Shevuot 4a — Talmud de Babylone

▶ 💬 Guemara he is liable for only one violation. Since the second oath did not prohibit any act in addition to the first oath, he is…

he is liable for only one violation. Since the second oath did not prohibit any act in addition to the first oath, he is not liable for violating it. The mishna concludes: This is an oath on an utterance for which one is liable to receive lashes for its intentional violation, and to bring a sliding-scale offering for its unwitting violation. The Gemara infers from the formulation of the mishna: It is specifically this case of an oath on an utterance for which one is liable to receive lashes for its intentional violation. But if a person stated: On my oath I will eat, and then he did not eat, he is not flogged. Presumably this is because the violation does not involve any action. This mishna, then, can provide a basis for Rabbi Yoḥanan’s ruling. The Gemara asks: Now, this mishna (27b) is unattributed and that mishna (2a) is unattributed. What did Rabbi Yoḥanan see that he practiced in accordance with this unattributed mishna? Let him instead practice in accordance with that unattributed mishna. The Gemara adds another question: And according to your reasoning that both mishnayot carry equal weight, then with regard to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi himself, when he redacted the Mishna, how could he teach us as unattributed both this opinion in the mishna here and that opinion in the mishna there? This would result in a contradiction. Rather, it is apparent that initially Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi held that for a violation of a prohibition that does not involve an action one is flogged, and so he taught it as an unattributed mishna, and later he retracted his opinion and held that one is not flogged for a violation of such a prohibition, and so he taught that opinion as an unattributed mishna. And he left the first mishna (2a) as it was because a mishna does not move from its place, i.e., since the students had already learned that mishna it was deemed inappropriate to remove it. Based on this logic, Rabbi Yoḥanan ruled in accordance with the later mishna (27b). The Gemara clarifies: In accordance with which opinion did you interpret the mishna? In accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, and it is referring to liability to receive lashes. The Gemara questions this: But in the parallel case of shades of leprous marks, what punishment of lashes is there? The Gemara answers: There is a punishment of lashes in a case where one cuts off his snow-white leprous mark [baheret], and in accordance with the principle that Rabbi Avin says that Rabbi Ile’a says, as Rabbi Avin says that Rabbi Ile’a says: Wherever it is stated: Observe, or: Lest, or: Do not, it is nothing other than a prohibition. So too, with regard to leprosy, the verse states: “Observe the leprous mark” (Deuteronomy 24:8), which according to Rabbi Ile’a’s principle teaches a prohibition, namely that it is prohibited to remove the mark. Accordingly, one who violates this prohibition is liable to receive lashes. The Gemara asks further: But in the parallel clause of acts of carrying out that are prohibited on Shabbat, what punishment of lashes is there? The prohibition against doing so is a prohibition in the Torah that potentially serves as a mandate for court-imposed capital punishment, and the generally accepted principle is that with regard to a violation of any prohibition in the Torah that potentially serves as a mandate for court-imposed capital punishment, one is not flogged for its violation even if no death penalty is imposed, as that prohibition is punishable only by death. The Gemara answers: It is due to that reason that we interpreted the mishna to be in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, as he says that with regard to a prohibition in the Torah that potentially serves as a mandate for court-imposed capital punishment, one is flogged for its violation in a case where there is no actual death penalty. