Houllin 15b — Talmud de Babylone

▶ 📖 Mishna it is in a case where one had a critically ill person in his household while it was still day, before Shabbat, as it is …

it is in a case where one had a critically ill person in his household while it was still day, before Shabbat, as it is permitted to slaughter the animal for such a person even on Shabbat. Therefore, the unslaughtered animal was not set aside from use. The Gemara asks: If so, what is the reason that Rabbi Yehuda prohibited consumption of the meat on Shabbat? The Gemara answers: He issued this ruling in a case where one had a critically ill person in his household before Shabbat and that person recovered. In that case, although the unslaughtered animal was not set aside from use when Shabbat began, it is prohibited to slaughter it on Shabbat. According to Rabbi Yehuda, if he slaughtered it unwittingly, its consumption is prohibited on Shabbat. And that which Rav silenced the tanna for not stating that an unslaughtered animal is set aside from use, even when the prohibited labor of slaughter was performed unwittingly, is in accordance with that which Rav Aḥa bar Adda says that Rav says, and some say it is that which Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Adda says that Rav says: In the case of one who slaughters an animal to feed an ill person on Shabbat, it is prohibited for a healthy person to partake of the slaughtered animal on Shabbat. In a case of one who cooks food to feed an ill person on Shabbat, it is permitted for a healthy person to partake of that food. What is the reason for this distinction? This food was fit to be chewed before it was cooked, and therefore it was not set aside from use when Shabbat began, and the meat of that animal was not fit to be chewed before the animal was slaughtered, and therefore it was set aside from use when Shabbat began. Rav Pappa says: There are times when one slaughters for an ill person on Shabbat and it is permitted for a healthy person to eat the meat on Shabbat, such as where he had a critically ill person in his household before Shabbat and the animal was designated for slaughter while it was still day, before Shabbat; in that case, it was not set aside from use. And there are times when one cooks on Shabbat for an ill person and it is prohibited for a healthy person to eat the food on Shabbat, such as where one cut a gourd that was attached to the ground for the ill person on Shabbat. Because it is prohibited to detach the gourd on Shabbat, it is set aside from use and forbidden. Rav Dimi of Neharde’a says that the halakha is: In the case of one who slaughters for an ill person on Shabbat, it is permitted for a healthy person to eat the raw meat [be’umtza]. What is the reason that it is permitted? Since it is impossible for an olive-bulk of meat to be permitted without slaughter of the entire animal, when he slaughters the animal, he slaughters it with the ill person in mind. Since slaughter of the animal was permitted, all its meat is permitted even for a healthy person. In the case of one who cooks for an ill person on Shabbat, it is prohibited for a healthy person to eat the food on Shabbat. What is the reason that it is prohibited? It is due to a rabbinic decree lest he increase the amount of food that he is cooking on behalf of the healthy person. In the case of one who slaughters an animal with the smooth side of a hand sickle, which has both a smooth and a serrated side, or with a sharpened flint, or with a reed that was cut lengthwise and sharpened, his slaughter is valid. All slaughter [hakkol shoḥatin], and one may always slaughter, and one may slaughter with any item that cuts, except for the serrated side of the harvest sickle, a saw, the teeth of an animal when attached to its jawbone, and a fingernail, because they are serrated and they consequently strangle the animal and do not cut its windpipe and gullet as required.

▶ 💬 Guemara The Gemara notes that the language of the mishna, which states: One who slaughters an animal with a hand sickle, with a …

