📜 Yoma — 11a

All the gates that were there on the east side of the Temple courtyard did not have a mezuza except for the Gate of Nicanor, as in the courtyard just inside the gate was the Chamber of Parhedrin, in which there is an obligation to affix a mezuza. Therefore, a mezuza was affixed to the gate as well. Let us say that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis and not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as, if it were in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, a difficulty arises. The principle is that decrees are issued only to prevent violation of a Torah prohibition. The fact that a mezuza was affixed to the Parhedrin chamber itself is due to a rabbinic decree, and will we then proceed to issue a decree to affix a mezuza on the gate before the chamber in order to prevent violation of the existing decree? The Gemara rejects this reasoning: Even if you say that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, it is not difficult, as the entire obligation to affix the mezuza on both the chamber and the gate is the result of a single decree. § Apropos the mezuza in the High Priest’s chamber, the Gemara discusses other halakhot of mezuza. The Sages taught with regard to the verse: “And you will write them upon the doorposts of your houses and upon your gates” (Deuteronomy 6:9): With regard to the gates of houses, and the gates of courtyards, and the gates of cities, and the gates of towns, all of them are obligated in the mitzva of mezuza in that place, due to the fact that it is stated: “And you will write them upon the doorposts of your houses and upon your gates.” Abaye said to Rav Safra: If there is an obligation to affix a mezuza on city gates, with regard to those city gates [abbulei] of Meḥoza, a city with a Jewish majority, what is the reason that the Sages did not affix a mezuza on them? Rav Safra said to him: Those gates are not the city gates. They are made as reinforcement to the fort [akra] of turrets above the gate, and therefore no mezuza is required. Abaye said to him: And shouldn’t the fort of turrets itself require a mezuza, since there is a residence for the prison guard in the fort? As, wasn’t a similar case taught in a baraita: A synagogue in which there is a residence for the synagogue attendant requires a mezuza? Although no one lives in the synagogue itself, since the attendant lives in an adjacent room, the synagogue requires a mezuza. Rather, Abaye said: The reason that no mezuza was affixed there was due to the danger involved. The gates of a city populated by Jews certainly require a mezuza; however, since gentiles live there as well, the danger is that the gentiles would suspect the Jews of witchcraft or espionage, as it was taught in a baraita: The mezuza belonging to an individual is examined twice every seven years to determine whether it was stolen or became disqualified. And in order to avoid excessive burden on the community, the mezuza belonging to the public is examined twice in a fifty-year Jubilee period. And Rabbi Yehuda said: There was an incident involving an examiner [artavin], who was examining mezuzot in the upper marketplace of Tzippori during a period when decrees were issued against the Jewish people, and a Roman official [kasdor] found him and collected a fine of one thousand zuz from him. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But didn’t Rabbi Elazar say that those on the path to perform a mitzva are not susceptible to harm throughout the process of performing the mitzva? The Gemara responds: In a place where danger is permanent it is different, as one should not rely on a miracle, as it is written with regard to God’s command to Samuel to anoint David as king in place of Saul: “And Samuel said: How will I go, and Saul will hear and kill me; and God said: Take in your hand a calf and say: I have come to offer a sacrifice to God” (I Samuel 16:2). Even when God Himself issues the command, there is concern with regard to a clear and present danger. § Rav Kahana taught a baraita before Rav Yehuda: A storehouse for hay, and a cattle barn, and a woodshed, and a storehouse are exempt from the obligation of mezuza, due to the fact that the women make use of them. And what is the meaning of the term: Make use? It means that the women bathe in them. Since women bathe there unclothed, it is inappropriate to affix a mezuza there. Rabbi Yehuda said to him: The reason that there is no requirement to affix a mezuza there is due to the fact that women bathe there; one can learn by inference that standard buildings of this kind, where women do not bathe, are obligated in the mitzva of affixing a mezuza there. But wasn’t it taught in a different baraita: A cattle barn is exempt from the obligation of mezuza, unrelated to whether or not women bathe there? Rather, the term should be