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that were it not for this reason, the mishna could be interpreted in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, who holds that one is not flogged for violating such prohibitions? But then the question raised above with regard to the mishna’s detailing of the cases of one’s awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods poses a difficulty, as Rabbi Akiva holds that one is not liable if he entered the Temple during a lapse of awareness of the fact that the place he entered was actually the Temple, whereas the mishna indicates one is liable in such a case. The Gemara answers: Didn’t you say above that it is possible to conclude that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael and the liability referred to in the mishna is for liability to receive lashes? Similarly, it is also possible to say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva and the liability referred to in the mishna is for liability to receive lashes. The Gemara asks: If so, why did the tanna use the term: Cases of awareness, which is generally used for cases in which the transgression was performed during a lack of awareness and then subsequent awareness is necessary in order for the person to be liable to bring an offering? The tanna should have instead said: Forewarnings, as the forewarning is a necessary condition to be able to give lashes for an intentional transgression. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult; emend and teach the mishna as saying: Cases of awareness of forewarnings. The Gemara rejects the suggestion that the mishna is referring to liability to receive lashes: If so, if the mishna is referring to liability to receive lashes, why does it state that there are two types that are four? There are only two types. Since the person was forewarned he is certainly fully aware of all aspects of his transgression. Accordingly, there are only two cases of liability: For a ritually impure person who enters the Temple and for a ritually impure person who partakes of sacrificial foods. And furthermore, the continuation of the mishna states the case: In which one had awareness at the beginning and awareness at the end, but had a lapse of awareness in between, when he actually transgressed. The Gemara asks: What is the relevance of lapses of awareness to one’s liability to receive lashes? And furthermore, that clause explicitly concludes: This person is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering. Clearly then, the mishna is not referring to liability to receive lashes. Having rejected the suggestion that the mishna is referring to liability to be punished with lashes, it addresses the difficulty raised above that the mishna’s ruling with regard to oaths does not accord with Rabbi Yishmael’s opinion and its ruling with regard to cases of one’s awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods does not accord with Rabbi Akiva’s opinion. If so, whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? Rather, Rav Yosef said: The mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and he formulates the mishna according to different tanna’im, as follows: With regard to cases of one’s awareness of the defiling of the Temple or its sacrificial foods, he formulates it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, and with regard to oaths, he formulates it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. Rav Ashi said: I said this statement of Rav Yosef before Rav Kahana, and he said to me: Do not say that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi formulates the mishna according to different tanna’im but he himself does not hold accordingly. Rav Kahana continued: Rather, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is explicating his own reasoning, as it is taught in a baraita: From where is it derived that one is liable to bring a sliding-scale offering only for cases in which one had awareness at the beginning and awareness at the end and had a lapse of awareness only in between, when he actually transgressed? The verses state with regard to a person’s awareness of the fact that he was impure: “And it was concealed,” “and it was concealed” (Leviticus 5:2–3), mentioning concealment twice. The first mention is necessary to teach that one is liable to bring an offering only where he was unaware of his status at the time of the transgression. The second mention is superfluous and serves to teach an additional condition for liability, that one must have had awareness of his status before the transgression. This is the statement of Rabbi Akiva. The baraita continues: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: This proof is not necessary, as it says in the verse:

