📜 Sanhédrin — 16a

we are dealing with the Nasi of a tribe who has sinned. Doesn’t Rav Adda bar Ahava say: The verse states: “They shall bring every great matter to you” (Exodus 18:22), meaning: Matters of a great one, i.e., in any case where a great person is accused of a transgression whose punishment is death, he is tried by the Great Sanhedrin of seventy-one judges. And this Nasi of the tribe is also a great one, so his trial is by seventy-one judges. Ulla said that Rabbi Elazar said a different explanation: The mishna discusses a case where two tribes came to adjudicate a dispute about matters of inheritance, i.e., territory claimed by each tribe on the border between them, and this dispute is handled by the Great Sanhedrin consisting of seventy-one judges, as was done at the beginning of the settlement in Eretz Yisrael during the time of Joshua. Just as the beginning, the initial division, was performed by seventy-one Elders of the congregation, so too here, when there is a dispute about the borders determined by that initial division, the case is adjudicated by the seventy-one judges of the Great Sanhedrin. The Gemara asks: If this logic is employed, then just as the beginning was performed by casting lots [kalpei], with the Urim VeTummim, and with all of the Jewish people present, so too here, in a dispute between tribes, there should be a need for lots, the Urim VeTummim, and the presence of all of the Jewish people. Since this is not required by halakha, it is apparent that a border dispute between tribes need not be adjudicated using the same procedures as the original division of the inheritances. Consequently, there is no reason to require seventy-one judges. Rather, it is clear that this must be explained in accordance with the explanation of Rav Mattana, who says that the mishna is discussing the Nasi of a tribe who has sinned. Ravina said: The mishna is actually discussing a tribe that was subverted and which engaged in idol worship, and with regard to that which poses a difficulty for you, the question of whether we judge such a tribe with the halakha of a multitude, it can be answered: Yes, although we execute them as individuals by stoning, and their money is not confiscated, nevertheless we judge them in a court of the multitude, i.e., each one of them is tried by the Great Sanhedrin. Ravina continues: Doesn’t Rabbi Ḥama, son of Rabbi Yosei, say that Rabbi Oshaya says: The verse that discuses an individual who serves idol worship states: “And you shall take out that man or that woman who did that evil thing to your gates, even the man or the woman, and you shall stone them until they die” (Deuteronomy 17:5), and it is inferred: You take out a man or a woman to your gates to judge them in the court that is located at the gates of the city, which is a lesser Sanhedrin, but you do not take out an entire city to your gates; rather they are to be judged by the large court. Here also with regard to a tribe that has sinned: You take out a man or a woman to your gates, but you do not take out the entire tribe to your gates; rather they are judged by a court of seventy-one. § The mishna teaches that a false prophet may be judged only by the Great Sanhedrin, consisting of seventy-one judges. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived? Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, says: It is derived by means of a verbal analogy, with the meaning of presumptuousness stated in the context of a false prophet learned from presumptuousness stated in the context of a rebellious elder. With regard to a false prophet the verse states: “But the prophet who shall speak a word presumptuously in My name, which I have not commanded him to speak, or who shall speak in the name of other gods, that prophet shall die” (Deuteronomy 18:20), and with regard to a rebellious elder it states: “And the man that acts presumptuously, by not listening to the priest that stands to minister there before the Lord your God, or to the judge, that man shall die” (Deuteronomy 17:12). Just as there, with regard to a rebellious elder, he is presumptuous against a court of seventy-one judges, so too here, with regard to a false prophet, he is judged by a court of seventy-one judges. The Gemara challenges: But when presumptuousness is written with regard to a rebellious elder, it is written with regard to the death penalty, and a death sentence may be issued by a court of twenty-three judges. Rather, Reish Lakish said: It is derived by means of a verbal analogy, with the meaning of the term word stated in the context of a false prophet learned from the term word, used when describing the rebellious elder’s rebellion. The rebellious elder transgresses by violating the mitzva: “And you shall do according to the word that they will tell you” (Deuteronomy 17:10), and with regard to the false prophet the verse states: “Who shall speak a word presumptuously in My name” (Deuteronomy 18:20). Just as the rebellious elder rebels against a court of seventy-one judges, so too, a false prophet who speaks a word that is not in the name of God is sentenced to death by a court of seventy-one judges. The Gemara asks: And let the halakha of a rebellious elder return, and let it be derived by means of a verbal analogy, with the meaning of presumptuousness stated in the context of a rebellious elder learned from presumptuousness stated in the context of a false prophet, to indicate that a rebellious elder is also sentenced by a court of seventy-one judges. The Gemara answers: This tanna derives halakhot through the verbal analogy comparing the terms word and word, but he does not derive halakhot through a verbal analogy between the terms presumptuousness and presumptuousness, as he did not receive it as an authentic tradition. § The mishna teaches that the High Priest may be judged only by the Great Sanhedrin, consisting of seventy-one judges. