📜 Yebamot — 9a

And a community brings a bull for an unwitting communal sin for idolatrous worship only if the act of idolatry involved a matter that for its intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering. And we also learned in a mishna: With regard to any mitzva in the Torah for whose intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, if a private individual sinned unwittingly, he brings a ewe or a she-goat. If it was a Nasi, he brings a goat for a sin of this kind, and if the sinner was an anointed High Priest or the court, they bring a bull. And if they unwittingly sinned in a matter involving idolatrous worship, a private individual, a Nasi, and an anointed High Priest bring a she-goat, whereas a community brings a bull and a goat, the bull as a burnt-offering and the goat as a sin-offering. The Gemara asks: From where are these matters, that one must bring a sin-offering for this transgression, derived? The Gemara answers: As the Sages taught with regard to an unwitting communal sin offering: “And the sin by which they have sinned is known” (Leviticus 4:14). Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: It is stated here, with regard to a sin-offering: “By which [aleha],” and it is stated there, with regard to the prohibition with regard to a wife’s sister: “Unto [aleha].” This teaches by verbal analogy: Just as there, in the case of a wife’s sister, it is a matter that for its intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, so too here, the offering is brought for a matter that for its intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering. The Gemara continues: We found a source for the halakha that the offering brought by the community is a sin-offering; from where do we derive that an anointed High Priest also brings a sin-offering for this transgression? As it is written with regard to an anointed High Priest: “If the anointed priest shall sin so as to bring guilt on the people” (Leviticus 4:3), which indicates that an anointed High Priest brings an offering like the community. From where is it derived that a private individual and a Nasi bring sin-offerings only for a severe transgression of this kind? This is derived by verbal analogy between the words “mitzvot” and “mitzvot” that are stated three times, with regard to the community’s sin-offering, a private individual’s sin-offering, and the sin-offering of a Nasi: “Any of the mitzvot of the Lord that He has commanded not to be done” (Leviticus 4:2, 13, 22). And it was stated above that this halakha applies to idolatrous worship only if it involved a matter that for its intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering. The halakha of a community that was guilty of idolatrous worship is derived by a verbal analogy between the phrases “from the eyes” and “from the eyes.” With regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin, the verse states: “From the eyes of the assembly” (Leviticus 4:13), while concerning an unwitting sin of idol worship, it says: “From the eyes of the congregation” (Numbers 15:24). This verbal analogy teaches that a congregation brings a sin-offering for idolatrous worship only if it involved a transgression that incurs karet when performed intentionally. The cases of a private individual, a Nasi, and an anointed High Priest are derived from a verse that deals with an unwitting sin of idolatry: “And if one person sin” (Numbers 15:27). All of these, a private individual, a Nasi, and an anointed High Priest, are included in this verse. In this case the principle: The letter vav adds to the previous matter, applies. When a phrase begins with the conjunction vav, meaning: And, it is a continuation of the previous matter rather than a new topic. Based on this principle, these two halakhot are connected with one another. And therefore let the lower, i.e., the second, subject, a private individual, be derived from the upper issue, the community. Just as a community brings this offering only for a transgression whose intentional violation incurs karet, the same is true of a private individual. The verbal analogy stated in this baraita is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s inference from the phrase “with her.” § The Gemara asks: And with regard to the Rabbis, who interpret “with her” with regard to rival wives, from where do they derive this conclusion that one is liable to bring the offering for idolatrous worship only for a transgression whose intentional violation incurs karet? The Gemara answers: They derive it from that which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi read out to his son to teach him the verses that summarize the case of unwitting idol worship: “You shall have one law [Torah] for him that does unwittingly. But the soul that does with a high hand, whether he be home born or a stranger, he blasphemes the Lord; and that soul shall be cut off from among his people” (Numbers 15:29–30). In this manner, the entire Torah is juxtaposed with idolatrous worship. Just as in the case of idolatrous worship there is no obligation to bring an offering unless it is a matter that for its intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering, as indicated by the verse: “That soul shall be cut off from among his people,” so too, the same applies to any matter that for its intentional violation one is liable to receive karet and for its unwitting violation one is liable to bring a sin-offering. The Gemara comments: We found a source for a private individual, a Nasi, and an anointed High Priest, whether with regard to idolatrous worship or with regard to the other mitzvot. From where is it derived that a community is liable only for an unwitting transgression of idolatrous worship of this kind? The verse states: “And if one person sin” (Numbers 15:27). Once again, the letter vav teaches that these two cases are connected, and let the upper, the first, issue of a community, be derived from the lower case, that of a private individual. However, from where do we derive that a community brings an offering for other mitzvot only if the intentional violation of the prohibition incurs karet? The Gemara responds: He derives it from the aforementioned verbal analogy between “from the eyes” and “from the eyes.” The Gemara asks: And what does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi do with this verse: “One law”? The Gemara answers: He requires it for that which is taught in a baraita: Since we find that the Torah differentiates between private individuals who sinned and the many who sinned in idol worship. The baraita elaborates: Private individuals who worshipped idols are sentenced to stoning, and therefore their money is spared from destruction. Although the sinner is put to death, his possessions are not destroyed. By