▶ 🇫🇷 Résumé en français il est passible de une seule violation. Puisque le second serment n’interdit aucun acte en plus du premier serment, il n…

il est passible de une seule violation. Puisque le second serment n’interdit aucun acte en plus du premier serment, il n’est pas passible de l’avoir violé. La mishna conclut : C’est un serment sur une énonciation pour lequel on est passible de recevoir des coups de fouet pour sa violation intentionnelle, et d’apporter une offrande à échelle mobile pour sa violation non intentionnelle. La Guemara déduit de la formulation de la mishna : C’est spécifiquement ce cas d’un serment sur une énonciation pour lequel on est passible de recevoir des coups de fouet pour sa violation intentionnelle. Mais si une personne a dit : Par mon serment je mangerai, et ensuite il n’a pas mangé, il n’est pas flagellé. Vraisemblablement, c’est parce que la violation n’implique aucune action. Cette mishna peut donc servir de base à la décision de Rabbi Yoḥanan. La Guemara demande : Or, cette mishna (27b) est sans attribution et cette mishna (2a) est sans attribution. Qu’a vu Rabbi Yoḥanan pour se conformer à cette mishna sans attribution ? Qu’il se conforme plutôt à cette mishna sans attribution. La Guemara ajoute une autre question : Et selon ton raisonnement que les deux mishnayot ont un poids égal, alors en ce qui concerne Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi lui-même, lorsqu’il a rédigé la Mishna, comment a-t-il pu nous enseigner comme sans attribution à la fois cette opinion dans la mishna ici et cette opinion dans la mishna là-bas ? Cela entraînerait une contradiction. Plutôt, il est apparent que initialement Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi tenait que pour une violation de une interdiction qui n’implique pas une action, on est flagellé, et donc il l’a enseignée comme une mishna sans attribution, et plus tard il s’est rétracté de son opinion et a tenu que on n’est pas flagellé pour une violation d’une telle interdiction, et donc il a enseigné cette opinion comme une mishna sans attribution. Et il a laissé la première mishna (2a) telle quelle parce que une mishna ne bouge pas de sa place, c’est-à-dire que puisque les étudiants avaient déjà appris cette mishna, il a été jugé inapproprié de la retirer. Sur la base de cette logique, Rabbi Yoḥanan a statué conformément à la mishna ultérieure (27b). La Guemara clarifie : Conformément à quelle opinion as-tu interprété la mishna ? Conformément à l’opinion de Rabbi Yishmael, et elle fait référence à la responsabilité de recevoir des coups de fouet. La Guemara conteste : Mais dans le cas parallèle des nuances de marques lépreuses, quel châtiment de coups de fouet y a-t-il ? La Guemara répond : Il y a un châtiment de coups de fouet dans un cas où l’on coupe sa marque lépreuse blanche comme neige [baheret], et conformément au principe que Rabbi Avin dit que Rabbi Ile’a dit, comme Rabbi Avin dit que Rabbi Ile’a dit : Partout où il est dit : Observe, ou : Prends garde, ou : Ne fais pas, ce n’est rien d’autre qu’une interdiction. De même, en ce qui concerne la lèpre, le verset dit : « Observe la marque lépreuse » (Deutéronome 24:8), qui, selon le principe de Rabbi Ile’a, enseigne une interdiction, à savoir qu’il est interdit d’enlever la marque. Par conséquent, celui qui viole cette interdiction est passible de recevoir des coups de fouet. La Guemara demande encore : Mais dans la clause parallèle des actes de sortie qui sont interdits le Chabbat, quel châtiment de coups de fouet y a-t-il ? L’interdiction de le faire est une interdiction dans la Torah qui potentiellement sert de mandat pour la peine capitale imposée par le tribunal, et le principe généralement accepté est qu’en ce qui concerne la violation de toute interdiction dans la Torah qui potentiellement sert de mandat pour la peine capitale imposée par le tribunal, on n’est pas flagellé pour sa violation même si aucune peine de mort n’est imposée, car cette interdiction n’est punissable que par la mort. La Guemara répond : C’est à cause de cela que nous avons interprété la mishna comme étant conformément à l’opinion de Rabbi Yishmael, car il dit qu’en ce qui concerne une interdiction dans la Torah qui potentiellement sert de mandat pour la peine capitale imposée par le tribunal, on est flagellé pour sa violation dans un cas où il n’y a pas de peine de mort effective. La Guemara demande : Est-ce à dire que n’eût été cette raison, la mishna pourrait être interprétée conformément à l’opinion de Rabbi Akiva, qui tient que l’on n’est pas flagellé pour la violation de telles interdictions ? Mais alors la question soulevée ci-dessus concernant le détail de la mishna sur les cas de conscience de la souillure du Temple ou de ses aliments sacrificiels pose une difficulté, car Rabbi Akiva tient que l’on n’est pas passible s’il est entré dans le Temple pendant un laps de conscience du fait que le lieu où il est entré était en réalité le Temple, alors que la mishna indique que l’on est passible dans un tel cas. La Guemara répond : N’as-tu pas dit ci-dessus qu’il est possible de conclure que la mishna est conforme à l’opinion de Rabbi Yishmael et que la responsabilité mentionnée dans la mishna est pour la responsabilité de recevoir des coups de fouet ? De même, il est aussi possible de dire que la mishna est conforme à l’opinion de Rabbi Akiva et que la responsabilité mentionnée dans la mishna est pour la responsabilité de recevoir des coups de fouet. La Guemara demande : Si c’est le cas, pourquoi le tanna a-t-il utilisé le terme : Cas de conscience, qui est généralement utilisé pour les cas où la transgression a été commise pendant un manque de conscience et où une conscience ultérieure est nécessaire pour que la personne soit passible d’apporter une offrande ? Le tanna aurait dû plutôt dire : Avertissements, car l’avertissement est une condition nécessaire pour pouvoir donner des coups de fouet pour une transgression intentionnelle. La Guemara an [...]

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