The Gemara notes that the language of the mishna, which states: One who slaughters an animal with a hand sickle, with a flint, or with a reed, rather than: One may slaughter, indicates that after the fact, yes, the slaughter is valid, but one may not slaughter with those blades ab initio. The Gemara asks: Granted, one may not slaughter it with a hand sickle, lest he come to perform the slaughter with the other, serrated, side; but as a flint and a reed have no serrated side, is it so that one may not slaughter with those ab initio? And the Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita: One may slaughter with any item that cuts, whether with a flint, or with glass shards, or with the stalk of a reed. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. There, where the baraita permits slaughter ab initio, it is referring to slaughter with a flint and a reed when they are detached. Here, where the mishna says that the slaughter is valid only after the fact, it is referring to slaughter with a flint and a reed when they are attached to the ground, as Rav Kahana says: In the case of one who slaughters with a blade that is attached to the ground, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems the slaughter not valid and Rabbi Ḥiyya deems it valid. The Gemara infers: Even Rabbi Ḥiyya deems the slaughter valid only after the fact; but one may not do so ab initio. In accordance with which opinion did you interpret the mishna? Is it in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya, and the slaughter is valid after the fact? But if so, with regard to that which is taught in a baraita: One may slaughter with any item that cuts, whether with a blade that is detached from the ground or with a blade that is attached to the ground, whether the knife is above and the neck of the animal is below or the knife is below and the neck of the animal is above; in accordance with whose opinion is it? It is in accordance neither with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi nor with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya. If one would claim that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya, he says: After the fact, yes, the slaughter is valid, but it is not permitted to slaughter in this manner ab initio. If one would claim that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, he says: Even after the fact, the slaughter is not valid. The Gemara answers: Actually, the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya, and he permits slaughter with these blades even ab initio. And the fact that the opinions of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Ḥiyya were formulated such that they disagree concerning the halakha after the fact is to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi that the slaughter is not valid even after the fact. But rather, the mishna here, which teaches: With regard to one who slaughters, after the fact, yes, it is valid, but it is not ab initio, in accordance with whose opinion is it? It is in accordance neither with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi nor with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya. If one would claim that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya, he says: The slaughter is permitted even ab initio. If one would claim that it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, he says: Even after the fact, the slaughter is not valid. The Gemara answers: Actually, Rabbi Ḥiyya holds that it is permitted to slaughter with these blades, and even ab initio; and the mishna here, which teaches: One who slaughters, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. The Gemara objects: This is difficult, as there is a contradiction between one statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and another statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as in his dispute with Rabbi Ḥiyya he holds that the slaughter is not valid. The Gemara answers: This contradiction is not difficult. There, in his dispute with Rabbi Ḥiyya, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that slaughter is not valid in a case where the blade was attached from the outset; here, in the mishna, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi deems the slaughter valid after the fact in a case where the blade was detached and ultimately he reattached it. The Gemara asks: And from where do you say that there is a difference for us between a blade that was attached from the outset and a blade that was detached and ultimately he reattached it? As it is taught in a baraita: With regard to one who slaughters with a mechanism [bemukhni] of a wheel with a knife attached to it, his slaughter is valid; with an item that is attached to the ground, his slaughter is valid; if one embedded a knife in a wall and slaughtered with it, his slaughter is valid. If there was a flint emerging from a wall or a reed arising from the ground on its own and he slaughtered with it, his slaughter is not valid.

▶ 🇫🇷 Résumé en français La Guemara note que le langage de la mishna, qui dit : Celui qui égorge un animal avec une faucille à main, avec un sile…

