Yebamot 11a — Talmud de Babylone

▶ 💬 Guemara § The Gemara comments: Rav Sheshet’s explanation of the contradiction between the first clause and latter clause of the …

§ The Gemara comments: Rav Sheshet’s explanation of the contradiction between the first clause and latter clause of the baraita is difficult. Consequently, the Gemara cites different resolutions of this contradiction. Rav Ashi holds in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish and resolves the baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. Ravina, in contrast, holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan and resolves the baraita in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. The Gemara elaborates: Rav Ashi holds in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish and resolves the baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. This is his interpretation: In the case of one who performs ḥalitza with his yevama and went back and betrothed her, and then died, she requires ḥalitza from one of the brothers. Who are the brothers referred to here? Rav Ashi explains that they are the newborn brothers, i.e., those who were born only after the brother betrothed her. Consequently, although this woman was the wife of the first deceased brother before they were born, after their birth she was already the wife of a living brother. Therefore, the prohibition of a wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist never applied, and she requires ḥalitza. In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that in a case of this kind the brothers are not considered to be coexisting. Meanwhile, the latter clause speaks of a case where one of the brothers who was born in the lifetime of the first brother arose and betrothed her, after another brother had performed ḥalitza. In this case, she has no claims of a bill of divorce on him. In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? It is in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish, who maintains that the penalty of karet applies in this case, and therefore the betrothal is entirely invalid. The Gemara continues its explanation of the opinions. Ravina holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan and resolves the baraita in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. How so? In the case of one who performs ḥalitza with his yevama and went back and betrothed her and then died, she requires ḥalitza from one of the brothers. Who are these brothers? This is referring to the brothers already born in the lifetime of the first brother. In accordance with whose opinion is this interpretation? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who held that this case constitutes a regular prohibition. Consequently, the yevama is not exempt from the obligation of ḥalitza. If one of the newborn brothers, who were born after the death of the first brother, arose and betrothed her, she has no claim on him. Since he is considered a brother who did not coexist with his deceased brother, the yevama is prohibited to him as a brother’s wife, and as this prohibition entails karet, the betrothal is invalid. This is the halakha even if he was born after the second deceased brother betrothed her. In accordance with whose opinion is this ruling? It is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who maintain that the prohibition of a wife of a brother with whom one did not coexist applies even to a brother’s widow who entered into levirate marriage before the younger brother was born. It was stated that there is a similar dispute between amora’im with regard to one who had relations with his yevama and thereby performed the mitzva of levirate marriage as required, and one of the other brothers had relations with her rival wife. Rav Aḥa and Ravina disagree with regard to this matter. One said: The second brother is liable to receive karet. And the other one said that he is in violation of only a positive mitzva. The verse: “Who does not build up his brother’s house” (Deuteronomy 25:9), is a positive mitzva, as it teaches that one house may be built up, but not two