Meilah 4b — Talmud de Babylone

▶ 💬 Guemara And furthermore, one may cite proof for the opinion of Rav Giddel from that baraita, as the latter clause of the baraita…

And furthermore, one may cite proof for the opinion of Rav Giddel from that baraita, as the latter clause of the baraita teaches: If its blood was left overnight instead of being sprinkled on the altar on the day it was slaughtered, even though the priest later sprinkled it on the following day, nevertheless, one who derives benefit from it is liable for misuse of consecrated property. The Gemara analyzes this statement of the baraita: Granted, if you say that the baraita is referring to a sin offering, then it is well. Since the blood was disqualified for sprinkling by being left overnight, it does not become permitted to the priests even after the blood is sprinkled, and is therefore subject to the halakhot of misuse. But if the blood had not been left overnight, the offering would not be subject to the halakhot of misuse, as the sprinkling would have removed the sin offering from that category due to the fact that it became permitted for the priests. But if you say that the baraita is referring to a burnt offering, does it need to be said that it is still subject to the halakhot of misuse? A burnt offering remains subject to the halakhot of misuse even if the blood had not been left overnight and the sprinkling was performed properly, as it never becomes permitted to the priests. The Gemara comments: The latter clause of the baraita certainly supports the opinion of Rav Giddel, as it clearly shows that an unfit sprinkling does not remove an offering from being subject to the halakhot of misuse. But with regard to the first clause of the baraita, what does it teach concerning the opinion of Rav Giddel? Is it reasonable to say that since the latter clause of the baraita supports the opinion of Rav Giddel, the earlier clause, which states that piggul is always subject to the halakhot of misuse, also supports his opinion? The Gemara rejects this suggestion: It is not even certain that the latter clause supports Rav Giddel, as it is possible that although the sprinkling of blood that was left overnight does not remove an offering from being subject to the halakhot of misuse, nevertheless, sprinkling after piggul does achieve this. The Gemara clarifies: What is the difference between the two cases? The difference is with regard to leaving the blood overnight, where it is performed in relation to an action, i.e., the priest failed to act in the proper manner, sprinkling the blood is not effective to remove the offering from the status of being subject to the halakhot of misuse. By contrast, in the case of sprinkling after piggul, where the disqualification is merely a function of intent, which is not performed in relation to an action, perhaps sprinkling the blood is effective to remove the offering from the status of being subject to the halakhot of misuse. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this baraita supports the opinion of Rav Giddel: With regard to an offering of the most sacred order that is piggul, one who derives benefit from it is liable for misuse of consecrated property.Does this not mean that it is subject to the halakhot of misuse even though the priest sprinkled its blood, and if so this baraita supports Rav Giddel’s opinion? The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, one cannot cite a proof from this baraita, as it is possible that it is referring to a case where the priest did not yet sprinkle the blood. The Gemara asks: But if that is so, what, then, is the halakha if the priest did sprinkle the blood? Is the halakha indeed that one is not liable for misusing it? If so, why is it taught in the latter clause of the baraita: Unlike an offering of the most sacred order, in the case of an offering of lesser sanctity, one who derives benefit from