaches only which action is included in the prohibition against destroying, let the verse write: That which is of your beard. What is added by the expression “the corners of your beard”? Conclude two conclusions from it, both the definition of the prohibition against shaving and the exemption of women.
The Gemara returns to its question. But that which is taught in the baraita: The beard of a woman and that of a eunuch, if they grew facial hair, are considered like a beard for all matters, with regard to what halakha is this stated? Mar Zutra says: It is stated with regard to ritual impurity from leprosy. A leprous sore in the beard of a woman or a eunuch is treated like an affliction of the beard, not like an affliction on the skin. Different halakhot apply to leprous sores that develop on various parts of the body.
The Gemara objects: Concerning ritual impurity from leprosy, it is written explicitly: “And when a man or woman has a plague upon the head or upon the beard” (Leviticus 13:29). This indicates that there is no difference between a man and woman with regard to the beard in the case of leprosy. The baraita would not state a halakha that is explicit in the verse. Rather, Mar Zutra says: This baraita is referring to ritual purification from leprosy, i.e., women can also be purified from leprosy of the beard.
The Gemara asks: With regard to ritual purification from leprosy it is also obvious: Since impurity applies to a woman, purity likewise applies to her. The Gemara answers: It was necessary to state this with regard to the impurity of afflictions of the beard, as it might enter your mind to say that this verse is written disjunctively, i.e., that the phrase: “And when a man or woman has a plague upon the head,” applies to both a man or a woman; whereas when it states: “Or upon the beard,” we have come back to the case of a man alone. Therefore the baraitateaches us that this phrase is not referring solely to a man, as there is no difference between a man and a woman with regard to leprosy.
Isi taught in a baraita: Women are also exempt from the prohibition: Do not make baldness upon your heads, a prohibition against tearing out one’s hair in grief over someone’s death. The Gemara asks: What is the reason of Isi? The Gemara explains that he teaches as follows: The verse states: “You are the sons of the Lord your God; you shall not cut yourselves, nor make any baldness between your eyes for the dead. For you are a holy people to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 14:1–2). This verse, which applies to sons and not daughters, is referring to causing baldness, and therefore this prohibition includes only men.
The Gemara asks: Do you say that this is referring to causing baldness, or is it perhaps referring only to the prohibition against cutting, which appears first? The Gemara answers that when it states: “For you are a holy people to the Lord your God,” it is stated with regard to the prohibition against cutting, and this verse applies to both men and women, as they are all members of God’s people. How then do I realize and explain the emphasis on sons and not daughters? This is referring to the prohibition against causing baldness.
The Gemara asks: And what did you see to include cutting and to exclude causing baldness? Perhaps the opposite is true, and causing baldness applies to men and women whereas cutting applies only to men. The Gemara answers: I include cutting, whose prohibition is broader, as it is applicable both in a place of hair and not in a place of hair; and I exclude causing baldness, which is more limited, as it applies only in a place of hair.
The Gemara asks: But one can say that the limitation of sons and not daughters applies both to causing baldness and to cutting, and when the verse writes: “For you are a holy people to the Lord your God,” that is written with regard to scoring oneself. The prohibition against scoring oneself is derived from a verbal analogy from a verse stated with regard to priests (see Leviticus 21:5), which applies to both men and women. The Gemara answers: Isi maintains that scoring oneself and cutting
▶🇫🇷Résumé en françaisSi l’animal a tué un homme, qui est tenu à toutes les mitsvot, oui, son propriétaire devrait devoir payer la rançon, mai…
Si l’animal a tué un homme, qui est tenu à toutes les mitsvot, oui, son propriétaire devrait devoir payer la rançon, mais si l’animal a tué une femme, qui n’est obligée qu’à certaines mitsvot, non, il est exempté de la rançon. Et inversement : Si la Torah avait enseigné que les hommes et les femmes sont assimilés uniquement dans ce cas de la rançon, on pourrait dire que parce qu’il y a perte de vie, le Miséricordieux a pitié d’elle et donc le propriétaire de l’animal est toujours obligé de payer la rançon. Mais en ce qui concerne ces deux autres catégories, je pourrais dire non, une femme n’est pas assimilée à un homme. C’est pourquoi il a été nécessaire de toutes les mentionner.
§ La mishna enseigne que les femmes sont obligées à toutes les interdictions sauf les interdictions de : Ne pas arrondir les coins de la tête, et : Ne pas détruire les coins de la barbe, et : Ne pas contracter d’impureté rituelle d’un cadavre. La Guemara demande : Certes, une femme de lignée sacerdotale n’est pas obligée à la mitsva de : Ne pas contracter d’impureté rituelle d’un cadavre, comme il est écrit : « Parle aux prêtres, fils d’Aaron, et dis-leur : Nul ne se rendra impur pour un mort parmi son peuple » (Lévitique 21:1). Ce verset enseigne que l’interdiction s’applique aux fils d’Aaron, mais non aux filles d’Aaron. Mais d’où déduisons-nous les interdictions de : Ne pas arrondir les coins de la tête, et : Ne pas détruire les coins de la barbe ?