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived? Rav Adda bar Ahava says that the verse states: “They shall bring every great matter to you” (Exodus 18:22). This means that Moses, or the Great Sanhedrin with seventy-one judges, which served the parallel role to that of Moses, adjudicates all matters relating to a great one, i.e., the High Priest. The Gemara raises an objection to this from a baraita: The verse states: “They shall bring every great matter to you,” which is interpreted to mean that a difficult matter is judged by the Great Sanhedrin. The baraita asks: Do you say that the verse is actually referring to a difficult matter, or is it only referring to the matters relating to a great one? The baraita answers: When it states in a different verse that Moses implemented Yitro’s advice: “They brought the difficult matter to Moses” (Exodus 18:26), a difficult matter is stated explicitly. As Moses was following the directive of Yitro, it is therefore apparent that the term “great matter” is referring to a difficult matter. The Gemara answers: Rav Adda bar Ahava states his opinion in accordance with the opinion of that other tanna, as it is taught in a different baraita: The meaning of “great matter” in the verse is matters relating to a great one. The baraita asks: Do you say that it is referring to matters relating to a great one, or is it only referring to a difficult matter? The baraita explains: When it says further on: “They brought the difficult matter to Moses,” a difficult matter is stated, so how do I realize the meaning of “great matter”? It is referring to matters relating to a great one. The Gemara asks: And as for this tanna in the first baraita who maintains that “great matter” and “difficult matter” are referring to the same halakha, why do I need two verses to express the same idea? The Gemara answers: One is for the command in general, and one is to state that the execution of the matter was carried out correctly. And why does the other tanna not accept this explanation? The Gemara explains: He would claim that if so, if both verses were actually referring to the same thing, let it write either “great” in one verse and “great” in the other, or “difficult” in one verse and “difficult” in the other. What is the significance of writing “great” in one verse and what is the significance of writing “difficult” in the other? Conclude two conclusions from it; one verse is referring to difficult matters and the other to matters relating to a great one. Rabbi Elazar asked: If the ox of a High Priest killed a person, by how many judges is it sentenced? Do we compare it to a trial that could result in the death of its owner, the High Priest, which would have to be judged by seventy-one judges, or perhaps we compare it to a trial that could result in the death of owners in general, which could be judged by twenty-three judges? Abaye said: Since he asked the question only with regard to the High Priest’s ox, where there is a specific reason to say that its judicial proceedings should have the same halakhot as those concerning its owner, by inference it can be derived that it was obvious to him that court hearings related to the High Priest’s other property may be deliberated by an ordinary court. The Gemara asks: Isn’t that obvious? Why should it not be so? The Gemara answers: Abaye needed to clarify this, lest you say that since it writes: “Every great matter,” one might have thought that the verse is referring to all matters relating to a great one, meaning that any case involving the High Priest is adjudicated by the Great Sanhedrin. Therefore, Abaye teaches us that this is not the halakha. § The mishna teaches that the king may bring the nation out to an optional war only on the basis of a court of seventy-one judges, i.e., the Great Sanhedrin. The Gemara asks: From where is this matter derived? Rabbi Abbahu says: It is as the verse states with regard to the appointment of Joshua: “And he shall stand before Elazar the priest, and he shall ask counsel of the Urim before the Lord; by his word they shall go out, and by his word they shall come in, he and all of the children of Israel with him and all of the congregation” (Numbers 27:21). Rabbi Abbahu analyzes the end of the verse. With regard to the word “he,” this is the king, referring to Joshua and to any other leader who brings the nation out to war. With regard to the word “him” in the verse “And all of the children of Israel with him,” this is the priest anointed for war, who was anointed specially to stand and instruct the people before the war (see Deuteronomy 20:2). “And all of the congregation”; this is the Sanhedrin. Consequently, the king can embark on an optional war only if the Great Sanhedrin is present and grants authority to him. The Gemara challenges: But perhaps this mention of the Sanhedrin simply means that the Merciful One says that the Sanhedrin may ask a question of the Urim VeTummim, as may the king or the priest anointed for war, as opposed to an ordinary person; but with regard to the decision to go to war, perhaps the king may do so without the agreement of the Sanhedrin. Rather, the proof is like that which Rav Aḥa bar Bizna says that Rabbi Shimon Ḥasida says: A lyre hung above David’s bed, and once midnight arrived, the northern midnight wind would blow on it and cause the lyre to play on its own. David would immediately rise from his bed and study Torah until the dawn arrived. Once dawn arrived, the Sages of Israel would enter to advise him with regard to the various concerns of the nation and the economy. One time they said to him: Our master the king, your nation, Israel, requires sustenance. King David said to them: Go and sustain one another, i.e., provide each other with whatever is lacking. The Sages said to him in response, citing a parable: A single handful [hakometz] of food does not satisfy a lion, and a cistern will not be filled merely from the rain that falls directly into its mouth, but other water must be channeled in. So too, the nation cannot sustain itself using its own resources. King David then told them: Go and take up arms with the troops in battle in order to expand our borders and provide our people with the opportunity to earn a livelihood. The Sages immediately sought advice from Ahithophel to determine whether or not it was appropriate to go to war at that time and how they should conduct themselves; and they consulted the Sanhedrin in order to receive the requisite permission to wage a war under those circumstances; and they asked the Urim VeTummim whether or not they should go to war, and whether or not they would be successful. Rav Yosef says: What is the verse from which this aggada is derived?