it is not liable for misuse of consecrated property? The Gemara explains the difficulty: If there is a difference between whether or not the priest sprinkled the blood, let the baraita distinguish and teach the distinction in the first clause, with regard to the case of offerings of the most sacred order itself, as follows: Before the sprinkling of the blood one is liable for misusing the offering, but after the sprinkling of the blood one is not liable for misusing it. It is not necessary to mention offerings of lesser sanctity at all. The Gemara concludes: That statement in the latter clause of the baraita certainly supports Rav Giddel’s opinion. The Gemara suggests: Shall we say that since the latter clause supports the opinion of Rav Giddel, the first clause also supports his opinion? The Gemara again answers that even the latter clause does not necessarily support the opinion of Rav Giddel, as one can explain that the reason the baraita distinguishes between offerings of the most sacred order and offerings of lesser sanctity, rather than providing a distinction within the category of offerings of the most sacred order itself, is that the case of offerings of lesser sanctity is clear-cut, i.e., all cases of offerings of lesser sanctity that are piggul are not subject to the halakhot of misuse. By contrast, here in the case of offerings of the most sacred order, it is not clear-cut, as there is a difference depending on the sprinkling of the blood. § The mishna teaches that Rabbi Yehoshua said a principle with regard to misuse of disqualified sacrificial animals: With regard to any sacrificial animal that had a period of fitness to the priests before it was disqualified, one is not liable for misusing it. Misuse fundamentally applies to items consecrated to God, which are not permitted for human consumption at all. Once the offering was permitted for consumption by the priests, it is no longer in that category. And with regard to any sacrificial animal that did not have a period of fitness for the priests before it was disqualified, one is liable for misusing it, as it remained consecrated to God throughout. The mishna clarifies: Which is the sacrificial animal that had a period of fitness for the priests? This category includes a sacrificial animal whose meat remained overnight after it was properly sacrificed, and was therefore disqualified as notar, and one that was disqualified when it became ritually impure after it was properly sacrificed, and one that left the Temple courtyard after it was properly sacrificed and was thereby disqualified. All of these disqualifications transpired after consumption of the sacrificial meat was permitted, and therefore one who derives benefit from these offerings is not liable for misuse. And which is the sacrificial animal that did not have a period of fitness for the priests? It is a sacrificial animal that was slaughtered with the intent to partake of it or sprinkle its blood or sacrifice its sacrificial portions beyond its designated time, or outside its designated area, or one that those unfit for Temple service collected and sprinkled its blood. All of these disqualifications occurred before consumption of the sacrificial meat was permitted by means of the sprinkling of the blood. Therefore, these offerings remain consecrated to God and one is liable for misuse if one derives benefit from them. With regard to this matter, the Gemara relates that bar Kappara said to bar Pedat: My sister’s son, look into the topic of the question that you will ask me tomorrow in the study hall. The question involved the interpretation of Rabbi Yehoshua’s statement: Any sacrificial animal that had a period of fitness to the priests. Was it fitness of slaughtering that we learned, i.e., provided that it was slaughtered properly, even if the offering was later disqualified, it is no longer subject to the halakhot of misuse.