La Guemara répond que c’est comme il est écrit : « Vous ne arrondirez pas les coins de votre tête et tu ne détruiras pas les coins de ta barbe » (Lévitique 19:27). La juxtaposition des deux interdictions enseigne que quiconque est inclus dans l’interdiction de détruire la barbe est inclus dans l’interdiction d’arrondir la tête. Et puisque ces femmes ne sont pas incluses dans l’interdiction de détruire, elles ne sont également pas incluses dans l’interdiction d’arrondir la tête.
La Guemara demande : Et d’où déduisons-nousque les femmes ne sont pas obligées à l’interdiction de détruire les coins de la barbe ? La Guemara répond : Si tu veux, propose une raison logique, car ordinairement les femmes n’ont pas de barbe. Et si tu veux, cite un verset qui enseigne ce point, comme le verset dit : « Vous ne arrondirez pas les coins de votre tête [roshekhem] et tu ne détruiras pas les coins de ta barbe [zekanekha] » (Lévitique 19:27).
La Guemara explique : Du fait que le verset a changé son langage, car le terme « votre tête [roshekhem] » est au pluriel tandis que « ta barbe [zekanekha] » est au singulier, on peut en déduire que s’il en est ainsi, si l’interdiction de détruire sa barbe s’appliquait à tous, que le Miséricordieux écrive : Et vous ne détruirez pas les coins de vos barbes [zekanekhem], au pluriel, afin que la fin du verset corresponde au début. Qu’indique le fait que le verset dit : « Et tu ne détruiras pas les coins de ta barbe [zekanekha] », au singulier ? Cela sert à enseigner : Ta barbe est incluse, mais non la barbe de ta femme.
La Guemara demande : Et une femme n’est-elle pas incluse dans cette interdiction ? Mais n’est-il pas enseigné dans une baraita (Tossefta, Nega’im 4:8) : La barbe d’une femme et celle d’un eunuque, si des poils du visage poussent, sont considérées comme une barbe pour toutes les questions. Quoi, n’est-ce pas que cette déclaration se réfère à l’interdiction de détruire ?Abaye dit : Tu ne peux pas dire que la baraita se réfère à détruire, car il est dérivé qu’une femme est exemptée par l’analogie verbale de « les coins de ta barbe » (Lévitique 19:27) ici et « les coins de leur barbe » (Lévitique 21:5) des fils d’Aaron : De même que là, dans le cas des prêtres, les femmes sont certainement exemptées de la mitsva, car le verset se réfère aux descendants mâles d’Aaron qui accomplissent le service du Temple et non aux femmes, de même ici, en ce qui concerne l’interdiction de détruire sa barbe, qui est énoncée à tous les Juifs, les femmes sont exemptées. À ce stade, la Guemara suppose que l’exclusion des femmes indiquée par le verset : « Parle aux prêtres, les fils d’Aaron » (Lévitique 21:1), qui exclut les femmes, est appliquée à toutes les mitsvot énoncées dans ce chapitre, y compris détruire les coins de sa barbe.
La Guemara demande : Mais si nous maintenons que lorsque le Miséricordieux écrit : « Les fils d’Aaron » (Lévitique 21:1), cela est écrit en ce qui concerne toute la manière de ce chapitre, y compris l’interdiction de détruire sa barbe, que le verset, c’est-à-dire la Torah, se taise et ne dise pasà propos de cette interdiction concernant tous les Juifs. Et cette halakhapourrait être dérivée par une inférence a fortiori, car je pourrais dire ce qui suit : Et si en ce qui concerne les prêtres, pour lesquels le verset inclut des mitsvot supplémentaires, cette interdiction s’applique uniquement aux fils d’Aaron et non aux filles d’Aaron, n’est-ce pas à plus forte raison le cas en ce qui concerne les Israélites, qui ont moins de mitsvot, que seuls les hommes devraient être obligés et non les femmes ?
La Guemara répond : Néanmoins, l’analogie verbale est nécessaire. N’eût été l’analogie verbale, je dirais que les halakhot d’impureté rituelle concluaient la discussion de cette affaire. En d’autres termes, l’exclusion des femmes indiquée par l’expression « les fils d’Aaron » s’applique uniquement aux halakhot d’impureté, qui apparaissent immédiatement après cette expression. Inversement,
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▶✝️Réponse ScripturaLa distinction entre hommes et femmes pour certaines interdictions, comme celle de détruire les coins de la barbe, est d…
La distinction entre hommes et femmes pour certaines interdictions, comme celle de détruire les coins de la barbe, est déduite de Lévitique 19:27 et Lévitique 21:1, où le langage même de la Torah oriente l’application. Cette précision rabbinique témoigne du sérieux avec lequel Israël recevait chaque parole de Dieu, sérieux que Jésus confirme en disant qu’aucun iota de la Loi ne passera (Matthieu 5:18).
Sans Jésus, vous êtes perdu. Mais Christ est mort pour vos péchés et il est ressuscité : recevez-le avant qu'il ne soit trop tard. « Si tu confesses de ta bouche le Seigneur Jésus, et si tu crois dans ton cœur que Dieu l'a ressuscité des morts, tu seras sauvé. » — Romains 10:9