📜 Meilah — 2b

§ A dilemma was raised before the Sages: In a case where a rite was performed in the wrong location, e.g., offerings of the most sacred order were slaughtered in the south rather than the north, if the offerings had already ascended the altar, what is the halakha as to whether they descend, i.e., are they removed from the altar or are they sacrificed? Rabba says: If they ascended the altar, they shall descend. Rav Yosef says: If they ascended the altar, they shall not descend. With regard to this dilemma, the Gemara cites a relevant dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon in a mishna (Zevaḥim 84a). Rabbi Yehuda maintains that in certain cases when an offering became disqualified in the sacred area, i.e., the Temple courtyard, it was removed from the altar. By contrast, Rabbi Shimon rules that any offering that became disqualified once it was already inside the Temple courtyard was not removed from the altar if it ascended there. The Gemara states: In accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, you should not raise this dilemma, as everyone, i.e., both Rabba and Rav Yosef, agrees that in the cases of the mishna Rabbi Yehuda would rule that even if the disqualified offerings have ascended the altar, they must descend. They disagree when the dilemma is raised according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. Rav Yosef holds in accordance with a straightforward interpretation of the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, that the offerings listed in the mishna do not descend from the altar, as they became disqualified inside the Temple courtyard. By contrast, Rabba could have said to you: Rabbi Shimon states that the offerings do not descend only with regard to cases such as the bird sin offering, whose blood should be placed below the red line on the altar, which one placed above the red line; or with regard to offerings such as the bird burnt offering, whose blood should be placed above the red line, which one placed below that line. And therefore, Rabbi Shimon is actually dealing with cases where one slaughtered the offerings and collected their blood in the north, in accordance with the halakha. But here, in the cases of the mishna, since one slaughtered them in the south, it is considered as though they were strangled to death, and were not slaughtered at all. Consequently, Rabbi Shimon agrees that they should be removed from the altar. We learned in the mishna: With regard to offerings of the most sacred order that were disqualified before their blood was sprinkled on the altar, if one slaughtered them in the south of the Temple courtyard, he is liable for misusing them if he derives benefit from them. Granted, according to the opinion of Rav Yosef, this halakha works out well. Since they remain consecrated and do not become permitted to the priests, they may remain on the altar. But according to the opinion of Rabba, it is difficult: If these offerings must be removed from the altar, why can one be liable for misusing them? The Gemara explains: What is the meaning of the clause: One is liable for misusing them? This means that one is liable for misusing them by rabbinic law, but they are not subject to the halakhot of misuse by Torah law. The Gemara inquires: What practical difference is there between misuse by Torah law and misuse by rabbinic law? The Gemara explains that those who misuse by Torah law must pay an additional one-fifth to the Temple treasury, over and above the principal. By contrast, misuse by rabbinic law does not render one obligated to pay the additional one-fifth. The Gemara asks: And is there a concept of misuse of consecrated property by rabbinic law? The Gemara answers: Yes there is, as Ulla said that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: Sacrificial animals that died have been removed from the halakhot of misuse by Torah law. Evidently, it is by Torah law that the halakhot of misuse do not apply to them, but by rabbinic law they do apply to them. So too in this case, where the animals are slaughtered in the south, they are subject to misuse by rabbinic law. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If Rabba is correct that the mishna is referring to misuse by rabbinic law, let us say that we already learned in the mishna that which Ulla says that Rabbi Yoḥanan said. Why, then, was it necessary for Ulla to repeat this halakha? The Gemara explains: Even though we already learned it in the mishna, the statement of Ulla was necessary: It might enter your mind to say that here, with regard to offerings slaughtered in the south, people will not distance themselves from them, as they are no different in appearance from animals sacrificed properly, and therefore the Sages decreed that they are subject to misuse by rabbinic law. But in the case of sacrificial animals that died, and were never slaughtered at all, since people distance themselves from them, one might say that they are not subject to misuse even by rabbinic law. There-fore, Ulla teaches us that they are nevertheless subject to misuse by rabbinic law. The Gemara raises a further difficulty: Didn’t we also learn in a mishna that sacrificial animals that died are subject to the halakhot of misuse by rabbinic law? As the mishna (18a) teaches: One who derives benefit from a sin offering while it is alive is not liable for misuse until he causes it one peruta worth of damage. But if he derives benefit from it when it is dead, since it will not be redeemed it cannot be damaged. Therefore, once he derives one peruta worth of benefit from it, even without damaging it, he is liable for misuse. This misuse must apply by rabbinic law, as sacrificial animals that have died are not subject to the halakhot of misuse by Torah law. If so, the halakha that these animals are subject to misuse by rabbinic law is already stated in a mishna and therefore there is no reason for Ulla to repeat it. The Gemara answers: It might enter your mind