La Guemara note que le langage de la mishna, qui dit : Celui qui égorge un animal avec une faucille à main, avec un silex, ou avec un roseau, plutôt que : On peut égorger, indique que après coup, oui, l’abattage est valide, mais on ne peut pas égorger avec ces lames ab initio. La Guemara demande : D’accord, on ne peut pas égorger avec une faucille à main, de peur qu’il n’en vienne à effectuer l’abattage avec l’autre côté dentelé ; mais en ce qui concerne un silex et un roseau, qui n’ont pas de côté dentelé, est-il vrai qu’on ne peut pas égorger avec ceux-ci ab initio ? Et la Guemara souleve une contradiction à partir d’une baraita : On peut égorger avec tout objet qui coupe, que ce soit avec un silex, ou avec des éclats de verre, ou avec la tige d’un roseau. La Guemara répond : Ce n’est pas difficile. Là, où la baraita permet l’abattage ab initio, il s’agit d’égorger avec un silex et un roseau lorsqu’ils sont détachés. Ici, où la mishna dit que l’abattage n’est valide qu’après coup, il s’agit d’égorger avec un silex et un roseau lorsqu’ils sont attachés au sol, comme le dit Rav Kahana : Dans le cas de celui qui égorge avec une lame qui est attachée au sol, Rabbi Yehouda HaNassi juge l’abattage non valide et Rabbi Ḥiyya le juge valide. La Guemara en déduit : Même Rabbi Ḥiyya ne juge l’abattage valide qu’après coup ; mais on ne peut pas le faire ab initio. Selon quelle opinion as-tu interprété la mishna ? Est-ce selon l’opinion de Rabbi Ḥiyya, et l’abattage est valide après coup ? Mais si c’est le cas, en ce qui concerne ce qui est enseigné dans une baraita : On peut égorger avec tout objet qui coupe, que ce soit avec une lame qui est détachée du sol ou avec une lame qui est attachée au sol, que le couteau soit au-dessus et le cou de l’animal en dessous, ou que le couteau soit en dessous et le cou de l’animal au-dessus ; selon l’opinion de qui est-ce ? Ce n’est ni selon l’opinion de Rabbi Yehouda HaNassi ni selon l’opinion de Rabbi Ḥiyya. Si l’on prétend que c’est selon l’opinion de Rabbi Ḥiyya, il dit : Après coup, oui, l’abattage est valide, mais il n’est pas permis d’égorger de cette manière ab initio. Si l’on prétend que c’est selon l’opinion de Rabbi Yehouda HaNassi, il dit : Même après coup, l’abattage n’est pas valide. La Guemara répond : En réalité, la baraita est selon l’opinion de Rabbi Ḥiyya, et il permet d’égorger avec ces lames même ab initio. Et le fait que les opinions de Rabbi Yehouda HaNassi et de Rabbi Ḥiyya aient été formulées de sorte qu’ils disputent concernant la halakha après coup est pour te faire connaître l’étendue de l’opinion de Rabbi Yehouda HaNassi, selon laquelle l’abattage n’est pas valide même après coup. Mais plutôt, la mishna ici, qui enseigne : En ce qui concerne celui qui égorge, après coup, oui, c’est valide, mais ce n’est pas ab initio, selon l’opinion de qui est-ce ? Ce n’est ni selon l’opinion de Rabbi Yehouda HaNassi ni selon l’opinion de Rabbi Ḥiyya. Si l’on prétend que c’est selon l’opinion de Rabbi Ḥiyya, il dit : L’abattage est permis même ab initio. Si l’on prétend que c’est selon l’opinion de Rabbi Yehouda HaNassi, il dit : Même après coup, l’abattage n’est pas valide. La Guemara répond : En réalité, Rabbi Ḥiyya tient qu’il est permis d’égorger avec ces lames, et même ab initio ; et la mishna ici, qui enseigne : Celui qui égorge, est selon l’opinion de Rabbi Yehouda HaNassi. La Guemara objecte : C’est difficile, car il y a une contradiction entre une déclaration de Rabbi Yehouda HaNassi et une autre déclaration de Rabbi Yehouda HaNassi, car dans sa dispute avec Rabbi Ḥiyya, il tient que l’abattage n’est pas valide. La Guemara répond : Cette contradiction n’est pas difficile. Là, dans sa dispute avec Rabbi Ḥiyya, Rabbi Yehouda HaNassi tient que l’abattage n’est pas valide dans un cas où la lame était attachée dès le départ ; ici, dans la mishna, Rabbi Yehouda HaNassi juge l’abattage valide après coup dans un cas où la lame était détachée et finalement il l’a réattachée. La Guemara demande : Et d’où dis-tu qu’il y a pour nous une différence entre une lame qui était attachée dès le départ et une lame qui était détachée et finalement il l’a réattachée ? Comme il est enseigné dans une baraita : En ce qui concerne celui qui égorge avec un mécanisme [bemukhni] d’une roue à laquelle un couteau est attaché, son abattage est valide ; avec un objet qui est attaché au sol, son abattage est valide ; si quelqu’un a enfoncé un couteau dans un mur et a égorgé avec, son abattage est valide. S’il y avait un silex émergeant d’un mur ou un roseau poussant du sol de lui-même et qu’il a égorgé avec, son abattage n’est pas valide.

📜 Houllin — 15b

📋 Références bibliques — Houllin 15b

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