📜 Yebamot — 10b

If, however, his mother was a woman who was raped by his father and subsequently married his paternal brother, and the brother died, this is a case of his mother who exempts her rival wife. According to the opinion of the Rabbis this marriage is permitted, and even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda the marriage is valid despite the transgression. Consequently, both the mother and her rival wife come before the son for levirate marriage. Since the mother is a forbidden relation to him, her rival wife is exempt as well. And although the Sages taught in the mishna: Fifteen women, we must add a sixteenth case, for example, the situation described above. Reish Lakish said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: According to the opinion of Levi, who said that the mishna teaches even cases of: What if, which involve a transgression, let the mishna also teach the case of one who performs ḥalitza with his yevama and went back and betrothed her, and then died childless. His betrothal is a transgression, as after ḥalitza the yevama is permanently forbidden to him. As, in this case, since she is forbidden to all the brothers, due to the ḥalitza performed by the deceased yavam, her rival wife is also forbidden. This is an additional case of a woman who exempts her rival wife. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to Reish Lakish: This example is not cited because the case does not include the possibility of a rival wife of a rival wife. All of the other cases listed in the mishna involve both rival wives and rival wives of rival wives. Here, however, this is impossible, as the same prohibition applies equally to all of the brothers, and therefore none of them may marry her. The Gemara asks: And let Rabbi Yoḥanan say a different answer to Reish Lakish, as he could simply have pointed out that marriage to a woman who had performed ḥalitza is not a violation that incurs karet, neither for the one who performed the ḥalitza nor for his brothers if they marry her after he dies. Rather, it is an act for which they are liable for violating a regular prohibition, and those liable for violating a prohibition are obligated in ḥalitza and levirate marriage. In these cases the mitzva of levirate marriage still applies, and although the woman should be released by ḥalitza, she is not entirely exempt from levirate marriage, and therefore her rival wife is not exempt either. The Gemara responds that Rabbi Yoḥanan is speaking in accordance with the statement of Reish Lakish, as follows: According to my opinion your question is groundless, as they are liable for violating a prohibition, and those liable for violating a prohibition are obligated in ḥalitza and levirate marriage. However, according to your opinion, those brothers who marry a yevama who had performed ḥalitza are liable to receive karet, and therefore you must resolve the difficulty by saying that the mishna did not teach this case because it does not include the possibility of a rival wife of a rival wife. The Gemara discusses the dispute alluded to in the previous paragraph. It was stated: With regard to one who performs ḥalitza with his yevama and went back and betrothed her, Reish Lakish said: The brother who earlier performed ḥalitza is not liable to receive karet for returning to the yevama who performed ḥalitza [ḥalutza]. She is no longer forbidden as a brother’s wife, although she is forbidden by a regular prohibition. And the brothers who did not actually perform the ḥalitza are liable to receive karet for having relations with a ḥalutza. In their case, the woman retains her status as a forbidden brother’s wife even after the ḥalitza. With regard to the rival wife of the ḥalutza, although she too is released from the levirate bond, since the act of ḥalitza itself was not performed with her, both the brother who performed the ḥalitza and the other brothers are liable to receive karet for having relations with the rival wife, as she retains her forbidden status as a brother’s wife. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Neither he nor the other brothers are liable to receive karet, neither for the ḥalutza nor for having relations with the rival wife. The Gemara explains: What is the rationale of Reish Lakish? The verse states with regard to one who performs ḥalitza with his yevama: “Who does not build up his brother’s house” (Deuteronomy 25:9), which teaches that since he did not build his brother’s house by entering into levirate marriage, opting instead for ḥalitza, he shall never build it again. This statement is understood not only as a negative description of events, but also as a prohibition against marrying this woman at any point in the future. However, it is the man who performed the act of ḥalitza who stands liable to receive punishment for violating this prohibition of: Does not build up, i.e., the prohibition against marrying his ḥalutza. For him the prohibition involving karet has been replaced by the regular prohibition of: Who does not build up his brother’s house. However, with regard to his brothers, where they stood before, they stand now. In other words, just as before the mitzva of levirate marriage applied to them this woman was forbidden to them as a brother’s wife, once the obligation of levirate marriage has been removed they remain bound by the same prohibition. Consequently, she is forbidden to the brothers on pain of karet. And furthermore, only with regard to her, the ḥalutza, does he stand liable for: Does not build up, but as for the rival wife, who did not perform ḥalitza, where all the brothers stood before, they stand now. Just as before her rival wife performed ḥalitza she was forbidden on pain of karet, the same applies after the ḥalitza, both for the man who performed ḥalitza and his brothers. And Rabbi Yoḥanan claims: Is there anything of this kind in halakha? After all, at the outset, before the ḥalitza, if this brother wanted he could perform ḥalitza, and if that brother wanted he could perform ḥalitza, and if he wanted he could perform ḥalitza with this woman and if he wanted he could perform ḥalitza with that woman. All the deceased brother’s wives were included in the levirate obligation of marriage or ḥalitza, and therefore the prohibition proscribing a brother’s wife was negated for all of them at that time. And now, after the ḥalitza, they stand to incur karet for having relations with her? How can the prohibition proscribing a brother’s wife return after it was nullified by the death of the childless brother? Rather, he who performs ḥalitza performs the agency of the other brothers, and therefore he also releases her from the levirate bond of his brothers. Similarly, she who performs ḥalitza performs the agency of the rival wife, as the ḥalitza of one wife serves to release the other one as well. Consequently, it is as though all of the brothers released all of the wives, and there is no longer any prohibition that incurs karet. § The Gemara cites the ensuing discussion between the two disputing Sages. Rabbi Yoḥanan raised an objection to the opinion of Reish Lakish from a baraita: In the case of one who performs ḥalitza with his yevama and went back and betrothed her, and then died, she requires ḥalitza from one of the brothers. Granted, this makes sense according to my opinion, as I say that brothers who marry a ḥalutza are liable only for violating a prohibition, and that is why she requires ḥalitza from the other brothers. The principle is that a woman with whom relations are forbidden by a regular prohibition that does not incur karet may not enter into levirate marriage, but she must undergo ḥalitza. However, according to your opinion that the penalty of karet does apply here, why does she require ḥalitza at all? The penalty of karet indicates that the betrothal did not take effect at all, and therefore she is not bound to the brothers with regard to the requirement of ḥalitza. Reish Lakish answered: And according to your reasoning, how would you state and explain the latter clause of the baraita: If one of the brothers arose and betrothed her, she has no claims on him, i.e., the marriage does not take effect at all and she does not require a bill of divorce from him? But if the brothers are liable only for violating a prohibition, why does she have no claim on him? After all, in cases of regular prohibitions a betrothal is valid. According to my opinion that these brothers are liable to receive karet the matter is clear, as the betrothal is invalid. This indicates that there is a contradiction between the first and latter clauses of the baraita. How, then, can Rabbi Yoḥanan cite a proof from an apparently flawed baraita? Rav Sheshet said in resolution of this contradiction: In the latter clause of the baraita we have come to a different opinion, that of Rabbi Akiva, who said: Betrothal with those who are forbidden as they are liable for violating a prohibition is not valid. In Rabbi Akiva’s opinion there is no difference between regular prohibitions and prohibitions that incur karet in this regard, as in both cases the betrothals are invalid. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But if the first clause of the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, while the latter clause is in accordance with a different opinion, let the mishna teach explicitly: According to the statement of Rabbi Akiva she has no claims on him, as this represents a different opinion.