📜 Makkot — 3b

And even though now, during the Sabbatical Year, we do not yet read concerning his loan the prohibition: “He shall not exact it of his neighbor and his brother, because the Lord’s release has been proclaimed” (Deuteronomy 15:2), as the time for repayment has not yet arrived, ultimately, when the time for repayment arrives, he will come to a situation where the prohibition “He shall not exact it” applies. Therefore, like all other debts it is abrogated by the Sabbatical Year. Rav Kahana raises an objection from the mishna: Rather, the court estimates how much money a person would be willing to give so that he would keep a loan of one thousand dinars in his possession, and one calculates the difference between that sum in a situation where he would be required to give the money back from now until thirty days have passed, and that same sum in a situation where he would be required to give the money back from now until ten years have passed. And if you say that the Sabbatical Year abrogates a ten-year loan, the conspiring witnesses need to pay the borrower the entire sum of the loan as well, as their testimony sought to render the borrower liable to pay a debt that by right should be entirely forgiven. Rava said: What are we dealing with here in our mishna? We are dealing with debts that are not abrogated with the passing of the Sabbatical Year, e.g., in the case of one who lends money on the basis of collateral, or in the case of one who transfers his promissory notes to the court for collection. As we learned in a mishna (Shevi’it 10:2): In the cases of one who lends money on the basis of collateral and one who transfers his promissory notes to the court for collection, the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate those loans. In those cases, the debt would not have been forgiven during the Sabbatical Year. Therefore, the conspiring witnesses are not liable to pay the entire sum. There are those who state another version of this discussion: Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: In the case of one who lends money to another for a period of ten years, the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate the debt. And even though when the time for repayment arrives he will come to a situation where the prohibition “He shall not exact it” applies, now, in any event, during the Sabbatical Year we do not yet read the prohibition of “He shall not exact it” concerning his loan. Rav Kahana says: We learn this ruling in the mishna as well: The court estimates how much money a person would be willing to give so that a loan of one thousand dinars will be in his possession, and one calculates the difference between that sum in a situation where he would be required to give the money back from now until thirty days have passed, and that sum in a situation where he would be required to give the money back from now until ten years have passed. And if you say that the Sabbatical Year abrogates a ten-year loan, then the conspiring witnesses should pay the borrower the entire sum of the loan as well, as their testimony sought to render the borrower liable to pay a debt that by right should be entirely forgiven. The fact that they are not required to pay the entire sum proves that a ten-year loan is not abrogated by the Sabbatical Year. Rava said: No proof may be cited from there, as what are we dealing with here in our mishna? We are dealing with debts that are not abrogated with the passing of the Sabbatical Year, e.g., in the case of one who lends money on the basis of collateral, or in the case of one who transfers his promissory notes to the court for collection. As we learned in a mishna (Shevi’it 10:2): In the cases of one who lends money on the basis of collateral and one who transfers his promissory notes to the court for collection, the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate those loans. In those cases, the debt would not have been forgiven during the Sabbatical Year. Therefore, the conspiring witnesses are not liable to pay the entire sum. § And Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says with regard to abrogation of debts: In the case of one who says to another the stipulation: I am lending you money on the condition that the Sabbatical Year will not abrogate my debt, even if the borrower agrees to that stipulation, the Sabbatical Year abrogates the debt. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that Shmuel holds that the lender who proposed that stipulation is one who stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, and in the case of anyone who stipulates counter to that which is written in the Torah, his stipulation is voided. The Gemara asks: But wasn’t it stated that there is a dispute between Rav and Shmuel concerning this matter? In the case of one who says to another the stipulation: I am selling you this item on the condition that you have no claim of exploitation against me if I charge you more than the item is worth, Rav says: The buyer has a claim of exploitation against him, as one cannot stipulate to waive the halakha of exploitation. And Shmuel says: He has no claim of exploitation against him. Apparently, according to Shmuel, one may stipulate to waive a Torah law in monetary matters, as it is tantamount to waiving his rights to money due him and it is not in effect counter to that which is written in the Torah. The Gemara answers: Wasn’t it stated with regard to that halakha that Rav Anan said: It was explained to me personally by Shmuel himself that the matter depends on the formulation of the stipulation. If the seller stipulates: On the condition that you have no claim of exploitation against me, then the buyer has no claim of exploitation against him, as it is