understood otherwise. What is the meaning of the term: Make use? It means that the women adorn themselves there, and this is what the baraita is teaching: Although these structures are solid and clean to the extent that the women adorn themselves in them, they are exempt from the obligation of mezuza since they are not residences. Rav Kahana said to him: Are you saying that structures where the women adorn themselves are exempt from the mitzva of mezuza? But wasn’t it taught in a different baraita: A cattle stable is exempt from the obligation of mezuza, and a barn in which women adorn themselves is obligated in the mitzva of mezuza? Rather, what have you to say, that with regard to the requirement of mezuza the status of places where women adorn themselves is subject to a dispute between tanna’im? Just as there are different opinions in that case, in my opinion, the status of standard cattle barns is also subject to a dispute between tanna’im, as it was taught in a baraita that it is written: Upon the doorposts of your house, meaning your house that is designated as a residence, to the exclusion of a storehouse for hay, and a cattle barn, and a woodshed, and a storehouse, which are exempt from the mitzva of mezuza, and some obligate these structures in the mitzva of mezuza. Apparently, the Rabbis dispute the requirement of affixing a mezuza in a standard stable. Actually they said: There is a legal tradition that a building housing a bathroom, and a building housing a tannery [burseki], and a bathhouse, and a building housing a ritual bath for immersion, and any places of which women make use are exempt from the obligation of mezuza. This baraita is inconsistent with the opinions of both Rav Kahana and Rav Yehuda. Therefore, Rav Kahana interprets the baraita according to his line of reasoning, and Rav Yehuda interprets it according to his line of reasoning. Rav Kahana interprets it according to his line of reasoning: Your house means your house that is designated for your residence, to the exclusion of a storehouse for hay, and a cattle barn, and a woodshed, and a storehouse, which are exempt from the mitzva of mezuza in a case where their use is standard and they are not used for bathing or other immodest acts. And some obligate these structures in the mitzva of mezuza in a case where their use is standard. In truth they said the following with regard to a bathroom, and a tannery, and a bathhouse, and a ritual bath for immersion, and any places of which women make use; and what is the meaning of the term: Make use? It is that women bathe there. These places are exempt from the obligation of mezuza. The Gemara challenges this interpretation: If so, that make use in this context means bathe, this is identical to the bathhouse. Why would the baraita need to list both a bathhouse and a place where women bathe? The Gemara answers: The baraita teaches us the halakha with regard to the bathhouse of the public, and it teaches us the halakha with regard to the bathhouse of an individual. As it could enter your mind to say: A bathhouse of the public, whose filth is extensive, is exempt from mezuza; however, the bathhouse of an individual, whose filth is not extensive, as only women of that house bathe there, I would say it is obligated in the mitzva of affixing a mezuza. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that the bathhouse of an individual is also exempt. And Rav Yehuda interprets the baraita according to his line of reasoning, and this is what it is teaching: Your house means your house that is designated for your residence, to the exclusion of a storehouse for hay, and a cattle barn, and a woodshed, and a storehouse, which are exempt from the mitzva of mezuza even in a case where women adorn themselves there. And some obligate these structures in the mitzva of mezuza in a case where women adorn themselves there. However, in a case where use of the building is standard, everyone agrees that these structures are exempt from the mitzva of mezuza. In truth they said that a bathroom, and a tannery, and a bathhouse, and a ritual bath for immersion, even though women adorn themselves there, are exempt from the obligation of mezuza, because its filth is extensive. The Gemara asks: And according to Rav Yehuda, in cases where use of the building is standard, does everyone agree that a storehouse is exempt from the mitzva of mezuza? But wasn’t it taught in a baraita that it is written with regard to the mitzva to affix a mezuza: And upon your gates, meaning that with regard to the gates of houses, and the gates of courtyards, and the gates of cities, and the gates of towns, and a barn, and chicken coops, and a hay storehouse, and wine storehouses, and oil storehouses, all of them are obligated in the mitzva of mezuza? I might have thought that I include in the obligation of mezuza even