contrast, the many are condemned to the lighter death penalty of decapitation by sword, the punishment for those who worshipped idols in an idolatrous city, and therefore their money is forfeited, as by Torah law all possessions belonging to the residents of an idolatrous city must be burned. Due to this difference, one might have thought that we should likewise differentiate between their offerings, i.e., if an individual and a community unwittingly practiced idolatrous worship, different offerings are brought in the two cases. Therefore, the verse states: “One law for you.” The word: “you” is in the plural, which indicates that an individual and a community that worshipped idols are subject to the same halakha. Rav Ḥilkiya from the city of Hagronya strongly objects to this: The reason for this ruling is that the Merciful One specifically writes: “One law for you,” from which it may be inferred that if that were not so, I would say that we should differentiate between the offerings of an individual and a community. If so, it is appropriate to ask: What offering would they bring if we were to differentiate? You cannot say they would bring a bull, as it is a community that sinned unwittingly in transgressing other mitzvot who bring a bull, and as this case is written separately, clearly its halakha is different. Likewise, you cannot say that they should bring a ewe, as it is an individual who sinned in transgressing the other mitzvot who brings a ewe. Nor can you say that they bring a goat, as it is a Nasi who sinned in transgressing the other mitzvot who brings a goat. And you cannot say that they would bring a bull as a burnt-offering and a goat as a sin-offering, as it is the community, i.e., the majority of Jews, who sinned in performing idolatrous worship who bring these. Rather, what might they bring? If one were to suggest a she-goat, that would not be appropriate, because this is the offering of a private individual as well, since an individual brings a ewe or a she-goat as a sin-offering. Apparently there is no need for a special inference in this case, as there are no other possibilities. The Gemara answers: It is necessary for a verse to teach that there is no difference between the offerings of an individual and a community, as it might enter your mind to say: Since a community that sinned by the erroneous instruction of the court that it is permitted to practice idolatry brings a bull as a burnt-offering and a goat as a sin-offering, then, when a community sins of its own accord they too should bring these animals, but the opposite, i.e., a bull as a sin-offering and a goat as a burnt-offering. Alternatively, it could be argued: Theoretically a community must bring a different form of atonement from that of an individual, yet they have no remedy, as the Torah did not specify which offering is brought for a sin of the many. Therefore, the verse teaches us by means of the phrase “one law for you” that there is indeed an offering for the many who practiced idol worship. § After discussing different interpretations of the relevant verses, the Gemara addresses the details of the halakhot of the mishna. It first considers the numbers that comprise the structure of the mishna as a whole. The Sage Levi said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: Why does the tanna specifically teach the cases of fifteen women? Let him teach the cases of sixteen women, including the case of a rival wife of a forbidden relation. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to him: Judging by his question, it seems to me that this Sage has no brain in his head. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi proceeded to explain the question and the answer himself: What is your thinking? Is it that the tanna should have included the case of his mother who had been raped by his father? In the opinion of the Rabbis, a woman raped by one’s father is permitted in marriage to another of his sons. Consequently, it is possible that she might give birth to a son and later marry one of the other sons of the rapist. If her husband subsequently died childless, this woman would come before the brother of the deceased for levirate marriage, who is in this case her son. If so, there are in fact sixteen women with whom relations are forbidden. However, continued Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, this is incorrect, as the case of his mother raped by his father is a matter of dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis. According to Rabbi Yehuda, a woman raped by one’s father could never come before him for levirate marriage, as it is prohibited for her to marry his brothers. And the tanna of this mishna does not deal with disputed cases. The mishna enumerates only those cases that are accepted by all opinions, not those that are a matter of dispute. The Gemara asks: And does the tanna really not mention disputed cases? But there are the cases of a prohibition resulting from a mitzva of the Sages, and a prohibition stemming from sanctity. In other words, the tanna does refer to the cases of a woman who one is prohibited to marry by decree of the Sages, e.g., a distant secondary forbidden relation, and one who is prohibited due to a regular prohibition that preserves the sanctity of the Jewish people or the priesthood. These are cases concerning which Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis disagree whether these women are entirely exempt from both levirate marriage and ḥalitza like a forbidden relation, or whether the mitzva of levirate marriage does in fact apply but since the yavam may not marry her in practice, she must be released by ḥalitza. And yet these disputed cases are taught in the mishna. The Gemara responds: When we say that only accepted halakhot are included in the mishna, we are referring only to our present chapter, whereas the dispute between Rabbi Akiva and the Rabbis is stated in the second chapter. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But in this chapter it is stated that Beit Shammai permit rival wives to the brothers, as they hold that there is no prohibition against rival wives of those with whom relations are forbidden, and Beit Hillel prohibit this. Evidently, the first chapter does deal with disputed cases. The Gemara answers: When Beit Shammai express an opinion where Beit Hillel disagree, their opinion is considered as if it were not in the mishna, i.e., it is completely disregarded, as it is commonly accepted that the opinion of Beit Shammai is rejected and not ruled as halakha. Therefore, this cannot be considered a true dispute. The Gemara raises a further difficulty: But there is the case of a wife of a brother with whom he did not coexist, i.e., the yavam was not alive at the time of his brother’s death.