as though he is waiving his right to money due him. But if the seller stipulates: On the condition that there is no prohibition of exploitation in this transaction, there is a prohibition of exploitation in that transaction. Here too, if the lender stipulated to the borrower: I am lending you money on the condition that you will not abrogate the debt during the Sabbatical Year, the Sabbatical Year does not abrogate his debt, as the borrower is merely waiving money due him. But if he stipulated: On the condition that the Sabbatical Year will not abrogate my debt, the Sabbatical Year abrogates the debt, as that is a stipulation to nullify the halakha of the Sabbatical Year concerning that loan, and one may not stipulate counter to that which is written in the Torah. § Apropos the loan discussed in the mishna, the Gemara cites a Sage who taught: One who lends money to another for an unspecified period is not permitted to demand repayment from him less than thirty days after the loan took place. The Gemara comments: Rabba bar bar Ḥana, who was seated before Rav, thought to say: This statement applies only with regard to a loan with a promissory note, as a person does not typically exert himself to write a promissory note for a loan whose duration is less than thirty days. But with regard to a loan by oral agreement, no, it may be for less than thirty days. Rav said to him: This is what my uncle, Rabbi Ḥiyya, said: This halakha applies to both one who lends with a promissory note and one who lends by oral agreement. If one fails to establish a time for repayment of the loan, he may not demand repayment until thirty days have passed since the loan was given. The Gemara notes: That is also taught in a baraita: One who lends money to another for an unspecified period is not permitted to demand repayment from him less than thirty days after the loan took place, and that is the case with regard to both one who lends with a promissory note and one who lends by oral agreement. The Gemara relates: Shmuel said to Rav Mattana: You shall not sit on your feet until you have explained this halakha; explain it immediately. From where is this matter that the Sages stated derived: One who lends money to another for an unspecified period is not permitted to demand repayment from him less than thirty days after the loan took place, and that is the case with regard to both one who lends with a promissory note and one who lends by oral agreement? Rav Mattana said to him that it is derived from a verse, as it is written: “The seventh year, the Sabbatical Year, approaches” (Deuteronomy 15:9). The question arises: From the fact that it is stated: “The seventh year…approaches,” don’t I know that it is the Sabbatical Year? Rather, why must the verse state: “The Sabbatical Year”? It is to tell you that there is another period that is like the Sabbatical Year; and which period is it? It is the period in the case of one who lends money to another for an unspecified period, who is not permitted to demand repayment from him less than thirty days after the loan took place. During that period, as during the Sabbatical Year, one may not exact payment for his loan. In what sense can that period be characterized as a year? It is as the Master said: Thirty days in a year are considered a year. § And Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: One who unwittingly opens a new neck opening in a shirt on Shabbat by cutting through the fabric and threads that kept it closed is liable to bring a sin-offering. By creating the opening he renders the shirt fit to wear, thereby fashioning a utensil on Shabbat. Rav Kahana objects to this: And what is the difference between this and the stopper of a wine barrel, which the Sages permitted piercing on Shabbat in order to serve wine to guests? There too, by piercing the stopper he fashions a utensil. Rava said to him: The cases are not comparable: In this case, that of the neck opening of a shirt, the material closing the neck hole is considered a connecting element, i.e., it is an organic part of the weave of the fabric; and in that case, that of the stopper of the barrel, the stopper is not considered a connecting element, as its purpose is to be removed from the barrel. § And Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: In the case of three log of drawn water into which one sixty-fourth of a log [kortov] of wine fell, and the color of the water is like the color of wine, and that liquid fell into a ritual bath containing less than forty se’a, although the Sages ruled that three log of drawn water invalidate a ritual bath, in this case the liquid does not invalidate it, because the halakhic status of the liquid that fell into the ritual bath is that of wine, and wine does not invalidate a ritual bath. Rav Kahana objects to this: And what is the difference between this case of water into which wine fell and the case of dye water, as we learned in a mishna (Mikvaot 7:3): Rabbi Yosei says: Dye water in the amount of three log invalidates a ritual bath? The wine, like the dye, colors the water. Rava said to him: The difference is that there the mixture is called dye water, where the water maintains the status of water; here it is called diluted wine. The Gemara asks with regard to Rav’s statement: But didn’t Rabbi Ḥiyya teach that three log of water into which a kortov of wine fell reduce the ritual bath into a state where it is no longer valid? Rava said that this baraita is not difficult, as this statement of Rav is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri, and that baraita taught by Rabbi Ḥiyya is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Nuri. As we learned in a mishna (Mikvaot 7:5): In a case where there are three log of drawn water