📜 Meilah — 3b

it is admitted by the partitions of the courtyard for all matters; and from that point onward it has the status of a burnt offering sacrificed in the Temple with regard to all halakhot. The Gemara continues: In this regard, Rabbi Elazar asks: In the case of a burnt offering consecrated to be sacrificed on a personal altar that one brought into the Temple courtyard and it was rendered unfit for sacrifice, e.g., it was slaughtered in the south rather than its proper place in the north, if its limbs ascended the altar to be sacrificed, what is the halakha as to whether they should descend? Although the animal was disqualified due to the change in location, had it been slaughtered in the south on a personal altar it would not have been disqualified. The Gemara concludes: From the fact that Rabbi Elazar asked this question only with regard to this one case, one can conclude that in the other case, where the burnt offering was consecrated for sacrifice in the Temple, the halakha of the limbs that ascended the altar is obvious to him. He either holds that the halakha is that they are not sacrificed, in accordance with the opinion of Rabba, or he maintains that they are sacrificed, in accordance with the opinion of Rav Yosef. The Gemara rejects this inference, as it is possible that Rabbi Elazar was actually uncertain with regard to that case as well; but he raises one dilemma as a result of the other. In other words, Rabbi Elazar was asking two questions, one predicated on the other, and the second question is valid regardless of whether he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabba or Rav Yosef. The Gemara elaborates: Even if Rabbi Elazar holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabba, that in a regular case the limbs are removed from the altar, one can claim that Rabba says that if the limbs ascend the altar they shall descend only there, i.e., if the burnt offering was consecrated for sacrifice in the Temple. In that case, the owner consecrated the offering with the intention of sacrificing it within the partition of the courtyard, where slaughtering is performed properly, in the north. Consequently, if it was slaughtered in the south, that renders the offering entirely disqualified, and therefore even if it ascended the altar it must descend. But in a case where he consecrated the offering in order to sacrifice it improperly on a personal altar, slaughtering it in the south does not render the offering entirely disqualified, and therefore if it ascends the altar it does not descend. Or perhaps, the opposite is the case: Even according to the opinion of Rav Yosef, who said that if it ascends the altar it shall not descend, that halakha applies only in a case where the owner consecrated the offering in order to sacrifice it within the partition of the courtyard, in which case it was consecrated properly. In such an instance, the offering is admitted by the partitions of the courtyard, and therefore even in a case where it was disqualified, if it ascended the altar it does not descend. By contrast, in a case where he consecrated it in order to sacrifice it improperly on a personal altar, the offering is not admitted at all by the partitions of the courtyard, which means that even if it ascends the altar it must descend. The Gemara concludes that the dilemma shall stand unresolved [teiku]. § With regard to the misuse of offerings that were rendered unfit, Rav Giddel says that Rav said: Sprinkling the blood of an offering with the intent to consume it after its appointed time [piggul], in a case where there was piggul intent during the slaughter as well, does not remove the meat of the offering from the status of being subject to the halakhot of misuse, in the case of offerings of the most sacred order. The reason is that its meat is still classified as “the sacred items of the Lord” (Leviticus 5:15), since there was no proper sprinkling that permitted the priests to partake of the offering, as it is piggul. Similarly, this sprinkling does not bring the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity into the status of being subject to the halakhot of misuse, as only a valid sprinkling confers that status. The Gemara relates that Abaye sat and related this halakha, which Rav Giddel said that Rav said. Rav Pappa raised an objection to Abaye from a mishna (Menaḥot 78b): With regard to one who slaughters the thanks offering in its proper place inside the Temple courtyard, and at that time, its forty accompanying loaves were outside the wall, where it is prohibited to partake of the loaves, the loaves are not sanctified by this slaughtering. Likewise, if he slaughtered the thanks offering before the surface of the loaves formed a crust in the oven, and this is the halakha even if the surface of all the loaves formed a crust except for one of them, the loaves are not sanctified, even those that had already formed a crust. If the priest slaughtered the thanks offering with the intent to partake of it or to burn the portions consumed on the altar beyond its designated time and it was thereby rendered piggul, or outside its designated area and was disqualified, the loaves are sanctified and are subject to the halakhot of misuse. This is presumably the case even if he also sprinkled the blood with piggul intent, as the mishna does not differentiate in this regard. The Gemara explains the objection: Evidently, sprinkling the blood of offerings of lesser sanctity with the intent of piggul subjects offerings of lesser sanctity to the halakhot of misuse. This apparently contradicts the opinion that Abaye stated that Rav Giddel said that Rav said. Abaye was silent, and was unable to resolve the difficulty against Rav’s statement. When Abaye came before Rabbi Abba and reported Rav Pappa’s comments, Rabbi Abba said to Abaye: That is not a difficulty, as Rav Giddel said that the intent of piggul during sprinkling does not subject offerings of lesser sanctity to the halakhot of misuse. Since the offering is rendered full-fledged piggul and is disqualified, it cannot become subject to the halakhot of misuse. By contrast, the mishna in Menaḥot is referring specifically to the intent of piggul during slaughtering, whereas there was no such intent during sprinkling. In such a case, the sprinkling was performed with proper intent, and therefore it subjects the offering to the halakhot of misuse. Rav Ashi said to Rava, with regard to this explanation of Rav Giddel’s statement: But doesn’t Ulla say: In the case of a handful that is piggul, which is unfit for sacrifice, that was brought up onto the altar to be sacrificed and was burned by the fire of the altar, its piggul status lapsed from it, and it is fit for sacrifice? And since the removal of the handful in the case of the meal offering is the same as slaughtering animal offerings, i.e., it is the equivalent rite, and in this case the improper intent during the removal of the handful rendered the meal offering piggul, the same should apply to slaughtering in the case of an animal offering: The sacrificial portions of the offerings of lesser sanctity should be rendered full-fledged piggul by slaughtering alone with the intent of piggul, regardless of the intent during sprinkling. If so, Rabbi Abba’s answer above is incorrect. Rava said to Rav Ashi: This is not a difficulty, as Ulla did not mean that the intent during the removal of the handful alone rendered the meal offering full-fledged piggul. Rather, he meant that a prohibited act was performed upon it which brings it to a status of piggul, but the full status of piggul is attained only if there is also improper intent at the time of the sacrificing of the handful, which is equivalent to sprinkling in the case of an animal.