houses, i.e., no more than one wife of a deceased brother may be married by one of his brothers. Any mitzva formulated as a positive injunction has the status of a positive mitzva, even if it is violated by the performance of an action, in the manner of a prohibition. The Gemara explains: The one who said that he is liable to receive karet holds in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish, who maintains that after the mitzva is performed with one yevama who required levirate marriage, the prohibition of a brother’s wife is once again fully applicable to her rival wife. And the one who said that he is in violation of only a positive mitzva holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan. The Gemara further analyzes the list of women exempt from levirate marriage. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: The rival wife of a sota is forbidden. In this context, sota refers to an unfaithful wife. If the husband died, the unfaithful wife and her rival wife are exempt from both ḥalitza and levirate marriage. What is the reason for this? The term defilement is written in that passage dealing with an unfaithful wife: “She being defiled secretly” (Numbers 5:13), just as defilement is written with regard to those with whom relations are forbidden in the verse: “Defile not yourselves in any of these things, for in all these the nations are defiled, which I cast out from before you” (Leviticus 18:24). This teaches that the halakha of an unfaithful wife is like that of a woman with whom relations are forbidden; both she and her rival wife are exempt from levirate marriage and ḥalitza. Rav Ḥisda raised an objection to this from the case of a woman who heard that her husband had died and remarried, only afterward to discover that he had still been alive at that time before dying later. What is the halakha in this case? Rabbi Shimon says: Her relations with or ḥalitza from the brother of the first husband exempts her rival wife. This shows that the obligation of levirate marriage applies to this woman. Although she lived as a married woman with someone else during her husband’s lifetime, Rabbi Shimon nevertheless maintains that her sexual intercourse or ḥalitza fulfills the mitzva of levirate marriage and exempts her rival wife. This suggests that the rival wife of an unfaithful wife requires levirate marriage. The Gemara answers that Rav could have said to you in response: I spoke to you about the halakha of a sota by Torah law, i.e., a wife who was intentionally unfaithful, and you speak to me of a sota by rabbinic law? The case you mentioned is an unavoidable accident, as the wife married another man only because she received testimony that her husband was deceased. When the Sages instituted that she was forbidden to both her first and second husbands, this was a penalty designed to ensure that women would examine testimony of this kind very thoroughly. However, this is not a case of a sota by Torah law, as she was not intentionally unfaithful, and therefore the mitzva of levirate marriage certainly applies to her. Since this response is overwhelmingly obvious, the Gemara asks: And he who asked it, why did he ask it? There are apparently no grounds for this comparison at all. The Gemara explains: He held that all ordinances that the Sages instituted, they instituted parallel to Torah law. Consequently, if a sota by Torah law is exempt from levirate marriage and exempts her rival wife as though she were a forbidden relative, the same should apply to a sota by rabbinic law. Rav Ashi raised an objection to Rav’s opinion from a different source: The halakha is that a wife who was warned by her husband not to be secluded with a specific man and yet entered alone with him in private, and remained with him long enough to be defiled, i.e., sufficient time to have sexual relations, she is forbidden to her house, i.e., her husband, from that moment until she undergoes the sota ritual. And likewise, if she was the wife of a priest she is prohibited from partaking of teruma, as she was possibly disqualified by unfaithfulness. And if he dies, she performs ḥalitza