▶ 🇫🇷 Résumé en français Et en outre, on peut citer une preuve à l’appui de l’avis de Rav Giddel à partir de cette baraita, car la dernière claus…

Et en outre, on peut citer une preuve à l’appui de l’avis de Rav Giddel à partir de cette baraita, car la dernière clause de la baraita enseigne : Si son sang a été laissé toute la nuit au lieu d’être aspergé sur l’autel le jour où il a été abattu, bien que le prêtre l’ait ensuite aspergé le jour suivant, néanmoins, celui qui tire un bénéfice de lui est passible de mésusage des biens consacrés. La Guemara analyse cette déclaration de la baraita : Certes, si tu dis que la baraita se réfère à un sacrifice pour le péché, alors c’est bien. Puisque le sang a été disqualifié pour l’aspersion par le fait d’avoir été laissé toute la nuit, il ne devient pas permis aux prêtres même après que le sang a été aspergé, et il est donc soumis aux halakhot de mésusage. Mais si le sang n’avait pas été laissé toute la nuit, le sacrifice ne serait pas soumis aux halakhot de mésusage, car l’aspersion aurait retiré le sacrifice pour le péché de cette catégorie en raison du fait qu’il est devenu permis aux prêtres. Mais si tu dis que la baraita se réfère à un holocauste, est-il nécessaire de dire qu’il est encore soumis aux halakhot de mésusage ? Un holocauste reste soumis aux halakhot de mésusage même si le sang n’avait pas été laissé toute la nuit et que l’aspersion avait été effectuée correctement, car il ne devient jamais permis aux prêtres. La Guemara commente : La dernière clause de la baraita soutient certainement l’avis de Rav Giddel, car elle montre clairement qu’une aspersion invalide ne retire pas un sacrifice de son assujettissement aux halakhot de mésusage. Mais en ce qui concerne la première clause de la baraita, qu’enseigne-t-elle concernant l’avis de Rav Giddel ? Est-il raisonnable de dire que puisque la dernière clause de la baraita soutient l’avis de Rav Giddel, la première clause, qui stipule que le piggul est toujours soumis aux halakhot de mésusage, soutient également son avis ? La Guemara rejette cette suggestion : Il n’est pas même certain que la dernière clause soutienne Rav Giddel, car il est possible que, bien que l’aspersion du sang laissé toute la nuit ne retire pas un sacrifice de son assujettissement aux halakhot de mésusage, néanmoins, l’aspersion après piggul accomplisse cela. La Guemara clarifie : Quelle est la différence entre les deux cas ? La différence concerne le fait de laisser le sang toute la nuit, où cela est accompli en relation avec une action, c’est-à-dire que le prêtre a omis d’agir de la manière appropriée, l’aspersion du sang n’est pas efficace pour retirer le sacrifice du statut d’être soumis aux halakhot de mésusage. En revanche, dans le cas de l’aspersion après piggul, où la disqualification est simplement fonction de l’intention, qui n’est pas accomplie en relation avec une action, peut-être l’aspersion du sang est-elle efficace pour retirer le sacrifice du statut d’être soumis aux halakhot de mésusage. La Guemara suggère : Disons que cette baraita soutient l’avis de Rav Giddel : En ce qui concerne un sacrifice de l’ordre le plus sacré qui est piggul, celui qui tire un bénéfice de lui est passible de mésusage des biens consacrés. Cela ne signifie-t-il pas qu’il est soumis aux halakhot de mésusage même si le prêtre a aspergé son sang, et si c’est le cas, cette baraita soutient l’avis de Rav Giddel ? La Guemara rejette cette suggestion : Non, on ne peut pas citer une preuve de cette baraita, car il est possible qu’elle se réfère à un cas où le prêtre n’a pas encore aspergé le sang. La Guemara demande : Mais si c’est le cas, quelle est alors la halakha si le prêtre a aspergé le sang ? Est-ce que la halakha est en effet que l’on n’est pas passible de mésusage à son égard ? Si c’est le cas, pourquoi est-il enseigné dans la dernière clause de la baraita : Contrairement à un sacrifice de l’ordre le plus sacré, dans le cas de un sacrifice de moindre sainteté, celui qui tire un bénéfice de lui n’est pas passible de mésusage des biens consacrés ? La Guemara explique la difficulté : S’il y a une différence entre le fait que le prêtre ait ou non aspergé le sang, que la baraita distingue et enseigne la distinction dans la première clause, en ce qui concerne le cas des sacrifices de l’ordre le plus sacré lui-même, comme suit : Avant l’aspersion du sang, on est passible de mésusage du sacrifice, mais après l’aspersion du sang, on n’est pas passible de mésusage à son égard. Il n’est pas nécessaire de mentionner les sacrifices de moindre sainteté du tout. La Guemara conclut : Cette déclaration dans la dernière clause de la baraita soutient certainement l’avis de Rav Giddel. La Guemara suggère : Dirons-nous que puisque la dernière clause soutient l’avis de Rav Giddel, la première clause soutient également son avis ? La Guemara répond à nouveau que même la dernière clause ne soutient pas nécessairement l’avis de Rav Giddel, car on peut expliquer que la raison pour laquelle la baraita distingue entre les sacrifices de l’ordre le plus sacré et les sacrifices de moindre sainteté, plutôt que de fournir une distinction au sein de la catégorie des sacrifices de l’ordre le plus sacré lui-même, est que le cas des sacrifices de moindre sainteté est clair, c’est-à-dire que tous les cas de sacrifices de moindre sainteté qui sont piggul ne sont pas soumis aux halakhot de mésusage. En revanche, ici dans le cas des sacrifices de l’ordre le plus sacré, ce n’est pas clair, car il y a une différence de [...]

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