📜 Sanhédrin — 15b

Why not say instead that it comes to teach that the owner of the ox is liable to receive the death penalty? Rava responded: If so, let it write in the same verse only: “The ox shall be stoned and also its owner,” and let it be silent and not add more. It would be clear that the owner is also to be put to death. Since the verse added the explicit term: “Shall be put to death,” it is clear that the intention is to teach that just as the manner of the death of the owner, so is the manner of the death of the ox. Abaye said: Had the Merciful One written the verse in this manner, I would say that the owner is executed by stoning. The Gemara rejects this: Would it enter your mind to say he should be executed by stoning? If he killed the person himself he would be executed by the sword, which is deemed a lighter punishment; if his property killed the victim, could he be given the more severe execution by stoning? The Gemara asks: But perhaps this term that the Merciful One wrote: “Shall be put to death,” is to be lenient with him, to remove his sentence from the category of execution by the sword and instead to sentence him to death by strangulation. This works out well according to the one who says that strangulation is more severe than the sword. According to that opinion there is no place for such a claim, as the punishment is certainly not more severe than that of an actual murderer. But according to the one who says that strangulation is a lighter punishment, what is there to say? The Gemara responds: It would not enter your mind to think this, as it is written: “If a ransom be placed upon him, then he shall give for the redemption of his life whatever is placed upon him” (Exodus 21:30), and if it enters your mind to say that he is liable to receive the death penalty, that verse would not be understood, for the following reason: But isn’t it written: “You shall take no ransom for the life of a murderer who was convicted to die, for he shall be put to death” (Numbers 35:31)? Since in this case there is a ransom payment, it is clear that there is no actual death penalty involved. This line of reasoning is rejected: On the contrary, the additional phrase in the verse is necessary due to this argument itself. If one killed a person himself, it would not be enough for him to make a payment of money; he must be punished only with actual execution. But if his ox killed someone, I would say he should redeem himself with money, but that if he does not pay money, he would receive the death penalty. Rather, the matter cannot be decided on the basis of these verses, and it must be proven by what Ḥizkiyya says, and so the school of Ḥizkiyya taught this baraita: The verse states: “He that struck him shall be put to death; he is a murderer” (Numbers 35:21), from which it is inferred: You execute him for his act of murder, but you do not execute him for his ox’s act of murder. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: By how many judges would an ox at Mount Sinai have been judged? At the time of the giving of the Torah it was forbidden to ascend onto Mount Sinai, as it is written: “No hand shall touch him, but he shall be stoned or shot through; whether animal or man, it shall not live” (Exodus 19:13). If an ox did ascend the mountain, how many judges would be necessary to sentence it to execution by stoning? The Gemara explains the question: Do we derive a halakha that applies only to a specific time from a halakha that applies for all generations, and accordingly any animal that is to be stoned is judged by twenty-three judges; or not? The Gemara answers: Come and hear a solution from that which Rami bar Yeḥezkel taught: The verse states: “Whether animal or man it shall not live.” The comparison serves to teach that just as a person is judged by twenty-three judges, so too an animal is judged by twenty-three judges. § The mishna records a dispute with regard to the judgment of a lion or a wolf: Does this judgment require twenty-three judges? Reish Lakish says: And that dispute concerns a lion or wolf that has killed a person. But if they have not killed, then no, they may not be executed. Apparently, Reish Lakish holds that they have the capability of being tamed and domesticated, and consequently they might have owners, so it is not permitted to kill them without due cause. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The dispute applies even if they have not killed. Apparently, Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that they do not have the capability of being tamed, and therefore they do not have owners. We learned in the mishna: Rabbi Eliezer says: Anyone who kills them first merits. Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, what does he merit? It can be explained that he merits, i.e., acquires, their hides; since these animals are by definition ownerless, whoever kills them first may take the hide for himself. But according to the opinion of Reish Lakish, what does he merit? Since according to Reish Lakish the mishna is discussing a case where they have already killed, the Sages made their status equivalent to those whose verdicts have been issued in court, and oxen that are stoned are items from which deriving benefit is prohibited. The Gemara answers: What is the meaning of: Merits, according to Reish Lakish? It means that he merits according to Heaven, meaning that he has performed a mitzva by destroying a harmful animal. The Gemara relates: It is taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish (Tosefta 3:1): Both an ox that killed and a different domesticated animal or undomesticated animal that killed are sentenced by twenty-three judges. Rabbi Eliezer says: An ox that killed is sentenced by twenty-three judges, but with regard to other domesticated animals and undomesticated animals that killed, anyone who kills them first merits, with that act, according to Heaven. It is therefore apparent that the disagreement concerns only animals that have killed, and that, as Reish Lakish explained, the term: Merits, indicates only a moral achievement but not a financial acquisition. § The mishna states that with regard to these dangerous animals, Rabbi Akiva says: Their death is decreed by twenty-three judges. The Gemara asks: The opinion of Rabbi Akiva is identical to the opinion of the first tanna; what is the novelty of his statement? The Gemara answers: The difference between them relates to the halakha concerning a snake. According to the first tanna, a snake is also sentenced by twenty-three judges, whereas Rabbi Akiva holds that all domesticated and undomesticated animals other than snakes are included in this requirement. § The mishna teaches that the court judges cases involving an entire tribe that sinned only in the Great Sanhedrin, consisting of seventy-one judges. The Gemara asks: With regard to this tribe that sinned, in what way did it sin? If we say that it was a tribe that transgressed most prohibitions, e.g., they desecrated Shabbat, this is difficult. There is a source to say that the Merciful One distinguishes between individuals and multitudes with regard to idol worship, as there is a special halakha with regard to an idolatrous city. But with regard to other mitzvot, does He distinguish between individuals and multitudes? Rather, it must be that the mishna is discussing a tribe that was subverted and which engaged in idol worship. The Gemara asks: Is this to say that we judge such a tribe with the halakha of a multitude, meaning that an entire idolatrous tribe is subject to the same treatment as an idolatrous city? If so, in accordance with whose opinion is the mishna? It is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoshiya, and not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yonatan. As it is taught in a baraita: How many people in a city must engage in idol worship for it to be designated as an idolatrous city? From ten until one hundred people; this is the statement of Rabbi Yoshiya. Rabbi Yonatan says: From one hundred people until a majority of a tribe. And it is therefore apparent that even Rabbi Yonatan, who allows a larger community to be declared an idolatrous city, said this only with regard to a majority of the tribe at most, but if it was all of the tribe that was idolatrous, then the halakha of an idolatrous city does not apply. Rav Mattana said: Here, in the mishna,