▶ 🇫🇷 Résumé en français § La Guemara commente : L’explication de Rav Sheshet de la contradiction entre la première clause et la dernière clause …

§ La Guemara commente : L’explication de Rav Sheshet de la contradiction entre la première clause et la dernière clause de la baraita est difficile. Par conséquent, la Guemara cite différentes résolutions de cette contradiction. Rav Ashi tient conformément à l’opinion de Reish Lakish et résout la baraita conformément à l’opinion de Rabbi Shimon. Ravina, en revanche, tient conformément à l’opinion de Rabbi Yoḥanan et résout la baraita conformément à l’opinion de les Rabbins. La Guemara développe : Rav Ashi tient conformément à l’opinion de Reish Lakish et résout la baraita conformément à l’opinion de Rabbi Shimon. Voici son interprétation : Dans le cas de celui qui accomplit ḥalitza avec sa yevama et qui revient et la fiance, puis meurt, elle requiert ḥalitza de l’un des frères. Qui sont les frères mentionnés ici ? Rav Ashi explique qu’il s’agit des frères nouveau-nés, c’est-à-dire ceux qui sont nés seulement après que le frère l’a fiancée. Par conséquent, bien que cette femme ait été l’épouse du premier frère décédé avant leur naissance, après leur naissance elle était déjà l’épouse d’un frère vivant. Donc, l’interdiction de l’épouse d’un frère avec lequel on n’a pas coexisté ne s’est jamais appliquée, et elle requiert ḥalitza. Conformément à l’opinion de qui cette décision ? Elle est conformément à l’opinion de Rabbi Shimon, qui maintient que dans un cas de ce genre, les frères ne sont pas considérés comme coexistant. Pendant ce temps, la dernière clause parle d’un cas où l’un des frères qui était né du vivant du premier frère se leva et la fiança, après qu’un autre frère eut accompli ḥalitza. Dans ce cas, elle n’a aucune prétention de billet de divorce contre lui. Conformément à l’opinion de qui cette décision ? Elle est conformément à l’opinion de Reish Lakish, qui maintient que la peine de karet s’applique dans ce cas, et donc les fiançailles sont entièrement invalides. La Guemara poursuit son explication des opinions. Ravina tient conformément à l’opinion de Rabbi Yoḥanan et résout la baraita conformément à l’opinion de les Rabbins. Comment cela ? Dans le cas de celui qui accomplit ḥalitza avec sa yevama et qui revient et la fiance puis meurt, elle requiert ḥalitza de l’un des frères. Qui sont ces frères ? Cela fait référence aux frères déjà nés du vivant du premier frère. Conformément à l’opinion de qui cette interprétation ? Elle est conformément à l’opinion de Rabbi Yoḥanan, qui tenait que ce cas constitue une interdiction ordinaire. Par conséquent, la yevama n’est pas exemptée de l’obligation de ḥalitza. Si l’un des frères nouveau-nés, qui sont nés après la mort du premier frère, se leva et la fiança, elle n’a aucune prétention contre lui. Puisqu’il est considéré comme un frère qui n’a pas coexisté avec son frère décédé, la yevama lui est interdite comme épouse d’un frère, et comme cette interdiction entraîne karet, les fiançailles sont invalides. C’est la halakha même s’il est né après que le deuxième frère décédé l’a fiancée. Conformément à l’opinion de qui cette décision ? Elle est conformément à l’opinion de les Rabbins, qui maintiennent que l’interdiction de l’épouse d’un frère avec lequel on n’a pas coexisté s’applique même à la veuve d’un frère qui est entrée en lévirat avant la naissance du frère cadet. Il a été dit qu’il y a un différend similaire entre les amora’im concernant celui qui a eu des relations avec sa yevama et a ainsi accompli la mitzva du lévirat comme requis, et l’un des autres frères a eu des relations avec sa rivale. Rav Aḥa et Ravina sont en désaccord concernant cette question. L’un dit : Le deuxième frère est passible de recevoir karet. Et l’autre un dit qu’il est en violation de seulement une mitzva positive. Le verset : « Celui qui ne bâtit pas la maison de son frère » (Deutéronome 25:9), est une mitzva positive, car il enseigne qu’une seule maison peut être bâtie, mais pas deux maisons, c’est-à-dire qu’aucune plus d’une épouse d’un frère décédé ne peut être épousée par l’un de ses frères. Toute mitzva formulée comme un commandement positif a le statut d’une mitzva positive, même si elle est violée par l’accomplissement d’une action, à la manière d’une interdiction. La Guemara explique : Celui qui dit qu’il est passible de recevoir karet tient conformément à l’opinion de Reish Lakish, qui maintient qu’après que la mitzva est accomplie avec une yevama qui requérait le lévirat, l’interdiction de l’épouse d’un frère s’applique à nouveau pleinement à sa rivale. Et celui qui dit qu’il est en violation de seulement une mitzva positive tient conformément à l’opinion de Rabbi Yoḥanan. La Guemara analyse plus loin la liste des femmes exemptées du lévirat. Rav Yehuda dit que Rav dit : La rivale d’une sota est interdite. Dans ce contexte, sota fait référence à une femme infidèle. Si le mari est mort, la femme infidèle et sa rivale sont exemptées à la fois de ḥalitza et du lévirat. Quelle est la raison de cela ? Le terme souillure est écrit dans ce passage traitant d’une femme infidèle : « Elle étant souillée en secret » (Nombres 5:13), tout comme la souillure est écrite concernant celles avec qui les relations sont interdites dans le verset : « Ne vous souillez pas par toutes ces choses, car par toutes ces choses les nations se sont souillées, qui [...]

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